

VOL. V.

No. 9.

The Journal

OF

PHILOLOGY.

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CAMBRIDGE.

London and Cambridge:

MACMILLAN AND CO.

DEIGHTON, BELL AND CO. CAMBRIDGE.

1873.

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.

DR KENNEDY ON SOPHOCLES.

Ὅσον ἑσμὸν...ἐπεγείρετε.

PLAT. *Rep.*

IN leaving Plato to return to Sophocles after many years, I had forgotten the magnitude of the peril. For, in the Platonic country, not only has the air been cleared by the spirit of the master, but there is a certain kindliness engendered by the fewness of those who cultivate the ground. Φιλοφρονούμεθα δι' ἑρημίαν. But the region of Attic tragedy has been so long occupied and fenced about, and that by a race of giants, that the simple traveller, whose one object is to note the features of the country, may find himself compelled at unawares to try a fall with some Antaeus, and may have to pay dearly for his rashness in having crossed the sacred boundary, even if in his discomfiture he have the satisfaction of murmuring to himself that his adversary, like certain persons in the *Lysis*, ὑποβαρβαρίζει. The shrine of the Muses in these parts is hard by that of Achelous, so that you may chance to be swept away by the torrent if you approach too near. And the Heroön of Dr Bentley is not far off.

Dr Kennedy, however, is a goodnatured (if not quite a
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good-humoured) giant. He threatens terribly, but his anger dissolves in blessing. "You are so discourteous," he says in effect, "so ungenerous, so good-for-nothing that"—"I will point out your errors!" A pleasant *bathos* indeed! I shall certainly not repent of having rushed into print (εἰκόστω ἔτει, as I may almost say), perhaps not adequately even of my "ungenerous" conduct, if I can have the mistakes of my edition pointed out to me by Dr Kennedy, who is an excellent touchstone, having knowledge and outspokenness, and being really, I think, not unfriendly to myself. For he has told me that in interpreting Sophocles I am more often right than wrong, and this is no faint praise. I may almost assume that when Dr Kennedy agrees with me, I am right. And where he differs, whether on re-consideration I hold to my opinion or not, my book will have the advantage of attentive criticism.

But this is unseemly lightness. I must not forget that I am labouring under a "grave imputation."

I. I do not admit that in adding one more to the many editions of Sophocles, I was bound at every step to define my position relatively to those who have preceded me. My object has been to give my own opinion of the meaning wherever I thought that there could be any doubt, and to indicate the grounds of my opinion so far as this seemed necessary for the sake of clearness. It now appears that I have sometimes failed in this. "Brevis esse laboro; Obscurus fio." For this error, if it be one, I have only to plead that the brevity was not altogether of my own choosing. I wrote within strict limits, imposed on me, perhaps wisely, by the Clarendon press. If within these limits it was possible to be more intelligible, I have missed my purpose. For I certainly desired to be understood. But I refuse to plead this enforced shortness as an excuse for the omission of distinguished names¹, though it may have often been a cause of such omissions. For there is a gain to the student in clearing our notes to the classics as much as possible from the element of authority, and in asking

¹ Amongst these would have been that of Mr R. C. Jebb, Public Orator of Cambridge, certainly one of the most graceful scholars of our time.

him to consider what is said in each instance rather than by whom. There is of course a certain penalty which an editor must pay for such recklessness. He cannot expect to have much credit for originality, at least in detail. He will often be thought to have borrowed, where his judgment has coincided with another, and to have ignored suggestions which he has rejected after long consideration. But it is better that he should suffer this amount of loss than that the attention both of editor and reader should be distracted, by mere personalities, from the meaning of the author. "But," it will be said, "there ought to be a list of authorities in the Preface." I do not see the necessity for this in an edition of Sophocles. It is time that it should be held as a matter of course that the new editor has not formed his judgment without consulting previous editions. The sources of an edition of Sophocles in the present day are patent to all. I have probably taken too little from them rather than too much, but I have no wish to "*suppress*" my obligations to them. I am fully sensible how much, in this kind of commentary, must be matter of tradition, and that there must be many debts, which it would be impossible for me to acknowledge in detail, as for instance to Professor Lushington, of Glasgow, with whom I read the *Oedipus Tyrannus* in the winter of 1847—8¹. If any authorities are to be mentioned, I think those have the strongest claim which are recent or comparatively unknown or hitherto not sufficiently recognised. And generally I think that a paper in a scientific journal, such as Dr Kennedy's, has a stronger claim to notice than an edition that is more readily accessible. But Dr Kennedy's contributions to Sophocles have been so long known, and some of them have been so much discussed by scholars, that one is naturally led to place them on a level with the editions.

I have been pleading hitherto for a certain division of labour. The interpreter who forms his own judgment on the materials before him, which he may have used more or less exhaustively, and lays that judgment open to criticism, has

¹ I must be content to share Dr Kennedy's blame with Schneidewin, who (eighteen years ago) was, however,

allowed to pass with the observation that his proceeding in omitting authorities was "neither fair nor wise."

made a certain contribution, though it be a modest one, to the knowledge of his subject. The man who undertakes to estimate the labours of his predecessors and to adjust their relation to his own, is one who may be described as "a laborious and not very fortunate person," but he has undertaken a different task. That task, however, I have undertaken, and hope to execute it according to my ability. But as the most delicate and thorny part of my work (how much it is so I only now begin to perceive) I had reserved it for my second volume. And it is a flattering thought that this announcement may conspire even with the love of Sophocles to create "anxiety" in the serene breasts of mighty scholars. Meanwhile I may fairly claim that it should be borne in mind, when any fault of omission is in question, that my edition of Sophocles, like Dr Kennedy's article, is "to be continued."

This is all I care to say on the question of citation. The only concern which I feel about it on personal grounds is the desire to have it understood that what is censured in my procedure in this matter has arisen out of a theory which I hold: and not from any failure of respect for one whom I have long been taught to regard as amongst the foremost of living Grecians, and as a most generous and high-minded English gentleman. The tacit compliment that is implied in his thinking it a matter of importance to the cause of literature, whether he is fairly treated in my book or not, would be a source of unmingled gratification to me, but for the pain of seeing that I have unintentionally wounded him. And I frankly own that I feel a certain regret, when I think that a slight difference of treatment would perhaps have won for me his full and hearty recognition.

II. For in our principles of interpretation it would really seem that we are at one. At least I can hardly take exception to Dr Kennedy's statement of his design.

"To shew the possibility of solving many difficulties of ancient literature, by applying to them a logical method of criticism: that is, by first observing what the nexus of thought in the place requires, and then carefully considering whether from the existing text the sense so required can be reasonably drawn."

So far as this means that the context must have the first place in determining the sense, every word of it has my most hearty concurrence. Only two expressions require some explanation. By "a logical method of criticism" applied to poetry Dr Kennedy does not mean that we are to ask "what it proves." And by the "nexus of thought" he does not mean the accidental interlacing of the branches, but the vital correlation of leaf, branch and stem. I say this because some of his reasoning might give the opposite impression.

Instead, however, of using these two phrases, which are rather cumbrous and possibly misleading, I would prefer to speak simply of "context." Now the law of context is different in different kinds, and in different authors of the same kind. No one requires that the logic or connexion of ideas should be similar or similarly rendered in a piece of music and in a public speech, in Wagner and Mendelssohn, in Gladstone and Bright. The "logic" of Hamlet's soliloquy is different from that which may be discerned in the conversation of Imlac with the Prince of Abyssinia. And the first rule of interpretation is to ascertain the nature (or, as Plato would say, the *εἶδος*) of this connexion in the author who is to be interpreted.

The connexion of a passage in Sophocles is always severely harmonious, but the harmony is ruled, not by what is commonly understood under the name of logic, but by dramatic and poetic feeling. What are the elements of this harmony? For these will give us the elementary laws of our interpretation.

There is first the *leading motive* of each tragedy, which, in every play of Sophocles, inspires and permeates the whole. Hardly a line in any of the seven can safely be studied without reference to the *plot*, since every touch contributes, in due subordination, to the main effect. But this prime rule may be easily abused, as has been the case notably in the *Oedipus Rex*, unless full account be taken, secondly, of the *situation*. When the Scholiast on O. T. 337, tells us that Teiresias, in saying *τὴν σὴν δ' ὁμοῦ | ναλοῦσαν οὐ κατείδες*, is alluding to Jocasta, no verbal criticism is needed to enable us to reject such a view. Further, in studying the connexion, the *characters* must not be

lost sight of, for they are always preserved. And so we come to the drift, or main feeling, of the particular scene, of the speech, of the paragraph, of the words immediately preceding and following. In reading Sophocles, as in rendering a piece of music, it is a capital fault ever to lose the key-note. And as there is a key-note of the whole composition, so there may be a special mood of the particular movement. This brings me lastly to the question of emphasis. Without insisting on the view, that the former of two words is commonly the more emphatic, I assert strongly, that (excepting sudden interjectional utterances such as Ant. 32), the *following* sentence is connected, not with the concluding words of that which *precedes*, but with whatever is felt to be most important in it. This dwells in the mind and naturally calls up the next thought. Hence frequent trajections or "hyperbata" of clauses as well as of words. By requiring the minute verbal correspondence of antecedent with consequent in such cases, we should not only be in danger of "æsthetical sins," but should destroy the simple strength and essential "logic" of the connexion. We should often be doing as Nature would do, if she took to hanging boughs on twigs. This short-sighted logic has led many a Byzantine critic into error, and has been a fertile source of the corruption of texts.

III. Professor Kennedy dwells at length on three passages. The first of these is Oed. Tyr. 44, 45, which he interprets thus: "I see that men of experience are also most accustomed to compare their counsels together."

1. I hold that this interpretation is frigid and out of place. It drops the tone of entreaty to introduce a parenthetical caution, so injuring the effect both of ll. 40—46, and ll. 47—51, and destroying the impressiveness of the transition to the tone of warning which I have noticed in l. 47. The caution itself is rudely inconsistent with the laudatory tone which is the key-note of ll. 33—46. Oedipus, who solved the riddle of the sphinx without information or suggestion from any Theban (ll. 37—39), is supposed to need "comparison of counsels" with other minds before he can find help against the plague.

But the logic of the passage is urged, and by this is meant chiefly the connexion with the immediately preceding words, εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἰσθά πού. Dr Kennedy has not observed that my interpretation of these words is different from his own. To complete their sense he seems to supply φήμην ἀκούσας. I supply ἀλκὴν from the main sentence. He takes πού as an indefinite adverb of manner, I, as an indefinite adverb of place. The argument from the logic of these words (even granting its importance) will be answered, if I make good my interpretation of them. So much for the general and immediate context. Now for the words themselves.

Dr Kennedy lays great stress on ζώσας. He seems to imagine that because poets can speak of a storm, or a calamity, or the Eternal Laws, or the oracular voice from Pytho, as having life and power, therefore Sophocles, when he wanted to say calmly, "Wise men are wont to take counsel together," was capable of expressing himself thus, "The habit of comparing counsels *lives* amongst experienced men." He may find persons to agree with him, perhaps many: ἐγὼ δὲ εἰς ὧν οὐ ζυμφέρομαι. This would seem to me a trivial use of a rare and impressive metaphor. For I cannot persuade myself that the use of ζῆν in such passages is other than figurative, or that a *metaphor* so seldom employed has already passed into an ordinary prosaic word. I am unwilling to admit that the laws so finely personified in the Antigone are there only said to be "*in viridi observantiâ*," or that the "storms of calamity" in Aeschylus are merely spoken of as a "prevailing" wind. Something more is meant of the oracular voices in the Tyrannus than that they retain their accustomed value, something more of virtue in Euripides than that it remains in operation. Here is the gist of my remark, that Dr Kennedy's interpretation increases the difficulty of ζώσας.

Now, does τὰς ζυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων mean "the habit of conferring counsels"? I do not say this is impossible. I am glad to own that in this and other instances Dr Kennedy shows an acute perception of the *fluxile* diction of Sophocles. But the word ζυμφορὰ in the sense of "event" is so extremely common, that strong reasons would be required for giving to it

here a new *etymological* sense. And (although this is a matter of feeling) the phrase wears a strained and un-Sophoclean aspect.

Before considering my own interpretation, I am obliged to notice that of Mr Shilleto, who, without seeming to be aware that he is differing from Dr Kennedy, interprets *ζώσας* as I do. I am glad to have this confirmation from one so distinguished in being "laudatus a laudato viro," for what Dr Kennedy pronounces to be inadmissible. But whatever objection may be raised against "the events of counsels being alive," i.e. "prosperous," would seem to lie with greater force against "the conference of counsels being alive," i.e. "prospering," or "being effective."

I will not follow Dr Kennedy's example in attempting to state my adversary's case for him. No one can state his case more effectively or pointedly than he has done. But I will now try to explain my own view of the passage, and then to defend my view.

I think that in lines 42, 3, the priest, after lauding Oedipus' former wisdom, is intended by the poet to suggest the two courses which Oedipus by his own unaided counsel actually took, viz. to send to Delphi, and to seek aid from Teiresias. In both cases no doubt the aid sought is in the form of advice, or rather direction, but in neither is any "conference of counsels" in question.

Further, I think that *που* in this and other hypothetical sentences has the locative meaning: i.e. that *εἴ που* signifies not "if, as is possible" (which involves an awkward condensation), but "if anywhere" (Phil. 44), or with a slight transference "if on any occasion" (Aj. 521), or as, I think, here, "if in any quarter."

And I would paraphrase the two lines thus: "to find some help for us, whether help from any god, or help from a man, if you know of help in any quarter from a man." Compare the similarly alternative appeal to Teiresias in 310, 311, *μήτ' ἀπ' οἰόνων φάτιν μήτ' εἴ τιw' ἄλλην μαντικῆς ἔχεις ὁδόν*. (Most of this is already given in my notes, but seems to have been *φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσιν*.) Then I connect the following line, not

immediately with the little clause *εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἴσθα πού*, but, as more frequently happens, with the main tenour of what precedes. "We beseech thee to find some help for us, for I see" (the priest is the coryphæus of the suppliants and passes easily to the singular verb) "that experienced men are most successful in their plans."

I say that the simplicity of such a maxim is no objection to its use here, and I quote a sentence from Herodotus (who has so many correspondences with Sophocles) to the effect that "likely plans are likely to succeed." He distinguishes there between the likeliness of the plans, and the blessing of providence on them: and I maintain that no Greek of the 5th century B.C. would feel that there was anything strange in distinguishing between the wisdom or excellence of a plan and the happiness of its issue¹.

Having thus *in transitu* disposed of the interpretation of *καὶ*, I pass on to consider my interpretation of *ζώσας*. I have admitted in my notes that this word presents some difficulty under either interpretation. But I presume that if *ζῆν* can mean "to be prosperous," there is no great harshness in predicating this of actions as well as of persons, and of the results of actions as well as of the actions. Now I observe, first, that in each of the metaphorical uses of *ζῆν*, there is a slight shade of difference in the meaning, relative to the thing spoken of. The storms of calamity do not abate their violence, the oracles do not cease to threaten, the laws maintain their authority. Why may not the results of counsel "prosper" or be full of success? [To the metaphorical uses of *ζῆν* should be added *El.* 1419, *ζῶσιν οἱ γὰρ ὑπαὶ κείμενοι*. *Trach.* 1169, *χρόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι καὶ παρόντι νῦν*. Time is frequently personified in Sophocles. *Fr. Inc.* 717 (Nauck), *ζῶντι ποδὶ χρώμενος*.]

There is also an *emphatic* use of *ζῆν* which has not been sufficiently noticed. As applied to persons, it often approaches the significance of *εὖ ζῆν*, i.e. "to enjoy the fulness of life." I trace this shade of meaning with more or less of certainty in

¹ I do not except even the real Socrates. See, however, the difficulty which the Platonic Socrates has in

convincing his hearers of the identity of *σοφία* and *εὐτυχία* in *Euthyd.* 280.

the following passages of Sophocles: Dan. fr. vi. 171 Nauck, ζῆ, πῖνε, φέρβου. Fr. Inc. 753 Nauck, τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἐστίν. Phil. 1021, σὺ μὲν γέγηθας ζῶν. Antig. 1169, καὶ ζῆ τύραννον σχῆμ' ἔχων. O. C. 1147, ζώσας, ἀκραιφνεῖς τῶν κατηπειλημένων. Trach. 235, ἰσχύοντα τε καὶ ζῶντα καὶ θαλλόντα. O. T. 1188, ὡς ὑμᾶς ἴσα καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ζώσας ἐναριθμῶ. El. 156: οἷα Χρυσόθεμις ζῶει. ib. 456, ζῶντ' ἐπεμβῆναι ποδί. ib. 811, ζῶντα τιμωρόν.

When these two facts are connected, first that ζῆν has sometimes the figurative meaning "to have power," and this with various modifications; secondly, that ζῆν has often the *emphatic* meaning, "to live successfully," I do not feel much difficulty in interpreting the passage as I have done. For I do not admit that in joining τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων there is any difficulty at all, especially since the genitive is added after an interval to complete the expression. The passage in Thucydides is sufficiently parallel, and according to Dr Kennedy's own method the phrase may be resolved into τὰ βουλευμάτων αὐτοῖς ξυμφέρει (or ξυμφέρεται) ταύτη. And the ξυμφοραὶ may be said to "live," just as in El. 999, the δαίμων is said ἀπορρεῖν, "to fade away."

2. The second of the interpretations, on each of which Dr Kennedy stakes his reputation as a scholar, is that of O. C. 308, 9. I certainly do not mean to "offer a similar *sponsio*" on any single passage, for though I have some faith in my method, my application of it may be not infallible. But, in the present instance, my reputation seems to be endangered in another way. For I am accused of the unpardonable sin of unintelligent plagiarism, ὅπερ χρή καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς κλέψῃ.

Without insisting here on my theory, which I have already enunciated, I should like to state the fact, for the satisfaction of Dr Kennedy and those who may be inclined to agree with him.

First, then, I did not take the general explanation from Dr Kennedy, and, secondly, our interpretations are essentially and widely different.

There was a time when I prided myself more on origin-

ality in Sophoclean interpretation than I do now. When my attention was called to Dr Kennedy's papers by the late Mr Conington, soon after they appeared, I know that I had previously communicated to that gentleman several interpretations of Sophocles which we both thought to be original¹. I am as certain as I can be of any minute fact so far remote that my present explanation of O. C. 308, 9, was one of them. And, unless memory deceives me, on perusing what Dr Kennedy had written on this passage, I was more struck with the difference of the two interpretations than with their resemblance. Indeed, if I had "lippeden," as the Scotch say, to commentators of any sort in those days, I need not have gone further, for what he calls the general explanation, than to the Scholiast, who, in saying φίλος, ἀντὶ τοῦ χρήσιμος, is surely directing a "covert polemic" against those who referred τίς γὰρ—φίλος to ἐμοί. That I cannot remember the time when I was guilty of this enormity, is a fact which I hope may soften the asperity of Dr Kennedy's resentment against me, for the greater offence of having seemed to ignore the partial coincidence of our views.

Beyond this point, my interpretation is almost entirely different from Dr Kennedy's. We both follow the Scholiast², who interprets φίλος, χρήσιμος, in taking the words τίς γὰρ—φίλος to mean "Goodness is profitable to the good man." But it is evident to me that this interpreter rightly connected the γνώμη with the *main current* of the preceding sentence, namely, with the assertion, couched in the form of a hope, that the princely condescension of Theseus, in visiting the poor blind man, would be fraught with blessing to the city, whose interests were inseparable from Theseus' own. It appears to me to involve a radical misconception, as well as a breach of the law of parsimony, where a motive can be supplied from the general feeling of the play, from the immediate situation, and from the drift of the preceding words, to intercalate a strain

¹ Professor Conington's paper on Sophocles in the *Journal of Philology*, for 1854, has been neglected by me equally with Dr Kennedy's. I have not stated

either the coincidence of our views on Ant. 310, 311, or the grounds on which I dissent from his other suggestions.

² This applies also to O. T. 1085.

of reflection, in itself, no doubt, "signally beautiful" (so beautiful, as to be hardly præ-Platonic), but having no relevancy either to the immediate situation or to the whole of the action. Oedipus is not there to be a teacher of absolute morality, or to enforce the doctrine of the Gorgias before the time. But he is there to find peace and rest and to bless Athens. That in blessing Athens he will bless Theseus, is a proposition, which, while it is repeatedly assumed by Oedipus in the course of the tragedy (I might have added to my citations ll. 1508, 9, and 1518, 9), I conceive to have been more self-evident to an Athenian audience than to the modern reader. Indeed the feeling which by an inseparable association was called up by the expression $\tau\eta\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\iota$ (cp. Plato, Rep. II. 380 B) was such as to render any direct mention of the individual superfluous. I am far from denying, however, that some mental expansion of the preceding words is necessary in order to account for $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$. According to my view the expression is considerably condensed. Oedipus has no doubt that the coming of Theseus will be a blessing to Athens. His chief anxiety is that (according to the assurance of the chorus) Theseus may come. But in speaking to those who could not have understood his real thought, he expresses his anxiety and his confidence in a single prayer, "Let him come and bless me and his own city." From this it is not difficult to elicit the *hypothetical* sentence, "If he comes, he will be a blessing to his own city." But this is not all. The missing $\alpha\acute{\iota}\tau\omega$ is not utterly suppressed. It is implied in $\epsilon\upsilon\tau\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$, which strikes the *key-note*. For it would be pleonastic to say $\epsilon\upsilon\tau\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\tau\omega$. And I may own that Dr Kennedy's strictures have here suggested what I believe to be the true motive for the substitution of the adjective for the adverb in this passage.

3. It is, of course, with a sort of tremor that I contradict the former Head-master of Shrewsbury School on a point relating to the structure of Greek Iambic Verse. But I can have no hesitation in asserting, as strongly as I am able, that Sophocles never could have written in *Antigone*, 31, 32 :

Κρέοντά φασι τὸν ἀγαθὸν τοιαῦτα σοὶ
κάμοί.....κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν,

and that he *can* have written what stands in my text, provided always that σοι does not depend upon ἀγαθόν, but upon κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν. He could not have placed Κρέοντα, which is the least emphatic word (except σοι if enclitic), in the most emphatic place, in preference to τοιαῦτα, which has by far the strongest emphasis. And σοι, whether emphatic or unemphatic, coming at the end of a line but in the middle of a clause, necessarily points forwards, and creates an expectation which is most naturally fulfilled at the end of the line following. Compare O. C. 1518, 19, ἅ σοι | γήρως ἄλυπα τῇδε κείσεται πόλει. Ibid. 1010—12, where a whole line intervenes between ἐμοὶ and ἐλθεῖν ἀρωγούς to which it is joined. I will even assert that from their relative positions in the versification, σοι is brought nearer to τοιαῦτα κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν than it would have been by actual juxtaposition. A similar thing occurs in El. 254, 5, where ὑμῖν is separated from δοκῶ by the greater part of a line, but is brought in while expectation is sustained by the flow of the verse. It is only fair to add that in speaking of a "possible want of emphasis" Dr Kennedy betrays the fact that the line which he has printed "rings false" to his own inmost ear.

I have more to say in defence of the unemphatic σοι (which was the reading of the editions before Schaefer). Dr Kennedy takes the trouble of proving that neither Antigone nor Ismene had heard or were likely to hear the decree, and that Creon did not contemplate them in proclaiming it. This might have some force if σοι were said to be the dative of direct reference, though even then I might have asked whether "*all the citizens*" (l. 27) had heard the decree, and if so, how there could be any that knew not of it (l. 33). But as the *dativus ethicus*, or dative of remote reference, σοι is eminently in place. Look at all that has prepared the way for it: νῶν in l. 3, τῶν σῶν... κακῶν in l. 6; πανδήμῳ πόλει in l. 7 ("it is an aggravation of our sorrows that they are extending to the state"); ἔχεις... ἥ σε λανθάνει in l. 9; ἐμοὶ in l. 11; οὐδὲν οἶδ' ἀτωμένη in ll. 16, 17; νῆν in l. 21. After all this, σοι comes in so naturally as to be easily understood, even if separated from its immediate context.

Dr Kennedy says the presence of *φασὶ* forbids the very idea of any such dative. Even if this were not a mere "canon for the nonce" (I do not see why a Greek author might not have written

ἄ σοι
γῆρως ἄλνπά φημι κείσεσθαι πόλει),

the energetic rapidity of the speech (of which more presently), would make light of such an obstacle, and *φασὶ* is a mere resumption from l. 27. Besides, in this respect there is no difference between *φασὶν ἔχειν* and *ὥς φασιν, ἔχει*.

With the same bluntness of vision which he has shewn in bringing together our explanations of O. C. 308, 9, Dr Kennedy identifies my account of the words *κάμοι, λέγω γὰρ κάμῃ* with Schneidewin's. It is true that I have so much in common with that editor (and, I think, with Seyffert) that we both pass from the unemphatic to the emphatic dative, but that is almost the extent of our agreement. In rendering, "Observe, even to me too, whose character he little knows" (for convenience sake I adopt Dr Kennedy's translation of his words), he takes *λέγω* in the sense of "I mean to say," and *κάμῃ* as a mere repetition of *ἐμοὶ*, *attracted* into construction with *λέγω*. And he makes Antigone refer to the action of Creon, rather than to the effect of that action upon herself. I take *λέγω* to mean "I count," or "I do not omit" (cp. Aesch. *Prom.* 973, *καὶ σὲ δ' ἐν τούτοις λέγω*), and *ἐμὲ* as the regular accusative after it. To make my explanation as explicit as I can, if the reader will exonerate me from accusing Sophocles of speaking in this cumbrous fashion, for I can call it nothing else, I take the words to mean: "Such is the decree which Creon has proclaimed, affecting you,—ay, and affecting *me*, for I do not hold myself exempted from the number of those whom it touches." If any one objects that the ethical dative is never emphatic, I would remind him that "ethical dative" is only a convenient phrase, and that there are various degrees between the most direct and the most remote uses of the dative.

Dr Kennedy says that this explanation is in violation of dramatic taste and propriety. I am sorry for Antigone. She is

misunderstood by her latest champion, and I fear that even he, could he understand her rightly, might prove to be a "modern Creon." The Antigone of Sophocles is supposed by him to come on the stage with a disposition to make "a modest acknowledgement of error," and to avoid anything like an assumption of superiority in addressing her sister. "I own I thought better of my uncle than to expect this of him; I know that you esteem him highly, and I confess I once did so too." That is the tone of the maiden, who has already spoken of Creon as an enemy, and, before she has uttered ten lines, has intimated with ill-suppressed scorn, the suspicion that her sister will be slow to apprehend the coming evil!

It is true that she would win Ismene to share her purpose, but she would win her by sheer impetuosity or not at all. At the same time, no comparison of herself with Ismene is implied in my construction of these words. When she is carried away by her feeling into this brief outburst, she is not thinking of her sister, but of her own passionate resolve¹.

It is only out of respect to Professor Kennedy that I would urge a further objection to construing the datives with *ἀγαθόν*. It is that such an epexegetis, which seems to me tame at best, is wholly out of keeping with the rapidity of such a speech as this. It is not the language of feeling at all. And it sadly interrupts the rhythm.

IV. Whatever may be the faults of my Sophocles, Dr Kennedy has not convinced me that I am in error in the points criticised by him. In reply to him I can, of course, only state my own opinion with its grounds. On the other hand, I can have little hope of convincing him—for instance, that Sophocles could hardly have used *ξυμφέρεσθαι* for *προσφέρεσθαι*, even if *ὁ τρόπος τῆς ξυμφορᾶς* could mean *ὁ τρόπος τοῦ ξυμφέρεσθαι*.

V. Dr Kennedy's fame rests on a sounder basis than these his favourite interpretations of Sophocles. The man, who has raised the level of Greek scholarship over a great part of England, to whom some of the best scholars in the country

¹ The negatives in the first speech are enough to shew that Antigone is in a white heat from the very beginning of the play.

both dead and living, have been proud to refer the origin of their acquirements, who by the energy and acuteness of his intellect and his genuine enthusiasm, has done so much to keep alive the opinion that Greek philology is more than a jargon of words, has no need to be solicitous—though he is true to his character in being so—about the fate of his cursory annotations on a special subject. It is simply impossible for such a man, however in his chivalrous abandonment he may desire it, to stake his title to the character of a Greek scholar on a few subtleties of his invention, for which he happens to have conceived a fond and inalienable affection.

LEWIS CAMPBELL.

P.S. Since my reply to Dr Kennedy was printed, I have received a communication from Dr James Browning, Assistant Classical Examiner in the University of St Andrews, from which I extract so much as has reference to the questions now in dispute. His letter to me is dated St Andrew's, 15th Feb. 1873. I will only add that the time when Dr Browning was a "student in St Andrews" was many years previous to 1854.

"I need not say any thing of the second and third passages, in the former of which Kennedy's supplement seems unnatural and uncalled for, and in the latter of which both your versions and his have been familiar to me since I was a student in St Andrews; but it may interest you to know that the meaning he gives to Oed. R. 44, 5, was suggested by Dr Thomas Young, the decipherer of the Rosetta Stone, as early as 1795, when he was a Student of Medicine in Edinburgh, and was then accepted as the true rendering by Prof. Andrew Dalzel, and afterwards by Prof. Dunbar in 1808. Dunbar's translation, though inelegant, as was to be expected, is virtually the same with Kennedy's: "For I perceive that the communication of opinions chiefly prevails among men of skill (or experience)."

Dalzel's note, which is really Dr Young's, is the following: "Ὡς τοῖσιν ἐμπείροισι...] *Usu enim peritis video felici quoque eventu consilia maxime vigere.* Brunck. Ita interpretes; sed

συμφορὰν pro *eventu consilii* sumi posse non credo; ea enim vox fortuitum aliquid semper innuere videtur: hic autem potius in primitivo sensu sumi, locusque adeo totus ita reddi potest. *Sicubi alicujus deorum vocem audisti, vel etiam a mortalium quocunque quicquam acceperis; video enim apud prudentes expertosque viros etiam collationes consilii maxime in usu esse.* Ipsius sapientiam suprà laudaverat, jam etiam alios consultâsse posse addit: qui sensus vulgato multò melior videtur; otiosum enim aliàs foret καὶ, neque tota sententia loco suo digna."

This note is from Dalzel's *Collectanea Græca Majora*, a work which has been in the hands of Scottish students for 70 years.

ON THE WORD ΒΟΥΤΑΙΟΣ.

Il. XIII. 824. *Αἴαν ἄμαρτοεπὲς, βουγάϊε, ποῖον ἔειπες;*
Od. XVIII. 79. *Νῦν μὲν μήτ' εὔης, βουγάϊε, μήτε γένοιο,*
εἰ τοῦτον τρομέεις, κ.τ.λ.

IN the first of these passages Hector is addressing Ajax, who is determined to stay his onward progress: in the second Antinous is reviling the bully Irus. Heyne on the former passage in his smaller edition quotes a short scholion on the word *βουγάϊε*, which interprets it *μεγάλως ἐπὶ σαντῶ ἀγλαϊζόμενος καὶ γανριῶν*. Ἡ, *βουεργέτα*. This scholion sums up the differences of opinion which existed among the Greek critics on the word: some (with Aristarchus) referring it to *γαίω*, others (with Zenodotus) to *γῆ*. Thus Apollonius, *Lexicon*, h. v. (quoted by Heyne in his large edition): *βουγάϊον δὲ λέγουσι τὸν ἐργατὴν βοῦν· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ τὴν γῆν ἐργάζεσθαι*: Hesychius, *βουγάϊον· ἀναίσθητον καὶ ἀλάζονα καὶ μέγανυχον*, which is possibly a mixture of the two explanations. For Eustathius on this passage mentions an interpreter in his view the most successful of all (*μάλιστα ἐπιτυχής*), ὁ μεταλαβὼν τὸν βουγάϊον εἰς βόσκημα ἀναίσθητον: it appears also from another scholion worked up into Eustathius' note, that among the people of Dulichium and Samos persons who lived on milk and were feeble of frame (*οἱ γαλακτοφαγοῦντες καὶ μηδὲν ἰσχύοντες*) were named (nick-named?) *βουγάϊοι*. This interpretation, considered most successful by Eustathius, has not found much favour with the modern commentators on Homer, who prefer explaining *βουγάϊος* as = a braggart, a great boaster ('Grossprahler', Faesi, virtually following Heyne, and so the word is explained in Liddell and

Scott's Lexicon). It seems to be assumed by them, as by the Greek critics quoted on the same side by Eustathius, that *βου-* is a mere prefix implying magnitude, as in *βούπαις*, &c., and that *-γαῖος* is connected with *γαίω*. Both assumptions seem to me unwarranted: there is nothing to shew, in the first place, that *βου-* is ever used as a prefix in Homer as it is in later Greek (*βούβρωστις* is the only word that gives any colour to such an idea, and that can be explained otherwise), and, in the second place, though *γαῖος* might be connected, so far as form goes, with *γαίω*, as *πυρκᾶή* is with *καίω*, *γαίω* does not mean to *brag*, but to *exult* or *rejoice*: so that this etymology would not bring out the required meaning.

Let us therefore try the other track indicated by the scholiasts. The interpretations of *βουγαῖος* as = *βουὺς ἐργατής*, or as = *ἀναίσθητος*, coincide on the whole with those given by Hesychius and Eustathius to the word *γαῖος* or *γαῖος*. *Γαῖος* is explained by Hesychius as = *βουὺς ἐργατής*: and Eustathius 142, 40 (188, 28), partly quoted by Schmidt on the word, says ἡ ὅτι ἐκ τῆς γαίας καὶ γαῖος ἀπόγειος ἄνεμος καὶ βουὺς γαῖος ὁ ἐργατικός· καὶ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ γέα ὃ γράφεται διὰ τοῦ ἐ ψιλοῦ γείος· ἡ καὶ ἄλλως γαῖος παρὰ Ἰταλιώταις καὶ Ταραντίνους ὁ μίσθιος· ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε καὶ ὁ παχὺς καὶ ἀναίσθητος ἄνθρωπος. Now is this *γαῖος* or *γαῖος*, which it is surely difficult not to connect with the Homeric vocative *βουγαῖε*, related etymologically to *γαῖα*, or, as G. Curtius in his *Grundzüge* suggests, to the Sanskrit *gaûs*, an ox? The Sanskrit derivatives *gavaya* (*bovis species*, the 'Gayal')¹ and *gavyas* (*bubulus, bovinus*)¹ are quoted by Curtius, and indeed offer a tempting similarity of form to *γαῖος*. If *γαῖος* then = *γάβιος*, it must mean properly 'belonging to an ox': and may thus easily have come as a term of reproach to mean either 'loud' (comp. Aristophanes' *βόεια ῥήματα*, Ranae 678), or 'hulking' or 'stupid': and *βουὺς γαῖος* (of which *βουγαῖε* may be the vocative, to be written as two words) must either mean 'a hulking ox', or be merely, like *σὺς κάπριος*, two words to express one thing. If *γαῖος*, on the contrary, be derived from *γῆ*, *βουὺς γαῖος* will simply = 'an

¹ Bopp, *Glossarium Comparativum*.

ox of the field'. In any case *βov-* turns out not to be a mere prefix signifying bigness, but a word retaining its proper meaning. The nickname 'hulking ox' or 'ox of the field' would be appropriate enough in the mouth of an enemy to Ajax, or of a contemptuous patron to Irus.

The Latin proper name *Gaius* has been connected with *gaudere* by some, by others with the root *ge-* in *genus*, &c. No one, so far as I know, has thought of connecting it with the *γαίος* of Hesychius: but when we consider how homely was the meaning of many of the Roman proper names (as e. g. *Stolo*, *Scipio*, *Bubulcus*, even *Brutus Bubulcus*), it will not appear impossible that 'Gaius' may originally have meant 'a man who had to do with oxen', if not 'a man like an ox'.

ON *VIS* (2ND PERSON OF *VOLO*), *INVITUS*, AND *INVITARE*.

Corssen, *Kritische Nachträge*, &c. p. 52—54, seems right in arguing that the base of the word *invitus* is the Sanskrit root *vî*, which, according to Benfey, has in the Vedas the meaning of *wishing*. I cannot help suspecting that *vis*, which does duty for the second person of *volo*, is really the second person of a lost verb *vio*, of which *vi-tus* would be the participle, meaning *will-ing*. From *vi-tus*, *in-vi-tus*, *unwilling*, would be naturally formed. Scholars generally assume that *vis* stands for an older form in which the *l* of *vol-o* had not disappeared. But such a disappearance of the *l* would be far more against Latin analogy than its retention. There is no reason for supposing that the Romans would have objected to say *vuls* or *vils* from *volo* any more than they objected to saying *fers* from *fero*, though as a general rule the combination *ls* and *rs* stood with them for *-lts* and *-rts*.

Corssen¹ connects *invitare* with the root *vî-* (= *to wish*), and would make it mean originally *to wish a person here*: G. Curtius² refers it to the root *voc-* (= *to call*), making *invitare* = *invi-citare* from *invocitare*. Corssen's account of the word is, as far

¹ *Kritische Beiträge*, p. 18; *Kritische Nachträge*, p. 54.

² *Grundzüge*, &c. 3rd ed.

as form goes, less strained than this: but both etymologies are based on an assumption which is at least doubtful, that the first meaning of *invitare* is *to invite*. There are two other meanings of the word, closely connected with each other, quite as old as this, *to cheer* or *enliven* (mostly of food and drink), and *to entertain*: and it is worth while considering whether the idea of *inviting* did not grow out of these. Let us examine the evidence. *Invitare* has apparently the sense of *cheering* or *enlivening* in Plautus, *Amph.* I. 1. 130: 'Mira sunt, nisi *invitavit* sese in cena plusculum'; *Rudens* II. 3. 32: 'Neptunus magnis poculis hac nocte eum *invitavit*' (though here the sense of *entertaining* would do as well): comp. *ib.* V. 3. 30, where it is used with a comical play on *invitus*. In the *Rudens*, II. 7. 32 'si *invitare* nos paullisper pergeret, Ibidem obdormissemus: nunc vix vivos amisit domum', the word may as well mean *to cheer*, or *to ply with cups*, as *to challenge to drink*. So Turpilium (*ap. Non.* pp. 320, 1): 'Non *invitavit* plusculum sese, ut solet'; '*Invitavit* vir plusculum hic se in prandio' (*invitavere* Luc. Müller); 'Coronam, mensam, tales, vinum, haec hujusmodi, Quis rebus *vita* amantum *invitari* solet'; Lucilius (30. 54): 'Scito etenim bene longincum mortalibus morbum In vino esse, ubi qui *invitavit* dapsilius se'. Nonius quotes instances of the same use from Sallust and Varro; and Virgil's '*Invitat* genialis hiems curasque resolvit' may best be explained in the same way: 'winter cheers us and loosens our load of cares'.

Invitare means *to entertain* in Cicero, *Verr.* IV. 11. 25: 'Rex denique equis est qui senatorem P. R. tecto ac domo non *invitet*'; *publice invitare* in the same passage may be taken indifferently as = *to entertain* or *to invite* at the public expense. In *Phil.* XII. 9. 23 Cicero says ironically of Clodius' house 'tota familia occurret, *hospitio invitabit*, propter familiaritatem notissimam', where it seems more natural to take *hospitio* as abl. and *invitare* as = *to entertain*, than to make the words = *vocabit in hospitium*. Comp. Virgil *Aen.* VIII. 178: 'Accipit Aeneas, solioque *invitat* acerno'. It is of course easy to see how the senses of *entertaining* and *inviting* run into each other.

Now supposing that *invitare* is derived from *vita* as *infor-*

mare from *forma*, the sense of *cheering* or *enlivening* would be the natural and primary sense of the word. And this hypothesis agrees quite sufficiently with the facts adduced above. The sense of *cheering* is at least as old in Latin usage as that of *inviting*: and the transition of meaning, *to cheer*, *to entertain at table*, *to invite*, seems a more natural one than the reverse, especially when the phrase *invitare se* is considered. Turpilius' 'quibus rebus *vita amantum invitari* solet' seems to point to a consciousness of connection in meaning between *vita* and *invitare*, though it is unsafe to build much upon such plays on words. It is, meanwhile, worth while to quote from Schleicher's Glossary the Lithuanian word *vitó-ti*, 'aufnehmen, bewirthen'.

ON THUCYDIDES I. 37.

In this chapter the Corinthians say to the Athenians about the Corcyraeans καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἅμα, αὐτάρκη θέσιν κειμένη, παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς ὧν βλάπτουσί τινα μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ ξυνθήκας γίνεσθαι. The commentators mostly explain this difficult passage by assuming an ellipse: understanding the sentence as equivalent either to παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς...μᾶλλον ἢ (δικαστὰς) γίνεσθαι κατὰ ξυνθήκας, 'makes them judges in their own case rather than that judges should be appointed by agreement': or to παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς μᾶλλον ἢ (ἐγένοντο αὐν) κ.ξ., 'makes them judges more than they would have been if an agreement had been entered into'. Classen again takes κατὰ ξυνθήκας γίνεσθαι together, comparing such phrases as κατὰ ξυλλόγους, κατὰ ξυστάσεις γίνεσθαι, and makes the clause = 'gives them the opportunity of acting as judges rather than according to arbitration'. But if the sense of αὐτοὺς, in connexion with the preceding word αὐτάρκη, be pressed, the sentence can be brought to yield very good sense without supposing any ellipse: 'gives them the chance of acting as judges according to their own will, irresponsibly, rather than according to agreement with others'. Classen remarks that the idea of being a δικαστής at all is contrary to that of acting κατὰ ξυνθήκας:

that you cannot be 'judge according to agreement' at all¹. But surely the relation which existed in matters of jurisdiction between the Athenians and their subject-allies proves that a Greek city might be *δικαστῆς ὦν τινα ἔβλαψε*, 'a judge in the case of its own wrong doings', and at the same time a *δικαστῆς κατὰ ξυνθήκας*: the Athenians would have represented themselves as exercising their judicial functions over their allies *κατὰ ξυνθήκας*, according to agreement with the allies, while the allies, if a case went against them, would probably complain that the Athenians judged *αὐτοί*, without responsibility.

VIRGILIANA. Ecl. iv. 15.

'Ille deum vitam accipiet, divisque videbit
permixtos heroas, et ipse videbitur illis,
pacatumque reget patriis virtutibus orbem'.

The prophecy is of a king reigning in righteousness, like Saturn according to the Roman myth, or Numa, and the commentators refer the words 'deum vitam accipiet' to the return of the golden age, when men (according to Hesiod, *Ἔργα*, v. 112 foll.) *ὥστε θεοὶ ἔζων ἀκήδεα θυμὸν ἔχοντες, Νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνων*. The words 'divisque videbit' &c. are in like manner referred to that familiar intercourse between gods and men supposed by the Roman poets (not, be it observed, by Hesiod) to be a characteristic of the golden age. Now, though Virgil's words will bear this plain and obvious meaning, no one has observed, so far as I know, that the poet has not expressed it in at all an ordinary manner. 'Deum vitam accipere' does not seem the most obvious way in which Virgil might have reproduced *ὥστε θεοὶ ζῆν*: and as, elsewhere, he uses the simple expression 'fruitur deorum colloquio' for intercourse with the gods, it seems strange that he should have used the less obvious

¹ 'Ein Vertragsverhältniss (ξυνθήκαι) überhaupt die Möglichkeit ausschliesst, dass der eine Theil sich zum Richter aufwerfe.' But the Athenians were

said *δικάζειν τοῖς συμμαχοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων*: see the discussion on Thuc. i. 77, in Grote, Chap. XLVII., and Classen's own note on that passage.

expression 'divisque videbit Permixtos heroas', &c. This criticism may appear far-fetched, but it should be remembered that Virgil chose his words with extraordinary care, often repeating himself with little or no variation when the language appeared to him to be a perfect expression of his thought, and, hardly ever, in important matters, using language which had not, to his mind, if not some cherished association, at least some more or less exquisite justification. I suspect that in this passage, though its first and most obvious reference is to a renewal of the golden age, Virgil is using language tinged by association with the mysteries, Eleusinian or other. 'Vitam accipere', 'to receive or take to one's self a life', is a phrase requiring comment: now 'accipere sacra' was the regular phrase for 'being initiated into mysteries': see Lampridius, Heliogabalus 7, 'Matris etiam deorum sacra accepit', and other passages in Hildebrand's note on Arnobius v. 19. Then as to 'deum vita', this expression might also have been caught from the mysteries: for Plato, *Phaedo*, p. 81, says of the soul, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγουσα: comp. *ib.* p. 69, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκέισε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει: passages which seem to shew that the idea of a participation in a divine life was popularly associated with the mysteries¹. The words 'divisque videbit' &c., carry out the idea which I have started: one of the chief points in the Eleusinia being that statues of the gods were exhibited to the gaze of the initiated: see Themistius, quoted by Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 52. I do not mean that Virgil literally means that his king will be a μεμνημένος, but that his language was originally suggested by the circumstances of the mysteries, and that thus 'deum vitam accipiet' might fairly be translated 'shall be initiated into', or 'partake in', 'the life of the gods'.

¹ This idea is further illustrated by Plato, *Phaedrus*, p. 250, ὅτε σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῶ μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν, ἐπόμενοι μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ μετ' ἄλλων θεῶν, εἰδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο. Theo

Smyrnaeus, quoted by Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 39, speaks of τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ θεοῖς συνδίδαιτον as the privilege of persons initiated into the Eleusinia.

Aeneid, ii. 615.

‘Jam summas arces Tritonia, respice, Pallas
insedit, nimbo effulgens et Gorgone saeva’.

It requires some courage to defend ‘nimbo’ in this passage when most modern critics prefer ‘limbo’, the variant mentioned by Servius. Whether the variation is as old as the time of Virgil, whether indeed he may have left it doubtful himself which he finally intended to write, cannot, I suppose, be decided: but it is in any case hard to imagine whence ‘nimbo’, decidedly the most difficult reading, can have come, except from the poet’s hand. Though it is not easy, it is not, I think, impossible, to translate ‘nimbo effulgens et Gorgone saeva’ Pallas shines out ‘with her surrounding of storm-cloud and with her dread Gorgon’: ‘nimbo et Gorgone saeva’ being a kind of descriptive ablative. But my purpose is not so much to discuss the construction of the words as to bring forward two passages which, so far as I know, have been hitherto overlooked by the advocates both of ‘nimbus’ and ‘limbus’. The first is from Homer, Il. xviii. 203 foll.

Αἰτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ὥρτο Διὶ φίλος· αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη
ᾠμοῖς ἰφθίμοισι βάλ’ αἰγίδα θυσσανόεσσαν
Ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ κεφαλῇ νέφος ἔστεφε δία θεῶων
Χρύσειον, ἐκ δ’ αὐτοῦ δαΐε φλόγα παμφανόωσαν.

Here the aegis and the cloud are coupled as they are in Il. xv. 308 (of Apollo): εἰμένος ὥμοῖν νεφέλην, ἔχε δ’ αἰγίδα θοῦριν, which Conington, in his note on this passage, maintains, apparently with good reason, that Virgil intended to translate. Meanwhile, for what seems to me the far tamer reading ‘limbo’, we may add to the passages quoted by Henry (Notes of a Twelve Years’ Voyage, &c. p. 109) a passage from Prudentius, contra Symmachum, ii. 576:

‘Nec Paphiam niveae vexere columbae,
cujus inauratum tremeret gens Persica limbum’.

Aeneid, iii. 525.

‘Magnum cratera corona Induit’. Is it possible that in this and similar passages Virgil was mistranslating Homer’s *ἀνθεμόεντι λέβητι*, *Odyssey*, iii. 440?

Aeneid, vi. 126.

‘Facilis descensus Averno’. The nearest Greek parallel to (perhaps the origin of) this passage seems to be Aeschylus, quoted by Plato, *Phaedo*, 108 a: *ἐστὶ δ’ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὥς ὁ Λίσχylου Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Αἴδου φέρειν.*

Ib. 273 foll.

‘Vestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orci
luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curae:
pallentesque habitant Morbi, tristisque Senectus,
et Metus, et malesuada Fames, et turpis Egestas,
terribiles visu formae; Letumque, Labosque;
tum consanguineus leti Sopor, et mala mentis
gaudia’, &c.

Conington, following Germanus, has shewn that Virgil is here thinking of Lucretius, iii. 65 foll. Another passage in the same book was probably also present to his mind, v. 459 foll.:

‘Huc accedit uti videamus, corpus ut ipsum
suscipere inmanis *morbos* durumque dolorem,
sic animum *curas* acris *luctumque metumque*,
quare participem leti quoque convenit esse.
Quin etiam morbis in corporis avius errat
saepe animus, dementit enim deliraeque fatur,
interdumque gravi lethargo fertur in altum
aeternumque *soporem* oculis nutuque cadenti’!

Comp. ib. 825 foll.

‘Advenit id quod eam de rebus saepe futuris
macerat inque metu male habet curisque fatigat,
praeteritisque male admissis peccata remordent’.

Of the last passage we are reminded by Virgil’s ‘ultrices Curae’: of the first by more expressions than one. It should be added, that if I am correct in supposing Virgil here to have been working upon Lucretian material, the theory which makes ‘consanguineus Leti Sopor’ mean ‘lethargy’, not ‘sleep’, receives new confirmation.

In the list of crimes punished in the infernal regions ‘Hic quibus invisi fratres’ &c. v. 608 foll., Virgil may also have been thinking of Lucretius iii. 70 foll.

Ovid, Fasti ii. 676 (of the god Terminus).

Here Merkel reads ‘Clamato, Suus est hic ager, ille tuus’. ‘*Tuus* est hic ager’ is the reading of the great majority of his MSS., including A: ‘ille tuus’ the first reading of A, though its second reading and the reading of the other MSS. is *suus*. The line is a far better one if we keep to A throughout: ‘Clamato, *Tuus* est hic ager, ille *tuus*’: *tuus* and *tuus* referring to the two neighbours, just as Horace makes Oppidius say to his two sons (S. ii. 3. 175),

‘*Tu* Nomentanum, *tu* ne sequerere Cicutam’.

H. NETTLESHIP.

ON AN UNCOLLATED MS. OF DEMOSTHENES, OF
SÆC. XIV.

ON looking over the library bequeathed by the late Mr Kerrich to the University, I came upon a MS. professing, on a slip of paper written perhaps a century or more ago, and inserted loose in it, to contain some writings and grammatical treatises of Libanius, Ulpian, and Hermogenes, with the Preface to Demosthenes and the arguments to the Orations, as usually assigned to Libanius.

The MS. is a small, but rather thick quarto, of 657 pages, the size being about nine inches by six. Though a good deal stained by damp, and a little injured by the book-moth, it is for the most part in fair condition, and, though full of contractions, everywhere legible. It is on paper, of the thick glossy kind used in the fourteenth century, and bearing, among other paper marks, a kind of triple leaf, which Professor Wright, a high authority, as one conversant with the MSS. in the British Museum, tells me fixes the date at about 1360. The water-marks however vary, and so does the handwriting, of which at least six, if not seven, distinct kinds may be traced; some of them, especially the part containing the grammatical works at the beginning, perhaps not earlier than the commencement of the fifteenth century¹.

On examining this MS. a little more closely, I found with equal surprise and satisfaction that it contained a large number

¹ Fac-similes of the different kinds of handwriting were exhibited at the reading of this paper before the Cambridge Philological Society, 13 Feb. 1873.

θαυμάζω· καὶ ἐπὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις, ἡμὰ δὲ θῶς ἡμῶν
 δοῦν ἀρεὰς ἀθηνᾶσι οἰδῶν αὐταὶ λεγίσασθαι πόσον
 πολεμὸν τεχέονον φίλῳ ποσσὶ καὶ τῇ ποιόωσιν
 ὁφείνομεν ἀπαοδιεῖν ἡμῶν τῷ ἴσῃ γὰρ δὴ
 ποῦ τοῦ θούτι μαλὸν ποῦ ἡμῶν· ἐτέρωσι τινὰς
 ἐκ τῶν ζόντων πρῶτον, αἵ τι οὐ μένον ἀλλήλοισι
 κρινόντων·

MS. Demosth. p. 139

ἡμὰς πολεμὸν τεχέονον φίλῳ ποσσὶ καὶ τῇ ποιόωσιν
 ὁφείνομεν ἀπαοδιεῖν ἡμῶν τῷ ἴσῃ γὰρ δὴ
 ποῦ τοῦ θούτι μαλὸν ποῦ ἡμῶν· ἐτέρωσι τινὰς
 ἐκ τῶν ζόντων πρῶτον, αἵ τι οὐ μένον ἀλλήλοισι
 κρινόντων·

p. 589.

ὁ πρὸς τοῖς καὶ ἀνὰ ἀμὲν ἡσυχασθῶ, ὅτι ταῦτα
 ὅτε οἱ δὲ, ὅτε κοινῶν· ποσὶς θῆκα δὲ ὡς οὐ ποσὶ
 δοχῶν παρὰ δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν μετὰ πρὸς δοχῶν
 τῶν τῶν. ὅτι πρὸς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀλλήλοισι ἐφικνέτω
 ρύντω γὰρ ταῦτα, τοῦτο μὲν ἐπαινεσθῶ· ὅτι τῇ

p. 493.

τῶν ἀθηνᾶσι ἀτάκτων, σφοδρὴ φωνὴ πρὸς τῶν ἐμῶν
 σωτῶν· καὶ μεζόνως ἐβλάψεν· ὅτι ὅτι συνῆλθον οὐδὲ
 παρὰ πλήσιον ἐν αὐτῇ πτωτῶν καὶ πολλὰ ἰσχυρὰ ἀθήνη
 παιδῶν·

p. 19.

of the Orations of Demosthenes in a perfect state. The Lep-
tines, the Androtion, the De Corona, and the De Falsa Lega-
tione, are the largest and perhaps the most important of these.
But it also contains the earlier orations; viz. the Olynthiacs,
Philippics, De Pace, *περὶ Ἀλουνήσου, περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ,*
πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, περὶ συντάξεως, ἐπιστολὴ Φιλίππου, περὶ
τῶν συμμοριῶν, περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλ. συνθηκῶν, περὶ τῆς Ῥοδίων
ἐλευθερίας, and ὑπὲρ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν. I have collated the
greater portion of the De Fals. Leg., and can pronounce the
MS. to be of high character, very carefully and accurately
written; occasionally, chiefly in the earlier Orations, with mar-
ginal scholia, and frequently with varieties of readings recorded
also in the margin by the usual formula *γρ. so-and-so.* I have
found so many varieties, notably in the inverted order of words,
not recorded by Bekker, that I cannot doubt the MS. would
well repay a complete collation. It seems to have been well
thumbed in ancient times; but I believe that, for editorial pur-
poses, it has never yet been critically used.

It seemed to me, at first glance, probable that leaves had
been lost at an early period from different parts of the Orations,
and supplied by later hands, as occasion presented itself. This,
of course, would make it likely that the readings did not always
follow one family or class of MSS.; and the difference in the
paper-marks, or water-marks—of which I have made out twelve,
and I think there are still more—points to different periods as
well as the marked and frequent changes in the handwriting.
On the other hand, there are reasons to think that the work
was rather slowly carried on, and by a succession and inter-
change of transcribers, or if chiefly by the same, then at inter-
vals sufficient to account for considerable variations in the style
of writing.

The text of Demosthenes begins on page 124, with the
first Olynthiac. From p. 59 preceding we have the introduc-
tions of Ulpian and the arguments and catalogue of the extant
speeches by Libanius. This portion, up to p. 118, is all in one
hand (No. 1), very small, neat, and closely contracted, and
written in a brown ink, apparently at the close of Sæc. XIV.
The paper-mark in all these pages is the same. At p. 119 is

Libanius' Preface to the Orations, and this, with the handwriting of the Olynthiacs (nearly to the end of the second), is the same as far as p. 139 (2), where a leaf is interposed by another hand (3), and again another begins at p. 141 (4), and there are alternations of these three styles (all of which are of Sæc. XIV, though very distinguishable), the third predominating, as far as p. 367, where apparently a fourth hand commences (though not certainly different from the first) and continues for five pages; then No. 3 resumes the work, and continues to p. 423, or *περὶ Στεφ.* p. 283. Here, up to p. 434, we have a new and very inferior hand (No. 5), which at first sight I was disposed to regard as somewhat later, but p. 434 is written by two hands, the latter half in this, the former half in No. 3; and therefore both are, probably, at least nearly coeval. This inferior hand continues as far as p. 494, or *De Fals. Leg.* p. 356, getting more and more slovenly and irregular, when No. 3 continues for five pages, and then again No. 5 commences and on the back of the *same* page (*viz.* 500) with No. 3; and is therefore contemporaneous. From p. 495 to 499 No. 3 takes up the work. From p. 500 to 504 we again have No. 5. Again at p. 505 No. 3 recommences, again taken up by No. 5 at p. 511 to p. 519, when another one, *viz.* the hand that wrote the Olynthiacs, commences again and goes on to p. 568. I think we have here even a 6th hand, though it is not unlike No. 3 as far as 587, when again a lighter ink and finer handwriting begins, though I think it is by the same hand as the last. Then at p. 590, where the *Leptines* begins, we have yet another hand, the same as that which wrote Libanius in the first part of the MS., and in the same light-coloured ink. There follows (p. 628) a short treatise on *ῥητορικὴ* by the same hand, and at p. 631 is a *Πασχάλιον* or Easter table, full of symbols and years of indiction, very difficult to make out, but probably tending to throw a light on the exact age of the MS. At p. 641 to the end is some ecclesiastical treatise which I cannot identify, and have not had time to decipher, the writing being extremely difficult, especially as the last few pages are very tattered and damaged by damp. As far as I can judge however, the MS. is entire except the loss of one page at the beginning. Of the first fifty pages I cannot now give a very

exact account; but they contain only grammatical treatises and are not likely to prove of great value.

I have been at the pains to collate very carefully above half of the De Fals. Leg. by this MS., and I will now mention a few readings in which it differs from all the copies collated, at least as mentioned in Mr Shilleto's rather full critical notes.

In p. 342, init., the MS. has ἄκυροι πάντων ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθε, for γενήσεσθε. In p. 343, εἰ οἶδ' ὅτι for οἶδ' ὅτι, and ὁ μέντοι τὸν νόμον τιθεῖς Σόλων, where Σόλων is wanting in all other copies, and may of course here be a mere gloss. At the end of the same page, ἔταξεν ἑαυτὸν for ἑαυτὸν ἔταξεν, as it has ἕκαστος ὑμῶν for ὑμῶν ἕκαστος quite at the beginning of the Speech; εἶπεν οὗτος for οὗτος εἶπε in p. 349; ἐν πύλαις ὁ φίλιππος for ὁ φίλιππος ἐν πύλαις in p. 359; and in fact, transpositions of this kind are remarkably numerous, and often well deserving of attention. In p. 344 we have πρέσβεις πέμπειν for πρέσβεις πέμψαι, and a better reading, I think. In p. 349 init., for ἵνα μηδεὶς ὑμῶν, ἐπειδάν τι λέγοντος ἀκούῃ μου τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ δοκῇ δεινὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑπερβάλλον εἶναι, we have the remarkable reading ἐπειδάν τι λέγοντος ἀκούῃ μου καὶ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν πεπραγμένων, δοκῇ δεινὸν, &c. In p. 350, for ὅτι οὕτιν' ἂν ὑμεῖς κατεστήσατε, which Mr Shilleto translates "whomsoever you might have placed in this post," the MS. has εἰ καὶ οὕτινοῦν, &c., which I believe is the true reading. In p. 362, MS. has δικαίως ἂν ὑποληφθεῖεν, which is again better than the vulg. δικαίως ὑποληφθεῖεν ἂν. In p. 366, for οἱ δ' ὅτιοῦν ἂν ἀργυρίου ποιήσαντες, we have the remarkable variant οἱ δὲ μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν ἄνευ ἀργυρίου ποιήσαντες. Another good reading given in this MS. is μετεκομίζεσθε for κατεκομίζεσθε in p. 368; and again κατηγορεῖ for καταμαρτυρεῖ in p. 377 ad fin. I could multiply these examples many times over; but I think I have given sufficient evidence that this really is a MS. of very considerable interest, not to say importance. My collation is in Mr Shilleto's hands: and no one is better able to use it or to judge of the value of the *variae lectiones*.

F. A. PALEY.

ON THE PREFIX *A-* IN ENGLISH.

THE value of the prefix *a-* is the first question that invites our attention when we open our Dictionaries at the beginning. The account of it in most Dictionaries is meagre and imperfect. In Webster, for example, we are told that the word *aloft* is from the prefix *a-* and *loft*. This shirks the whole question as to the value which it there possesses.

The best accounts are perhaps those given in Dr Morris's *Outlines of English Accidence*, Haldeman's *Affixes to English Words*, and the *English Grammars* by Mätzner and Koch. The last seems to give the best information, and may be consulted in preference to the others. Good examples may be found in Stratmann's *Old English Dictionary*. Leaving out the words in which this prefix is derived from Latin or Greek, Haldeman assigns fifteen different meanings to it. But these are merely such as have arisen from differences of usage, and have nothing to do with etymology. From an etymological point of view, I make out as many as eleven distinct values of the prefix, and I take as representatives of these values the following words, viz., (1) *adown*; (2) *afoot*; (3) *along*; (4) *arise*; (5) *achieve*; (6) *avert*; (7) *amend*; (8) *alas*; (9) *abyss*; (10) *ado*; and (11) *aware*. For convenience, I shall give different forms to the apparent prefix, and distinguish them as OF-, ON-, AND-, US-, AD-, AB-, EX-, A-, AN-, AT-, and GE-.

We must be careful to exclude words in which the prefix is not *a-*, but something else; such as e.g. the word *alone*, which is really short for *all one*, from which the word *lone* has been formed by mere contraction; and also *atone*, which—if we may trust the evidence—is formed from *at* and *one*.

One source of difficulty is this—that the oldest English sometimes exhibits as many as three prefixes, where at present we have only one. Hence cases arise in which it is almost impossible to say whence the *a-* is really derived, though we can limit it to three or two sources. This will appear more clearly as we proceed to consider each of our words in order.

(1) The prefix *OF-* in *ADOWN*.

The oldest spelling of *adown* is *of-dúne*, i.e. off the down or hill, and so *downwards*. Contrast this with Fr. *aval*, from *ad vallem*, which also means *downwards*; with its derivatives *avaler* and *avalanche*. The full form of the prefix is shewn in *offspring*, *offshoot*, and *offset*, where the spelling with two *effs* is modern. In *offspring* and *spring of a watch*, for instance, the *off* and *of* are identical. So also in *of-fal*.

This prefix is, of course, cognate with the Latin *ab-*, and therefore with *a-* in *avert*; but words from native and foreign sources should be carefully distinguished.

It is also cognate with *apo-* in *apostle*, *apology*, and *apogee*, which appears as *ap-* in *aphelion*, &c.

Other examples beside *adown* are uncommon. The following ought perhaps to be referred here, viz. *anew*, *athirst*, *an-hungered*, and *akin*.

Anew is spelt *ofnewe* even in Chaucer, in the last line of part v. of *The Clerkes Tale*.

Athirst is the A.S. *of-birst*, where the prefix has an intensive force; just as in the Icelandic *ofdrykkja*, indulgence in drink. *An-hungered* is a corruption of *a-hungered*, from which it was easily corrupted (in the thirteenth century or later) for greater ease in pronunciation. The A.S. verb was *of-hingrian*, to *feel excessive hunger*, whence came not only the forms *ahungered* and *anhungered*, but also the curious form *afyngred*, as in the phrase—‘Bope *afyngred* and *afurst*’; i.e. both a-hungered and athirst; *Piers Plowman*, C. xii. 43. Koch explains this correctly; see his *Englische Grammatik*, vol. III. p. 131.

Akin I am unable to trace with certainty. Such phrases as *of his cynne*, *of Adames cynne* (of his kin, of Adam’s kin)

are common; and we still have the phrase *next of kin*. I therefore place it here for the present.

Words like *adread*, *afear'd*, *aghaſt*, and *aſhamed*, which may poſſibly belong here, will be diſcuſſed in dealing with class 4.

The word *an-hungered* may be further illuſtrated by the example given by Dr Morris of a ſimilar change, in the word *Jack-an-apes* from *Jack of apes*; compare alſo *Jack-a-lantern* and *man-a-war* as they are ſometimes ſpelt.

(2) The prefix ON- in AFOOT.

Examples of this are exceedingly common; ſo much ſo that, when other evidence fails, we ſhall commonly be right in aſſuming *a-* to represent an original *on*. In the following words, the form *on* actually appears in Old Engliſh, ſo that we can have no doubt about them. They are—*aback*, *abaft*, *abed*, *ablaze*, *aboard*, *about*, *above*, *abroad*, *adays*, *afield*, *aſire*, *afoot*, *aſar*, *afore*¹, *ahigh*, *ajar* (for *on char*, i.e. on the turn), *aland*, *alive*, *aloft*, *amidſt*, *among*, *anights*, *aright*, *arow*, *aside*, *aſhore*, *aſleep*, *aſunder*, and *away* (which occurs in the form *on weg*, not *of weg*). Alſo in ſuch words as *a-hunting*, *a-fiſhing*, &c. In ſome caſes the prefix was originally the prepoſition *on*, but it comes to the ſame thing.

Probably we ought to add *alike*, Icelandic *á-líkr*, where *á* is the A.S. *on*, but I ſhall ſpeak of this word again; ſee class 11. Another form of *on* was *an*, which is ſtill preſerved in *anon* and *anent*. Of theſe, *anon* is the A.S. *on án*, lit. in one, i.e. in a moment, immediately. The etymologies of *anent* given by Webster and Wedgwood are wide of the mark. The right derivation is that given by Mätzner, who traces it to the A.S. *on-efne* (later *an-emne*) and the Old Saxon *on evan*, lit. *on even*; and hence, on an equality with, beſide, regarding. It is worth obſerving that the modern German *neben* is formed nearly in the ſame way, viz. from the old phrase *in epan*, where *in* is the prepoſition, and *epan* is the Engliſh *even*.

In the word *acknowledge*, the prefix has been turned into *ac-*, and the ſuffix *-ledge* (A.S. *-lác*) has been added. The A.S. form was *oncnáwan*, which at a later period became *aknowe*.

¹ The A.S. has *æt-fóran* as well as *on-fóran*.

We may therefore bear in mind that *acknowledge*, *anon*, and *anent* all contain this same prefix *on-*.

The common use of the above words with this prefix led to the formation of a number of others, in which, if we cannot find them used with the spelling *on-*, we may at least feel sure that they were formed by imitation, and so are really due to this prefix. Of this there can at least be no doubt when the substantives are of native origin; so that we may safely add to the list these words following. They are these;—*abreast*, *adrift*, *afresh*, *aground*, *ahead*, *agape*, *agog*, *aground*, *alight*, *aloof* (from *luff*), *aloud*, *alow*, *anigh*, *askew* (Icel. *á ská*), *askance*, *aslant*, *aslope*, *astir*, *astray*, *astride*, *atilt*, *atop*, *awork*, and *awry*. We may also add *athwart*, as the expression *on þweorh sprecan*, to speak athwart, i.e. perversely, occurs in Cædmon, ed. Thorpe, p. 145. Yet a commoner form was *overthwart*, which occurs in Chaucer.

Also *akimbo*, on the strength of a quotation from the Tale of Beryn, for which see Wedgwood's Etymological Dictionary.

The prefix *a-*, from *on-*, being thus well established, it was prefixed even to words of French origin, the borrowed words being made to conform to the English habit. This seems to me a better explanation than to have recourse to the French *à*, though the signification of the latter was much the same. Amongst such words I should reckon these, viz. *across*, *apace*, (which is not the French *à pas*), *arear* (which in French would be *par derrière*), *around* (French *à la ronde*), and several others. The only exception I should be inclined to make is *apart*, which was probably borrowed entire from the French *à part*; see class 5. Indeed, the word *aparte* is found in Spanish. In modern times, the word *apropos* has been borrowed, and is almost naturalised.

(3) The prefix AND- in ALONG.

The word *along* is easily traced back to the A.S. *andlang*, and the exact correspondence of this to the German *entlang* and the Old Friesic *ondling* at once helps us to understand it. Cf. *endelong* in Chaucer.

This prefix appears in Icelandic, Old Friesic, and Old Saxon in the form *and-*; in Old High German as *ant-*; in Mæso-

Gothic it has also a fuller form *anda-*, which answers to the Greek *ἀντί*, the Latin *ante*, and the Old Sanskrit *anti*.

This prefix is also exhibited by the word *answer*, which is the A.S. *andswerian*, and (as far as the prefix goes) the German *antworten*.

Another possible example is the word *abide*. We find not only the A.S. forms *onbīdan* and *anbīdan*, but also the fuller form *andbīdan*; and this answers to an Old High German *enbīten*, in which *en* is short for *ent-*. If *abide* be refused admission here, it must go into class 4.

It should be added here that there is one instance in which the prefix *and-* has passed into *e-*, viz. in the word *elope*. This is a borrowed word, from the Dutch *ontloopen*, which is the German *entlaufen*.

I have no doubt about referring hither also the words *again* and *against*, which are commonly referred to the prefix *on-* because the A.S. form is *ongean*. But it appears to me that the prefix *on-* is here a corruption of *ond-*, another spelling of *and-*. Indeed, our word *answer* occurs in A.S. in all three forms *andswarian*, *ondswarian*, and *onswærian*; so that the A.S. *ongean* exactly corresponds to the German *entgegen*.

(4) The prefix in *ARISE*, answering to the Mæso-Gothic *US-*.

We find in Mæso-Gothic a preposition *us*, meaning *out of* or *from*, answering in fact to the Latin *ex* in signification, though it hardly seems to correspond with it as far as the vowel is concerned. It occurs frequently in composition, and answers to the Old High German *ar-*, *ir-*, *ur-*, and the modern German *er-*, but in Old Saxon and Anglo-Saxon becomes *a-*. The principal words with this prefix are *abide* (?), *adread*, *afear*, *affrighted*, *aghost*, *ago*, *arise*, *arouse*, *ashamed*, and *awake*. *Abide* is A.S. *abīdan*, *anbīdan*, *onbīdan*, or *andbīdan*, so that it may belong, as just suggested, to class 3. We find, however, the Old German *erbīten*, and the Mæso-Gothic *usbeidan*, which give it some claim to come in here.

In *adread*, we find in A.S. all three forms *adrædan*, *ondrædan*, and *of-drædan*, but I place it here in company with *afear-*

ed, *affrighted*, and *aghast*; cf. Germ. *erschrecken*. *Afear*d is A.S. *afæred* or *of-færed*, both forms being found; but the O.H.G. has the verb *erværen* or *erveren*. *Affrighted* is A.S. *afyrht*, and in Old High German we meet with the verb in the various forms *arfurihtan*, *erforahten*, *erfurahten*, later *ervürhten*, *irvurhten*, or *ervurchten*. *Aghast*, now spelt, like *ghost*, with an intrusive *h*, is found in Old English in both forms, *agasted* and *ofgasted*. It seems best to refer it at once to the Mæso-Gothic *usgeisnan*, to be terrified, and *usgaisjan*, to terrify. *Ago* is often wrongly said to be a corruption of *igo*, the past participle of the simple verb *gán*, to go. But it is easily traced back to the A.S. *agán*, the past participle of *agangan*, to pass by; for *ago* still has the sense of *past by*. Besides, we find the same verb both in the Old Saxon *agangan* and the Old High German *ergan* or *argan*, now spelt *ergehen*. The Old Saxon past part. *agangan* was used precisely as we now use *ago*; see Heliand, ed. Heyne, l. 47. *Arise* is the A.S. *arísan*, Old Saxon *arísan*, and the Mæso-Gothic *ur-reisan*; it being a rule in Mæso-Gothic that *us-* becomes *ur-* before a following *r*. *Arouse* is parallel to the transitive verb *urraisjan* in Mæso-Gothic. *Ashamed* has in A.S. the double form *asceamod*, or *ofsceamod*; compare, however, the Old High German *erschamen* or *irscamen*. *Awake* is the A.S. *awacan* or *onwacan*; compare, however, the German *erwachen* and the Mæso-Gothic *uswakjan*. To shew how capriciously these prefixes were used, I may observe that whilst we find *erwachen* in German, we find *ontwaken* in Dutch. So that I must confess that I do not see how the four prefixes *of-*, *on-*, *and-*, and *us-*, can always be separated with perfect certainty. Each word ought to be investigated separately, and the result can only be certain in a few cases. In others some doubt must of necessity still remain.

Perhaps we may add to this list the word *abear*; though here again we are met by double forms, viz. the A.S. *abéran* and *onbéran*. Unfortunately, the signification of these prefixes is rather slippery; so that even this guide fails us.

The word *amase* has not been satisfactorily traced. One account connects it with the Icelandic *masa*, to chatter or talk idly, which is not very satisfactory. Dr Stratmann puts it in

this class. Perhaps it arose in a similar way to *appal*; and if so, it belongs to class 5.

I here collect, for convenience, the words in which the prefix may have arisen from one of several sources. They are:—*alike* (from *on-* or *and-*); *abide* (from *and-* or *us-*); *adread* (from *of-*, *on-*, or *us-*); *afear'd*, *aghast*, *ashamed* (from *of-* or *us-*); *awake*, *abear* (from *on-* or *us-*); *amase* (from *us-* or *ad-*). Also *afore* (from *on-* or *at-*); see class 10.

(5) The prefix AD- in ACHIEVE.

Properly speaking, the words containing the Latin *ad-* ought to go into two classes; (a) those which we have taken directly from the Latin, and (b) those which we have taken through the medium of the French. I put them together because they present no particular difficulty, and the dictionaries are generally correct in their information concerning this prefix.

(a) For further remarks on *ad*, see Haldeman's English Affixes, p. 43; and Koch's Eng. Gram. III. (b) 171. It assumes, as is well known, several forms, viz. *a-*, *ac-*, *ad-*, *af-*, *ag-*, *al-*, *an-*, *ap-*, *ar-*, *as-*, *at-*, according to the nature of the following consonant. There are very few words in which it is cut down to the simple *a-*. Examples of this are seen in *ascribe*, and *astringent*, in which the root contains *s* followed by a consonant. Several words of the same character, such as *ascend*, *aspect*, *asperse*, *aspire*, also occur, but these may have come to us through the French, whereas *ascribe* and *astringent* were borrowed directly.

(b) The French *à*, from Latin *ad*, appears evidently in such words as *abate*, *abandon*, *achieve*, *adieu*, *adroit*, *agree*, *alarm*, *alert*¹, *amort*, *apart*, *aver*, and many others. Sometimes it seems to make but little difference to the sense, as in the Old French *avengier*, from Lat. *vindicare*, whence Eng. *avenge*; neither do I see clearly how to tell (in some cases) whether this Old French prefix is to be referred to the Latin *ad-*, to the Latin *ex-*, or to the Old French *es-*, which is said, however, to be from the Latin *ex*. A remarkable instance of the free use

¹ The extraordinary phrase *on the alert* contains an English and a French preposition, and an English and a French definite article.

of the prefix *a-* (probably *ad-*) is seen in the word *appal*, formed from a Welsh root. The Welsh *pall* signifies *loss of energy, failure*; and the verb *pallu* is *to fail*. To this the middle-English *a-* (partly a reminiscence of the A.S. *on*, and partly an imitation of the Lat. *ad*) was prefixed, to give it a transitive force. The resulting word *appal* has some resemblance to the Old French *appalir*, to grow pale, and hence has frequently been referred to the Latin *pallidus*. It is, of course, quite possible that some confusion in sense with the word *pale* may have influenced the formation of the word from the very first.

(6) The prefix AB- in AVERT.

See, on this prefix, Haldeman's *English Affixes*, p. 42; and Koch's *Eng. Gram.* III. (b) 170. This class is also subdivisible into two classes; (a) words taken directly from Latin, and (b) words adopted through the French. The prefix generally appears in a fuller form, viz. either *ab-*, as in *abjure*, or *abs-*, as in *abscond*, *abstain*, and *abstract*. The word *avert* is almost the only one in which it is cut down to the simple *a-*. The most noteworthy example is in the word *advance*, where the *ab* has ignorantly been turned into *ad*. The derivation is from the Latin *ab ante*, whence the French *avancer* and Old Eng. *avance*.

(7) The prefix EX- in AMEND.

There can be little doubt that the Fr. *amender* was a corruption of the Latin *emendare*. Hence the prefix is really the Lat. *ex*. For the change of *e* into *a*, compare our *anoint* with the Old French *enoindre*, from the Lat. *inungere*.

In another instance, the form of the prefix is *as-*, or *es-*. I refer to *essay* or *assay*, which is from the Lat. *exagium*.

Probably the word *afraid* is to be referred hither also. It is from the O.F. *effraier* or *esfraier*, and the Provençal form *esfreidar* points to a probable Low Latin form *exfrigidare*. The original sense of *afraid* is, accordingly, *chilled*, and hence, *chilled with terror* or *terrified*.

I now draw attention to some very puzzling words, which have hardly been satisfactorily solved, viz. *await*, *award*, *abash*,

and *astonish*. These are easily traced to the Old French *eswaiter*, *eswarder*, *esbahir*, and *estonner*. All the authorities, including Littré, Diez, Burguy, and Brachet, agree in the account of this prefix *es-*, which they declare to be a corruption of the Latin *ex-*, used with various significations. It may be so, but I cannot refrain from advancing the rather bold suggestion that this *es-* was at any rate to some extent influenced by a reminiscence of the Mæso-Gothic *us-* or the Old High German *ar-*. According to this view, *eswarder* is parallel to the German *erwarten*; and *eswaiter* to the German *erwachten*, for it is well known that *wait*, *watch*, and *wake* are mere variations in spelling of the same word.

So also, instead of taking *estonner* to be from an imaginary Latin *extonare* (a strengthened form, we are told, of *attonare*), I make it parallel to the German *erstaunen*. Indeed, the form *astound* may have been pure English. We find an A.S. *stunian*, the modern *stun*, and also an A.S. compound verb *astundian*. The only drawback is that the latter word seems to have meant *to put up with*, and so does not agree with *astound* so well in sense as in form. Still it is made equivalent to our *astound* in Bosworth's Dictionary.

I may perhaps put the result in this way. All French etymologists divide the word *astonish* into *as-* and *-tonish*, and they admit no value of the Old French *es-* but that derived from the Latin *ex-*. My proposal is to divide it into *a-* and *-tonish*, connecting the verb with our *stun* and the German *erstaunen*. I then proceed to suggest a connection between the resulting French prefix *e-* and the Old High German *ar-*. An alternative suggestion is that the initial *e* in the Old Fr. *estonner* meant just nothing at all, but was added for convenience of pronunciation, like the *e* in *espérer*, from the Lat. *sperare*.

(8) The A- in ALAS!

Here the prefix is simply an interjection, answering to the English *ah*, Fr. *hé*, Ital. *ahi*. The same value is to be attributed to the *a* in *alack*, which seems, indeed, a mere corruption of *alas*. So also in *ahoy*, the prefix in which has not been accounted for. Yet *hoy* is clearly the Du. *hui*, an interjection

meaning "come up! well!" according to the small dictionary published by Tauchnitz; for *hoy* and *hui* would be pronounced almost exactly alike, and many sea terms are known to be Dutch. If then *hoy* is itself an interjection, the prefix *a-* must be one also.

The word *avast*, according to Webster, is a corruption of the Dutch *hou vast*, i.e. hold fast or "hold hard." This looks very likely; but if so, it increases the number of values of the prefix *a-* from *eleven* to *twelve*.

There is an *a* in the middle of *wellaway* or *welladay* which may be explained here. The older form of the two is *wellaway*, and this is known to be a corruption of the A.S. *wá la wá*, which means literally *woe! lo! woe!* The *a* is therefore a part of the A.S. *lá*, which is the modern *lo!*

(9) The prefix AN- in ABYSS.

This Greek negative prefix is well understood. It occurs in full in *anecdote*, *anodyne*, and *anomaly*; but it is commonly cut down to *a-*, as in *aneroid*, *abyss*, *achromatic*, and *adamant*. It answers to the Lat. *in-* and the English *un-*; and is well discussed in Prof. Key's Essays, p. 127. His suggestions that a fuller form of it is seen in the Lat. *ve-* in *vesanus*, and the Eng. *wan-* in *wanhope*, deserve consideration; I can hardly go with his next step, which would bring us to the same root in a supposed word *uam-alus*, bad, of which the latter part is preserved in the Latin *malus*.

(10) The prefix AT- in ADO.

I doubt if even the above nine values quite exhaust the subject. Besides the word *avast*, where *a* may stand for *hou*, there is the word *ado*, which may point to a prefix *at*. The only explanation I can find of this word is the ingenious one given by Mätzner, in his Englische Grammatik, vol. II. pt. II. p. 58.

The word *at* is used with the infinitive mood in Icelandic, Swedish, Danish, &c. The same practice, borrowed from the Danes, prevailed in Northern English. Thus in the Towneley

Mysteries, p. 181, we find 'We have othere thinges *at do*,' i.e. to do. This Mätzner compares with l. 5082 of the Romaunt of the Rose, 'And done all that they han *ado*;' where *ado* certainly means *to do*, and seems to be a contraction of *at do*. Conversely, the poet Gascoygne, in his *Jocasta*, Act I. Sc. I, has the expression, 'And so with much *to doe*,' where we should now say 'with much *ado*.' This helps to confirm the supposition. According to this view, *to-do* in the phrase 'here's a *to-do*,' is a translation (as it were) of the Northumbrian *at do*.

Another word which may exhibit *at-* is *afore*. We find in A.S. both *onfóran* and *atfóran*, as I have said, and the former form is more likely to have been the real source, since the prefix *on-* was so common. Yet we find the other form sometimes; Layamon, for instance, has *at-foren*, and Robert of Gloucester *atvore*.

(11) The prefix GE- in AWARE.

This is somewhat doubtful, yet it is difficult to assign any other source. The A.S. has *gewær*, but in later Old English we find *war*, *i-war*, or *y-war*. The evidence is distinctly in favour of a corruption of *iwar* into *aware*, loath as I am to admit such an unlikely change. We must remember, however, that the extreme frequency of *a-* as a prefix in words like *above*, *aloft*, and the like, may have greatly contributed to suggesting the alteration. In this case, the English *to become aware* of a thing exactly corresponds to the German *gewahr werden*.

The word *ilik* is found frequently in Early English, but we may escape the deduction that *alike* is a corruption of it. We may safely refer *alike* to A.S. *onlíc*, corresponding to the Icelandic *á-líkr* and the Mæso-Goth. *analeiko*; whence *o-like* in Robert of Brunne, p. 301 (according to Richardson), and *aliche* in Gower and in the Testament of Love. *Onnlicnesse* for *likeness* occurs in the Ormulum. We find also in A.S. the form *andlícnesse* (Gen. i. 27), which raises a suspicion that *on-* is short for *and-*, and makes it doubtful whether *alike* belongs to class 2 or to class 3.

I cannot say that I feel quite sure of all the results, owing to the imperfect state of our Old English Glossaries; but I wish

to call attention to their probable correctness, and venture to express a hope that future lexicographers, when they have occasion to mention the prefix *a-*, will condescend to explain *which* prefix *a-* they mean; since there are very nearly a dozen of them.

WALTER W. SKEAT.

ON HYPERIDES.

I. Orat. Fun. c. IX. 34 foll. οὐδεμία γὰρ στρατεία τὴν τῶν στρατενομένων ἀρετὴν ἐνεφάνισεν μᾶλλον τῆς νῦν γεγενημένης, ἐν ᾗ γε παρατάττεσθαι μὲν ὁσημέραι ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, πλείους δὲ μάχας ἡγωνίσθαι διὰ μιᾶς στρατείας ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας πληγὰς λαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ etc. Different conjectures have been made by learned men. Professor Fritzsche (Ind. Lect. in Acad. Rostoch. 1861, 1862) conjectures: πλείους δὲ πληγὰς λαμβάνειν ἐν μάχαις ἡγωνισμέναις διὰ μιᾶς στρατείας ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους etc. This would imply that the Athenians and their allies sustained in this war a great number of defeats; but up to the time when Hyperides delivered this speech, they had always been victorious. Hyperides says expressly regarding Leosthenes' engagements with the enemy: συνέβη δ' αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν πραγμάτων ὧν προείλετο κρατῆσαι, τῆς δ' εἰμαρμένης οὐκ ἦν περιγενέσθαι (c. VI. 38 foll.). Dr Blass in his edition and Dr Mähly in Neue Jahrb. f. Phil. und Pädag. 1872 p. 611 propose respectively ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας συμβαίνει ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χ. and ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας πολίτας συμβαίνει ἐν τῷ π. χ. Professor Cobet in his edition of this speech p. 16: 'arena sine calce. exime πληγὰς λαμβάνειν et sana erunt omnia.' Professor Babington defends the reading of the papyrus in his second edition: 'To myself at least the text of the MS. seems perfectly sound. Hyperides in his rhetorical flourishing fashion declares that Leosthenes and his men had passed through more battles in one campaign, than other people had received blows in all their lifetime. It may be hyperbolical enough to affirm that the number of the former exceeds that of the latter, but that is no reason for suspecting the cor-

rectness of the text; although it must be owned that *εἰληφέναι* would have been more natural.' I am inclined to think that *πληγὰς λαμβάνειν* is used in the meaning of 'clades accipere.' In a small essay (printed in Professor G. Curtius' *Grammat. Stud.* 1870, p. 101—114) I have collected a number of words which are more or less peculiar to Hyperides; some of them are not to be found in any other writer, some Hyperides used in common with one or other of the Comic poets, some occur in later writers, especially in Polybius; e.g., whilst Aeschines II. 176 etc. has *ἀψιμαχία*, Hyperides fragm. 134 and Polybius XVII. 8, 4 use the verb *ἀψιμαχεῖν*; Demosthenes XVIII. 13 etc. has *τραγωδεῖν* (to tell in tragic phrase, to exaggerate), whilst Hyperides II. c. 10, III. c. 37 and later writers employ a noun *τραγωδία*, cf. Polybius VI. 56 etc. In like manner Hyperides may have used *πληγή* in the sense of 'defeat,' whilst Herodotus and Thucydides use *πλήσσεσθαι* in the sense of 'to be defeated.' Cf. Photius s.v. *πέπληκται ἡττῆται*. *Μένανδρος* (Dobree, *Adv.* I. p. 606). We again meet with *πληγὰς λαμβάνειν* in this sense in Polybius, e.g. I. 15, 2, II. 32, 3; cf. Schol. on Thucyd. III. 18 *πληγέντες· μέγας νικηθέντες οἱ Μηθυμναῖοι. πληγή γὰρ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ τραῦμα ἢ ἰσχυρὰ ἦττα*. I quote the translation of the passage by M. Caffiaux (*Quelques observations sur la dernière récénsion du texte de l'Oraison Funèbre d'Hypéride* p. 12): 'Il fallait, en une seule campagne, gagner pour recouvrir l'hégémonie, autant de victoires que, dans le passé, il avait fallu, pour la perdre, essayer de défaites.'

II. There is a passage in [Longinus] *περὶ ὕψους* c. 34 regarding Hyperides which seems to require a closer attention than has been bestowed upon it. Hyperides is there compared to a *πένταθλος*. *εἰ δ' ἀριθμῶ, μὴ τῷ μεγέθει κρίνοιτο τὰ κατορθώματα, οὕτως ἂν καὶ Ὑπερείδης τῷ πάντι προέχοι Δημοσθένους. ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῦ πολυφωνότερος καὶ πλείους ἀρετὰς ἔχων καὶ σχεδὸν ὕπακρος ἐν πᾶσιν, ὡς ὁ πένταθλος, ὥστε τῶν μὲν πρωτείων [ἐν ἅπασιν—Professor Jahn places these words in brackets in his edition] τῶν ἄλλων ἀγωνιστῶν λείπεσθαι, πρωτεύειν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν*. Professor Kayser (*Heidelb. Jahrb.* 1853, p. 642) does not put a favourable construction on this comparison,

exclaiming: 'Ein schönes Lob in der That für einen Künstler unter den Laien der erste zu sein.' On the other hand Dr Boehnecke (Demosthenes, Lykurgos, Hyperides etc. p. 107) draws from it a conclusion in support of his opinion that Hyperides was an orator rather by nature than by education. I think the comparison of Hyperides with a *πένταθλος* cannot be fully understood without a thorough investigation of the system of the *πένταθλον* and the qualities required in a *πένταθλος*. Such an investigation has been made by Dr Pinder (*Über den Fünfkampf der Hellenen*, Berlin 1867). He has established quite a new theory. According to him the *πένταθλον* consisted of ἄλμα, ἀκόντιον, δρόμος, δίσκος, πάλη: in the leaping-contest all the competitors took part; to the spear-throwing those only were admitted who had shown a certain proficiency in leaping; in the subsequent contests the number of the competitors was limited: the four best spearmen entered for the race, the three best runners were admitted to the trial of throwing the discus, finally the two best discus-throwers wrestled, and the victorious wrestler was declared victor in the *πένταθλον*. I have only quoted so much of this interesting essay as is required for my purpose, which is to show how much value may be attached to the title of *πένταθλος* given to Hyperides. Dr Pinder (p. 85) says: 'The judgments of the philosophers and rhetoricians as to the *πένταθλοι* appear as the natural consequence of such a system. They blame the mediocrity of the performances, admitting at the same time their many-sidedness. This is a just censure. For in fact the victor in the *πένταθλον* was not required to be the best man in any one of the four first contests; his performances were only not allowed to be below a certain mediocrity. His final opponent could not be very bad at jumping or running or throwing the spear and discus, but might possibly be a poor wrestler. The victory over him, considered as a victory in wrestling, might be anything but brilliant. Therefore, the *πένταθλοι* are praised for many-sidedness and censured for their mediocrity.' Cf. Aristides Panath. p. 318 Dind.: ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδὲ πένταθλοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάντα νικῶντες τοσοῦτον τοῖς πᾶσι κρατεῖν; and Photius cod. 249 p. 440 Bekk.: καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ πένταθλος πάσας ἔχων τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν ἀθλημάτων

ἐν ἐκάστη ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν τι ἐπιτηδεύοντος; and Suidas s.v. Πένταθλος. Δημόκριτος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης ἤσκητο γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ, τὰ ἠθικὰ, τὰ μαθηματικὰ, καὶ τοὺς ἐγκυκλίους λόγους, καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν πᾶσαν εἶχεν ἐμπειρίαν. The πένταθλος may be considered inferior to any one who gave himself entirely to a single art. So Plato Amat. c. 4, p. 135: ἄρ' ἐννοῶ, ἔφην, οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἰσὶν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἄθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτοίς. From this passage we see clearly that the πένταθλος compared with a runner or wrestler, i.e. with one who cultivated exclusively running or wrestling, is his inferior, but still gets the victory on account of his many-sidedness, being the best of the competitors who cultivated all five branches of the contest. The passage of [Longinus], which is not mentioned in Dr Pinder's essay, is to be understood in the same way; *ιδιωταί* are not lay-men in the general sense of the word, but only in opposition to the professional spear-throwers etc., in the same way as *ιδιωταί* are sometimes contrasted with the professional orators.

In my essay above mentioned, I added a fragment (taken from E. Miller, *Mélanges de Littérature grecque*, p. 121) to those in Dr Blass' edition of Hyperides. This fragment I prefixed to his fragm. 100, so as to form the following: ἀκούω γὰρ Αὐτοκλέα τὸν ῥήτορα πρὸς Ἰππίνικον τὸν Καλλίου περὶ χωρίου τινὸς ἀμφισβητήσαντα καὶ λοιδορίας αὐτοῖς γενομένης ῥαπίζειν αὐτὸν Ἰππόνικον ἐπὶ κόρῃς. ἔπειτα καὶ Ἰππόνικος ὑπ' Αὐτοκλέους μόνον ἐρῥαπίσθη τὴν γνώθον etc. I may here mention that the Deliac speech of Hyperides is referred to in the Schol. on Aeschines III. 108: τὸ δὲ Προνοίας Ὑπερείδης ἐν Δηλιακῷ συνηγορεῖ ὅτι ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἐστίν (F. Schultz, *Aeschinis Oratt.* p. 334).

HERMAN HAGER.

ON THE DERIVATION AND THE MEANING OF ΕΠΙΟΥΣΙΟΣ.

THERE are four possible derivations of the word ἐπιούσιος;—*two* from εἶναι (which are really distinct), and *two* from ἰέναι, (which are only slightly divergent). Thus

1. Referred to εἶναι, the word may be
 - (a) from the participle, ἐπι-ών, or
 - (b) from ἐπὶ and οὐσία.
2. Referred to ἰέναι, it may be
 - (a) from [ὁ] ἐπ-ιών [χρόνος], or
 - (b) from [ῆ] ἐπ-ιοῦσα [ἡμέρα].

Of recent writers, Dean Alford, in his note on S. Matt. vi. 11, follows Tholuck in contending for 1 (b): whilst Professor Lightfoot, in a very able and interesting Essay appended to his treatise “on a Fresh Revision, &c.,” pleads in favour of the second of the above pairs; with a strong leaning towards 2 (b).

A question, on which so eminent scholars have held opposite opinions, may fairly be considered open to re-examination.

In the present paper each of the four possible solutions will pass under review; but it will be convenient to take them in an order the reverse of that in which they are given above.

I. *Is it from ἐπ-ιοῦσα?*

1. There is *no need* to draw the feminine form into the discussion¹.

¹ Although our great Lexicon does in one place countenance this, by giving
“οὐσία, ῆ, (ὦν, οὔσα, εἰμι).”

As *γερουσία* comes from *γέρων* directly, so will *ἐπιούσιος* from *ἐπιών*. If the interval between *γέρων* and *γερουσία* is to be abridged, we must call in the help of the Spartan form *γεροντία*. For, as the analogy of the Latin and Sanscrit verbs leads us to think *λέγοντι* an earlier form than *λέγουσι*, so *γεροντία* may well take precedence of *γερουσία*.

2. There is a serious reason against doing so.

Such a prayer as "Give us this day the bread of to-morrow," is both harsh in itself, and at variance with what Christendom generally has understood by the petition.

In any case, then, 2 (b) may be dismissed.

II. Or, from *ἐπ-ιών*?

Against either of the derivations from *ἔναι* there is the following weighty objection.

From the time of Origen downward, almost all critics have felt that the word *ἐπιούσιος* was, in all likelihood, formed on the model of *περιούσιος*. Therefore, as there is no doubt about *περιούσιος* being from *εἶναι*, we should naturally take *ἐπιούσιος* also from *εἶναι*—unless there be some insuperable obstacle in the way of our doing so.

It is, indeed, urged that such an obstacle actually exists; because the form of the word, if derived from *εἶναι*, would (it is said) be *ἐπούσιος* (with the iota elided).

To this it has been replied¹, that the rule respecting the elision of the iota cannot be considered absolute; since we have *ἐπίοπτος*, as well as *ἔποπτος*, and *ἐπιανδάνω*, as well as *ἐφανδάνω*. This appears to be a sufficient answer to the objection: though, when we come to speak of 1 (a), we shall take much stronger ground.

III. Is it, then, from *ἐπὶ* and *οὐσία*?

Once more we refer to the analogy of *περιούσιος*. Since the substantive *περιουσία* is not from *περὶ* and *οὐσία*, but directly from *περι-ών* (as *οὐσία*, *ἀπουσία*, *ἐξουσία*, *μετουσία*, *παρουσία*, *συνουσία* are from *ών*, *ἀπών*, &c. directly), the obvious

¹ Alford, u. s.

course is to derive the closely associated adjective *περιούσιος* also from *περι-ών*. As *περιουσία* is "the state in which one has *περιόντα*, a surplus," so *περιούσιος* is "such as belongs to, or forms, a surplus."

So far, then, the balance of probability seems to be on the side of *ἐπι-ών*.

IV. It remains to be considered how far this derivation, from *ἐπι-ών*, satisfies the conditions of the problem.

It does so completely. As *περιούσιος* signifies "corresponding to *τὸ περίον*,—what is over and above, or surplus," so *ἐπιούσιος* will denote, "corresponding to *τὸ ἐπίον*,—what is close by, or at hand." Accordingly, *ἄρτος ἐπιούσιος* would mean "bread suited to our ordinary, or immediate, wants."

We may now revert to the grammatical objection noticed above. The following consideration will, it is hoped, entirely remove all scruple that might be felt on this score.

It is unquestionable that no such form as *ἐπών* is anywhere to be found. Consequently, we must admit that the present participle of *ἐπεῖναι* is *ἐπιών*; unless some good reason can be produced for leaving *ἐπεῖναι* destitute of a present participle. In fact, however, we have very strong reason for concluding just the reverse. For, when we find in actual use¹ the two following correspondent sets of phrases,

- (1) *τὸ παρόν, ὁ παρὼν νῦν χρόνος, ἢ παροῦσα νῦν ἡμέρα,*
- (2) *τὸ ἐπίον, ὁ ἐπιὼν χρόνος, ἢ ἐπιούσα ἡμέρα,*

it seems little short of a certainty that the participles of the latter set, no less than those of the former (with which they stand in sharp contrast), are to be taken as coming from *εἶναι*.

To complete our view of the subject, let two remarks be added.

1. The meaning most commonly assigned to the word *ἐπιούσιος* by Greek writers does, as a matter of fact, supply an exact antithesis to *περιούσιος*.

¹ See Liddell-and-Scott, s. vv.

For, as Polybius¹, on the one hand, uses πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας χρείας in contrast with πρὸς περιουσίαν:

So, on the other hand, Theophylact² explaining ἐπιούσιον says, οὐ τὸν περιττὸν πάντως, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀναγκαῖον: whilst both Chrysostom² and Theodoret², when commenting on Phil. iv. 19 ("my God shall supply all your need,"—χρεῖαν), call to mind this petition of the Lord's Prayer.

2. The view we have been led to take does away with the antithesis, so strongly pressed by Dr Lightfoot, between the "temporal" and "qualitative" meanings, which various writers, in their comments or paraphrases, have assigned to the word (e.g. καθημέρινος and ἀναγκαῖος). The two sorts of meaning do, in reality, interpenetrate. Thus:

(a) In S. James ii. 15, 16, we have ἡ ἐφήμερος τροφή and τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τοῦ σώματος³ used as equivalents.

(b) In the account of the manna in Exod. xvi. 4, where the Septuagint has τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας εἰς ἡμέραν, the Vulgate has "*quæ sufficiunt per singulos dies*:"—"Daily bread for daily needs," as the hymn says.

(c) The connexion between "daily" and "needful" food is met with in Rabbinical comments on Exod. xvi:—e.g.⁴

"*What was needed for each single day.*] He who created the day, created its supply of food (פרנסתו). Whence R. Eliezer said: He who has so much as is needed for to-day, and yet can ask, How am I to get provision for to-morrow? such a man is lacking in faith (מחוסר אמונה)."

¹ *Ib.* s.v. περιουσία.

² Quoted by Dr Lightfoot, *u.s.*

³ St. Cyril, on Exod. ii. 1 (ap.

Lightfoot, *u.s.*) explains ἄριστος ἐπιούσιος by τὰ εἰς ζῶην ἐπιτήδεια.

⁴ Mechilta; ap. Nork, *Rabb. Quellen*, p. 44.

W. KAY.

ON CICERO EPP. AD FAMILIARES, 4. 5. 3.

IN Vol. IV. of this Journal, p. 249, Mr Munro has a critical notice of the phrase AN CREDO which he, after Lachmann, had condemned as a solecism in Lucret. v 175 and in Cicero, Ep. ad Fam. iv. 5. 3, and had corrected by the plausible substitution of AT for AN. He now, while holding still that the phrase is a solecism, sees his way to a different correction.

I wish to confine my observations to the latter passage: for the two passages do not stand or fall together necessarily, though they invite comparison, and though Lambinus seems, by fair inference, to have revoked his first criticism on Cicero by his recollection of the parallel form in Lucretius.

The phrase occurs in the well-known letter of condolence from Sulpicius to Cicero, and it is introductory to the second argument by which Sulpicius seeks to divert Cicero from his grief for his daughter's death.

He had begun by urging: (1) "Can you let yourself be thus stirred by personal domestic sorrow? Have we not had losses far greater and such as should make the mind callous to annoyance?"

Then comes the next reflection: (2) "Nay, you will say, I grieve not for myself but for her. Is that it? Yet have we not often felt in these days that they are well off who have died painlessly; that there is little left to live for?"

The third argument is: (3) "But you will say grief for such a loss is natural. True; if it be an escape from a worse alternative."

The Latin runs thus: (1) *Quid est quod tanto opere te commoveat tuus dolor intestinus?* (2) *An illius vicem, credo, doles?* (3) *At vero malum est liberos amittere.*

I submit that AT is more to be expected in sentence (2) than AN. For AN would mean, Is it possible that? Can it be

that? implying some unlikelihood. But as a simple suggestion of a different point of view, AT finds place no less naturally in (2) than in (3); and AT ILLIUS not only corresponds to but is confirmed by, AT VERO.

It is objected that AT CREDO is ironical and therefore ill-suited to the occasion. But irony need not be satirical; irony is that which under one mode of expression hints at its opposite; e.g. under the affirmative *credo* veils a negation. CREDO may be rendered (as by Mr Munro, p. 242) '*I trow*', '*I will suppose*', '*perhaps*'. It occurs some three sentences lower in the sense '*no doubt*', where the objection of its being ill-suited to condolence would equally, if at all, apply.

The textual error however may lie not in AN but in CREDO. Mr Munro proposes AN ILLIUS VICEM, CICERO, DOLES?

Would he understand the name to be thrown in as a term of affection and sympathy? Even in that case it would come more naturally in sentence (1). But I think it would rather imply what is said below (§ 5), NOLI TE OBLIVISCI CICERONEM ESSE; and perhaps this paragraph might be thought at first sight to countenance the reading, but it is clear that NOLI TE etc. is but the application of the foregoing reflection, MEMINISSE HOMINEM TE ESSE NATUM.

I have been surprised to see that in very recent editions of this Letter of Sulpicius, no notice whatever is taken of the questions here discussed. I doubt whether, in the face of these difficulties, I can do as I had resolved in continuing my Edition of Cicero, viz. introduce the correction of AT for AN: but it is certain that no editor ought to pass by the reading without notice or comment. I have met however with like instances of neglect. The last editor of Tacitus ignores Mr Hort's *Adversaria* in the earlier series of this Journal, Vol. III. No. ix., and his elucidation of the difficult LIMITEM SCINDIT in *Annal.* I. 50. Still more remarkable is the omission in the Thucydides of the *Catena Classicorum* of all reference to Dr Donaldson's perfect correction and explanation of the text B. 2. 7.

J. E. YONGE.

ON SOME PASSAGES OF THE PENTATEUCH,
JUDGES, AND 2 KINGS.

Benoní or Binyamín. Gen. xxxv. 18.

“AND it came to pass, as her soul was in departing (for she died), that she called his name Ben-oni: but his father called him Benjamin.”

The English Version has in the Margin,

the son of my sorrow for בֶּן-אוֹנִי,
the son of the right-hand for בְּנֵימִין.

In the interpretation of בֶּן אוֹנִי the verse, Gen. xlix. 3,

רְאוּבֵן בְּכֹרִי אֶתָּה כָּחִי וְיִרְאֵשִׁית אוֹנִי

Reuben, my first-born thou, my strength and the *firstling of my vigour*,

should perhaps be borne in mind. A very plausible interpretation is “*filius roboris*, in quo supremum robur consumpsi;” a name which Jacob replaces by another, which signifies *strength, dignity*, &c. in a higher degree, and is less suggestive of mournful associations. But perhaps the best explanation is that which has been given by Nachmanides:

And the right in my eyes is that his mother called him Benoní, and meant to say, Son of my Mourning, from “bread of אֹנִים” (Hos. ix. 4), “I have not eaten בָּאֹנִי” (Deut. xxvi. 14). And his father made out of אוֹנִי, *my strength*, from the use of the word in רִאשִׁית אוֹנִי (Gen. xlix. 3), וְלֵאמֹר אוֹנִים (Is. xl. 29), and therefore called him Binyamín, Son of Strength, or Son of Might, for in the right-hand is power and success,

according to the signification of the Scripture, "A wise man's heart is at his right-hand" (Eccl. x. 2), "Thy right hand shall find out all thine enemies" (Ps. xxi. 9), "The right hand of the LORD is exalted" (Ps. cxviii. 16). He meant to call him by the name that his mother called him, for so all his sons were called by the name that their mothers called them, and he interpreted it of *excellence* and *power*.

For *Binyamín*, Son of the Right Side or Hand, compare *אִישׁ יְמִינָךְ* (Ps. lxxx. 18), and *בֶּן חֵיל* (1 Sam. xiv. 52). In 1 Sam. ix. 1 occurs *בֶּן אִישׁ יְמִינִי*. Even to the right eye a preeminence is assigned (Zech. xi. 17; Matt. v. 29).

It seems on the whole very probable that there is a play on the good and bad senses of *Benoní*; but in any case it would be well to recognize in the margin the two classes of renderings, *Son of my Sorrow*, and *Son of my Vigour*.

The Second Commandment. Exod. xx. 4, 5.

Mr W. A. Wright has, in this *Journal*, Vol. iv. p. 156, given reasons for objecting to the A. V. rendering of the second commandment: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of *any thing* that is in heaven above, &c.;" and has shewn that while *פֶּסֶל* is rightly translated "graven image," *תְּמוּנָה* is rather a natural *object* than a "likeness" or representation of such an object. It is suggested that the commandment might be expected to prohibit not only image worship but also the worship of external objects, such as the sun, the moon, and the like; and the following new rendering is proposed:

"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image; and (as to) any form that is in the heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth, thou shalt not bow thyself down to them, &c."

1. But it is an objection to this rendering that, by disturbing the punctuation, it introduces too great a variation

from the parallel passage in Deut. v. The whole passage (Ex. xx. 2—6) differs from the קרי of Deut. v. 6—10, by inserting ו before תמונה, and omitting it before על־שֵׁלִשִּׁים. Perhaps we ought to read in both cases תמונה, omitting ו, thus:

“Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image of any form that is in the heaven above, &c.”

It seems natural that we should here read

פָּסַל בְּלִי-תְמוּנָה,

instead of

פָּסַל וּבְלִי-תְמוּנָה,

since in all of the analogous verses where the words פָּסַל and תְּמוּנָה occur together, the former seems to be in the *status constructus*:

Deut. iv. 16 : וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לָכֶם פָּסַל תְּמוּנֹת בְּלִי-סֶמֶל :

Deut. iv. 23 : וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לָכֶם פָּסַל תְּמוּנֹת כָּל :

Deut. v. 8 : לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה לְךָ פָּסַל בְּלִי-תְמוּנָה :

2. It is still doubtful to what לָהֶם in ver. 5 refers. According to the LXX., which the A. V. seems to have had in view, it would be possible to take the commandment as prohibiting, (i) the making of images; (ii) the worship of the objects which the images represent, *αὐτοῖς* referring to *ἑσα*. This would be in accordance with Deut. iv. 16—19, where ver. 16—18 is a prohibition of image *making*, and ver. 19 of star *worship*.

But we might also connect ver. 3, 5, and take ver. 4 as a parenthetic sequel to ver. 3, thus:

“Thou shalt have no other GODS before me—(thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image of any form, that is, &c.)—thou shalt not bow down thyself to THEM, nor serve them: for I am the LORD thy God, &c.”

the expression GODS being applicable to the images mentioned in ver. 4. See Exod. xxxii. 1, 4; xxxiv. 17; Lev. xix. 4.

3. In the latter part of Exod. xx. 5 we might supply the ׀ which it was proposed to omit before תְּמוּנָה, and thus assimilate the passage still further to Deut. v. 9, by reading:

עַל בָּנִים וְעַל שְׁלִישִׁים וְעַל רְבָעִים

where three distinct generations, viz. the *second*, בָּנִים, the *third*, and the *fourth* are specified. Here also the A. V. is inexact.

Elsewhere, שְׁלִישִׁים = בְּנֵי בָנִים
and, רְבָעִים = בְּנֵי שְׁלִישִׁים

Moses striking the Rock. Numb. xx. 7—13.

This passage—briefly noticed in the *Journal of Philology*, No. 2, p. 60—runs as follows in the Authorized Version:

“And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying, Take the rod, and gather thou the assembly together, thou, and Aaron thy brother, and SPEAK YE¹ unto the rock before their eyes; and it shall give forth his water, and thou shalt bring forth to them water out of the rock: so thou shalt give the congregation and their beasts drink. And Moses took the rod from before the LORD, as he commanded him. And Moses and Aaron gathered the congregation together before the rock, and he said unto them, Hear now, ye rebels; must we fetch you water out of this rock? And Moses lifted up his hand, and with his rod he smote the rock twice: and the water came out abundantly, and the congregation drank, and their beasts *also*. And the LORD spake unto Moses and Aaron, Because ye believed me not, to sanctify me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore ye shall not bring this congregation into the land which I have given them. This *is* the water of Meribah; because the children of Israel strove with the LORD, and he was sanctified in them.”

¹ וְדַבַּרְתֶּם אֵלֶיהָ

With this compare the description of a similar occasion in Exod. xvii. 5—7:

“And the LORD said unto Moses, Go on before the people, and take with thee of the elders of Israel; and thy rod, wherewith thou smotest the river, take in thine hand, and go. Behold, I will stand before thee upon the rock of Horeb; and thou shalt SMITE¹ the rock, and there shall come water out of it, that the people may drink. And Moses did so in the sight of the elders of Israel. And he called the name of the place Massah, and Meribah, because of the chiding of the children of Israel, and because they tempted the LORD, saying, Is the LORD among us, or not?”

The remarkable agreement of these narratives in other particulars suggests a doubt as to the accuracy of the rendering SPEAK YE UNTO THE ROCK, which might, without detriment to the sense, be assimilated to the parallel, “thou shalt SMITE the rock;” nor do I know of any serious objection to a change of rendering in the former passage. It is indeed an obvious remark that דבר generally means *to speak*, but since it is equally certain that it sometimes has a different meaning, its rendering here must be regarded philologically as an open question. In relation to the context, the idea of *speaking to the rock* must, if it does not explain the sin of Moses, be regarded as an excrescence, since there is little to be said for the middle course sometimes adopted of keeping so strange a rendering, and then depriving it of all significance.

In regulating Numb. xx. 8 by the very similar Exod. xvii. 6 our translators would only be doing the like to what they have done more than once elsewhere, as the annexed examples plainly shew.

(a) 2 Chron. xxii. 10; 2 Kings xi. 1:

וַעֲתִלְיָהוּ אִם אֲחֻיָּהוּ רָאָתָה בִּי מֵת בְּנֶה וְתָקַם וְתִדְבֵּר
אֶת-כָּל-זֶרַע הַמַּמְלָכָה לְבֵית יְהוֹרָה :

¹ וְהָיְתָה בַצֹּר

“But when Athaliah the mother of Ahaziah saw that her son was dead, she arose and DESTROYED all the seed royal of the house of Judah.”

Here the meaning of **וַתִּדְבֹר** has been inferred from 2 Kings xi. 1, a passage which¹ is word for word the same in the English, but differs in the original by reading **וַתִּמְאַד** in place of **וַתִּדְבֹר**.

(β) Ps. xviii. 48; 2 Sam. xxii. 48:

הָאֵל הַנּוֹתֵן נַקְמֹת לִי
וַיִּדְבֹר עַמִּים תַּחְתִּי

“It is God that avengeth me,
And SUBDUETH the people under me.”

Here in like manner the doubtful word **וַיִּדְבֹר** has been interpreted with reference to the parallel verse, 2 Sam. xxii. 48, which gives **וַיִּמְוֶרֶד**, “and that bringeth down the people under me.”

Perhaps it would be rather better to read *smite* for **דָּבַר** both in (α) and (β): thus, “she arose and SMOTE all the seed royal” (2 Chron. xxii. 10); “and hath SMITTEN down mine enemies under me” (Ps. xviii. 48). The same word suits the passage under discussion: “Take the rod...and SMITE the rock before their eyes” (Numb. xx. 8).

The Mother of Sisera. Judg. v. 30.

“Have they not sped? have they *not* divided the prey; to every man a damsel or two; to Sisera a prey of divers colours of needlework, of divers colours of needlework on both sides, meet for the necks of *them that take the spoil*?”

¹ As far as “seed royal.”

There is not sufficient reason for accepting the renderings,

רַחֵם רַחֲמָתַיִם

a damsel or two,

לְצוֹאֲרֵי שָׁלָל

meet for the necks of them that take the spoil,

difficult as it may be to establish really satisfactory renderings in their place.

1. רַחֵם is a rarer form of רַחֵם the *womb*, and is said to be here used by way of contempt for a *female*¹; but this view is not supported by the usage of the language or by the ancient versions of the passage. Another serious objection arises from the addition of a second and unique form רַחֲמָה, which is said to be used in the same sense. But the combination of the masculine and feminine forms might be expected to denote something more extensive as regards number or quantity. Compare Isai. iii. 1, where in a description of the entire removal of supports the expressive combination מִשְׁעָן וּמִשְׁעָנָה is used. Rosenmüller aptly quotes from el-Harírí, *Makam.* 3:

أَرِيغِ الْقَنِيصَ بِهِ وَالْقَنِيصَةَ

and writes: “*Scipionem marem et scipionem feminam*, i.e. omne fulcrum atque præsidium; nam voces ejusdem potestatis, sed generis diversi, conjunctæ, universitatem ejus rei de qua susceptus sermo significant.”

A striking illustration is afforded by Judg. xv. 16:

חֲמוֹר חֲמֹרָתַיִם

or

heaps upon heaps,

according to the Authorized Version. It even suggests itself that the expression under consideration may have arisen by

¹ רַחֵם, joined with רַחֵם, רַחֵם, &c. occurs as a masculine proper name in 1 Chron. ii. 44—47. רַחֲמִים, and the

Assyrian רַחֵם, *self*, are used without distinction of sex. See Oppert's *Gram. Ass.* p. 37, and Sayce's, p. 47.

metathesis from the above; and it will be found that some slight confirmation of this hypothesis is afforded by the Ancient Versions quoted below:

הלא מרמשכחין מפלגין בותא
יהבין גבר וביתיה כל חד וחד בוא סג

"Is it not because they are finding, dividing the spoil,
Giving a man and his house, each single one, much spoil?"

ܠܗ ܐܢܐ ܫܐܠܡܬ ܠܗܡ ܫܠܠܐ
ܫܠܠܐ ܠܗܡ ܠܗܡ ܠܗܡ ܠܗܡ

"Perhaps he has gone and found much spoil,
And distributed a mule to the heads of the men."

لعل ظفر بنهب كثير في طريقه
فقسم لكل امرئ حمله عسل وزيت كثير

"Perhaps he has got possession of much booty on his way,
And distributed to each man a load of much honey and oil."

The LXX. reads,

οἰκτίρων οἰκτειρήσει εἰς κεφαλὴν ἀνδρός, κ.τ.λ.

It will be observed that,

- (i) None of these Versions favours the rendering *damsel*.
- (ii) The Chaldee, Syriac, and Arabic speak expressly of *much* spoil, while the LXX. by its construction of emphasis hints at the same.
- (iii) The Syriac may be supposed to have read **ܗܡܘܪ**, *ass*.
- (iv) The Arabic may either have read the same, or may have read **ܗܡܪ**, *heap*, since under **ܗܡܪ** we find: "ONUS; pilenta camelina; tum CAMELI in quibus sunt pilenta" (Freytag).

It is very suitable to the context that a *great quantity* of spoil should be spoken of. Such a meaning might be arrived at without metathesis, by assuming רָחַם, *uterus*, to have had some other meaning which is now obsolete. But without attempting to define how the required meaning is to be obtained, I shall merely assume that *heaps upon heaps* is a rendering which suits the context.

2. The rendering, "*fit for the necks of them that take the spoil*," has been reasonably objected to. The construction is harsh, and the idea of exquisite embroidery to be worn on the necks of soldiers is unsuitable; nor is it much better to read, "*for the necks of beasts of burden that are themselves spoil*." But the idea of distributing some of the spoil to the men's households is natural: it is suggested by the Targum, and, as some would say, by Ps. lxxviii. 13. I would therefore read, with a change of pointing,

either

צֹואֲרִי

or

צֹואֲרִי,

arranging the whole verse as follows:

הֲלֹא יִמְצְאוּ יְחִלְקוּ
שָׁלַל רָחַם רַחֲמִתַּיִם
לְרֹאשׁ גִּבּוֹר שָׁלַל צְבָעִים
לְסִיסֶרָא שָׁלַל צְבָעִים רִקְמָה
צֶבַע רִקְמָתַיִם לְצֹואֲרִי שָׁלַל :

"Are they not finding, dividing,
Spoil HEAPS UPON HEAPS?
For each man a spoil of colours,
For Sisera a spoil of colours of broidery,
A pattern of double broidery FOR MY OWN NECK a spoil?"

where there is (1) a distributive parallelism, the *finding* belonging to the second line, and the *dividing* to what follows; and (2) a natural gradation from the dyed stuffs which go to the common soldiers, to the choice piece of "needlework on both sides," which the speaker, "Fœmineo prædæ ardore" (*Æn.* XI. 728) would be glad to secure for her own neck.

Elisha and Naaman. 2 Kings v. 13.

The *locus classicus*,

וַיֹּאמְרוּ אָבִי דָּבָר גָּדוֹל
הַנְּבִיא דָּבָר אֵלֶיךָ הֲלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה
אֵף כִּי אָמַר אֵלֶיךָ רַחֵץ וְיִטְהַר :

is usually misquoted in the sense of the Authorized Version :

"And (they) said, My father, *if* the prophet had bid thee *do some* great thing, wouldest thou not have done *it*? how much rather then, when he saith to thee, Wash, and be clean?"

which takes no account of the emphatic position of הַנְּבִיא before its verb; and, as the italics partly shew, fails to render the tenses in a simple and direct way.

1. The idiom דָּבָר גָּדוֹל may be illustrated by reference to the following passages:

(a) רַק אֵין דָּבָר בְּרַגְלִי אֶעֱבֶרָה

"I will only just—no matter—pass by on my feet."

(Numb. xx. 19.)

where the LXX. has τὸ πᾶγμα οὐδέν ἐστι.

(β) וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד מָה עָשִׂיתִי עָתָה
הֲלֹא דָּבָר הוּא :

“And David said, What have I now done? *Is there* not a cause?” (1 Sam. xvii. 29.)

Literally, οὐχὶ ῥῆμά ἐστιν; (Alex.).

(γ) “If I expressly say unto the lad, Behold, the arrows *are* on this side of thee, take them; then come thou: for *there* is peace to thee, and no hurt; as the LORD liveth.” (1 Sam. xx. 20.)

where the Hebrew text has,

כִּי שָׁלוֹם לְךָ וְאֵין דָּבָר חַי יְהוָה :

and the LXX.

ὅτι εἰρήνη σοι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ζῇ κύριος.

I take the expression under discussion as an example of the idiom which occurs in the passages (α) (β) (γ). The word דָּבָר is susceptible of various shades of meaning, and cannot be exhaustively rendered by a single expression in English; but to pass by for a moment the question of the rendering of דָּבָר itself, an affinity will be at once recognized between

there is no DABAR.

אֵין דָּבָר

is it not DABAR?

הֲלוֹא דָּבָר הוּא

great DABAR.

דָּבָר גָּדוֹל

In the passage under discussion we may read either, *It is a great, a serious, matter*; or *There is great cause*. For the sense *cause, reason*, see Josh. v. 4, &c.

2. The obvious rendering of the next clause is somewhat as follows:

“The PROPHET hath spoken unto thee; wilt thou not perform?”

where there is a strong emphasis on דְּנִבִּיא, indicated by its position before its verb דִּבֶּר. The correspondence between דְּנִבִּר and the preceding דִּבֶּר cannot, perhaps, be given by any

English rendering; but it might be retained in a Greek rendering since λόγος is susceptible of almost the same varieties of application as דבר.

3. The servants of Naaman have urged upon him that the word of the prophet was either a serious *matter*, or a valid *reason* why the thing in question should be done. They now go on to say that in addition to all this there is nothing repulsive, but quite the reverse, in the thing commanded. It is both easy of performance, and very much to the man's advantage, to "*Wash and be clean.*"

Thus the sense of the whole address is as follows:

"My father, There is great cause,
The PROPHET hath bidden thee,
Wilt thou not do it?
The more so that he hath said unto thee,
Wash and be clean."

The LXX. fails to give the emphasis of דְּבַר, but it renders the tenses directly, and may be said to meet the above rendering halfway, thus:

Μέγαν λόγον ἐλάλησεν ὁ προφήτης πρὸς σέ·
οὐχὶ ποιήσεις;
καὶ ὅτι εἶπε πρὸς σέ
Λοῦσαι καὶ καθαρίσθητι.

C. TAYLOR.

THE SOPHISTS.—II.

IN the last number of this Journal I argued in favour of the view put forward by Grote as to the common acceptation, in the age of Socrates and Plato, of the term Sophist. I tried to shew, that even after it had partly lost its vaguer and wider signification, inclusive of Masters of any Arts, Poets and *literati* generally—it still was not restricted to teachers of a particular sect or school, having common doctrines, or even a similar philosophic tendency: but was applied to all whom the vulgar regarded as teaching λόγων τεχνήν, whether they were rhetoricians and declaimers like Gorgias and Protagoras, or arguers and disputers, after the fashion that Socrates brought into vogue. It comprehended, therefore, several classes of persons besides the Professors of the Art of Conduct with whom Socrates is contrasted in the earlier Platonic dialogues. It included, for example, Rhetoricians generally, even though like Gorgias they disclaimed altogether the teaching of Virtue: in fact it is evident from Plato's Gorgias that the distinction which he there tries to draw between Sophist and Rhetor is but vaguely apprehended by the popular mind. It included also (as I was chiefly concerned to shew) Socrates and his disciples: who were considered—by all except themselves—as Sophists of the Disputatious, as distinct from the Declamatory, species. In fact even Plato, in his later works, and Aristotle, shew us, under the title of Sophist, a professor of quasi-Socratic argumentation: quite unlike the rhetorical lecturers on Conduct whom Socrates

confutes in the earlier dialogues. We may perhaps distinguish three stages in the signification of the term: or rather (as they are not strictly successive) three areas of an application narrowing gradually, but not uniformly, so that at any time the class would be conceived with considerable vagueness, and very differently by different persons.

(1) Even after the *σοφία* which a Sophist professed was generally understood to be something higher than mere technical skill in any department, still an eminent specialist who made any pretensions to general enlightenment might easily be called a Sophist: and so the term would be applied, by many persons, to such professors of music as Damon and Pythoclides, to Hippodamus the architect and Meton the astronomer.

Then (2) I conceive that for about the period 450—350 B.C. the word was commonly used to denote all who professed, as Xenophon says, *λόγων τεχνήν*: including both the rhetorical and dialectical professors of the Art of Conduct (which the vulgar would persist in regarding as an Art of talking about conduct), and also rhetoricians like Gorgias, Polus, &c. down to Isocrates: not that the line between the two was very clearly drawn, as Isocrates claimed that his 'Philosophy' really involved instruction in morals, and it was matter of debate down to the time of Cicero whether the true orator must not necessarily possess a knowledge of things in general. However during the latter half of this period, after the death of Socrates, the appellation, being an invidious one, was probably repudiated with equal vigour and ultimate success by Rhetoricians and Philosophers.

But (3) we need not doubt that the still stricter manner in which Plato (in the *Gorgias*) conceives the class of *σοφισταί*, distinguishing them from the *ρήτορες*—was at least partially current in the time of Socrates. For when once cultivated society in Greece had become persuaded that *ἀρετή*—excellence of character and conduct—could really be imparted in lectures, and were willing to pay large sums for obtaining it: naturally the professors of this *Ars Artium* would be regarded as in a special sense, Professors of Wisdom,

σοφισταί. And it is such men as these that the term always suggests to readers of Greek history, however they may be vaguely conscious of its wider usage. The fresh light in which he placed the ethical teaching of these men was the most important result of Grote's discussion. If his argument had appeared generally so overwhelming as it seems to myself, the present paper would not have been written: but since the contrary view is still supported by the whole prestige of German erudition, I shall endeavour to re-state Grote's case in such a manner as to shew most clearly on what a curious combination of misrepresented historical evidences, and misconceived philosophical probabilities, the opposite theory rests.

But before doing this, I wish to notice one or two points in which I cannot follow Grote, and by which he seems to me to have prejudiced unnecessarily the general acceptance of his theory. Although one may fairly say that to a mind like Grote's scarcely anything could be more antipathetic than the manner of Protagoras and his followers: and although it is evident to careful readers of his Plato, that he had the deepest enthusiasm for the spirit that dwelt in Socrates, and reigned over the golden age of Greek philosophy: still the intensity of his historical realization has made him appear as an advocate of the pre-dialectical teachers. He seems always to be pleading at the bar of erudite opinion for a reversal of the sentence on certain eminent Hellenes. Now with this attitude of mind I have no sympathy. There was at any rate enough of charlatanism in Protagoras and Hippias to prevent any ardour for their historical reputation—even though we may believe (as I do) that they were no worse than the average popular preacher, or professional journalist, of our own day. One might more easily feel moved to take up the cudgels for Prodicus, resenting the refined barbarity with which Plato has satirized the poor invalid professor shivering under his sheepskins. But justice has been done to Prodicus by the very German erudition against which I have here to contend. And as for the class generally—they had in their lifetime more success than they deserved, and many better men have been worse handled by posterity. It is only because they represent the first stage of ethical reflection in Greece, and therefore the

springs and sources of European moral philosophy, that one is concerned to conceive as exactly as possible the character of their teaching. The antagonism to that teaching, which developed the genius of Socrates, constitutes really so intimate a relation that we cannot understand him if we misunderstand 'Sophistik.'

But again, in his anxiety to do justice to the Sophist, Grote laid more stress than is at all necessary on the partisanship of Plato. No doubt there is an element of even extravagant caricature in the Platonic drama: and the stupidity of commentators like Stallbaum, who treat their author as if he was a short-hand reporter of actual dialogues, is provoking. Still, one always feels that the satirical humour of Plato was balanced and counteracted by the astonishing versatility of his intellectual sympathy. And the strength of Grote's case lies in what Plato actually does say of the Sophists, and not in suggestions of what he may have said untruly.

Before examining the evidence, it may be well to state clearly the conclusions commonly drawn from it which I regard as erroneous. What does a writer mean when he speaks of 'Sophistical ethics,' 'Sophistical theories on Law and Morality'? As far as I can see, he always means speculative moral scepticism leading to pure egoism in practice. He means a denial of the intrinsic validity of all traditional social restraints, and a recommendation to each individual to do exactly what he finds most convenient for himself. That nothing is really proscribed or forbidden to any man, except what he chooses to think so: that Nature directs us to the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure, and that the seeming-strong moral barriers to this pursuit become mere cobwebs to enlightened reflection: that "Justice is good for others" than the just man, and that the belief that it is good for him to be just is kept up by these others in their own interest—this is supposed to be the teaching which the youth of Athens thronged to hear. Whatever speculative and rhetorical garnish the Sophists may have added, this was "*der langen Rede kurzer Sinn*."

I might have abstracted this statement from almost any of the German writers whose works are text-books in our universi-

ties: but I will choose as my authority the generally judicious and moderate Zeller. He speaks of "Sophistik" as "Moralische Skepsis:" of the "Sophistische Theorie des Egoismus," the sophistical "Grundsatz dass für jeden recht sey, was ihm "nützlich," the sophistical "Satz von der Naturwidrigkeit des "bestehenden Rechts:" to the Sophists, he says, "das natürliche Gesetz schien nur in der Berechtigung der Willkür, in "der Herrschaft des subjectiven Beliebens und Vortheils zu "bestehen": "das Sophistische Ideal" was "die unbeschränkte "Herrschermacht."

I need not multiply quotations: and perhaps even these are superfluous. In Schwegler's smaller treatise, in Erdmann's more recent handbook, in the popular history of Curtius, views substantially the same are put forward. Now I would not deny that licentious talk of this kind was probably very prevalent in the polite society of Athens during the age of Socrates and Plato. But the precise point which I, after Grote, maintain, is that such was not the professional teaching of those Professors of the Art of Conduct whom it fell to Socrates to weigh in his formidable balance: that it was not for this that he found them wanting: and that it is a grave misapprehension of his relation to them to conceive him as shielding morality from their destructive analysis, and reaffirming the objectivity of duty in opposition to their "Absolute Subjectivität."

The indictment thus sweepingly drawn against a profession proceeds upon two lines of argument. It appeals to the evidence of contemporary authority, especially Plato: and it is further supported on a presumption drawn from the metaphysical doctrines believed to have been held by the Sophists. It will be convenient to take the two arguments separately: accordingly, in the present paper, I shall confine myself entirely to the first.

The only testimony which it is worth our while to consider at length is that of Plato. Aristotle's knowledge of the contemporaries of Socrates must have been entirely second-hand: and indeed what he says of the Sophists must be taken to refer chiefly to what I have ventured to call post-Socratic

Sophistry—the Eristical disputation which I conceive to have been chiefly imitated from Socrates, and to have borne at any rate less resemblance to the rhetorical moralizing of Protagoras and Prodicus than it did to the dialectic of Socrates.

Obviously we can make no use of the evidence of writers like Aristophanes and Isocrates, who lump Socrates and his opponents together under the same notion. And though Xenophon does not, of course, do this: still his conception of sophistical teaching is evidently of the vaguest kind. He probably would have included under the term physical theorists like Anaxagoras, for we find him speaking of “the Cosmos, *as the Sophists call it.*” So that we cannot refer with any confidence to his description of the class generally, but only to the notices that he gives of particular individuals. The most important of these is an account of a dialogue between Socrates and Hippias, which is noticed below: he further represents his master as borrowing from Prodicus the well-known fable of the Choice of Hercules: and this together with other testimonies has led to the general acquittal of Prodicus from the charges brought against his colleagues. But the main part of our historical investigation must turn upon the Platonic dialogues. Those in which the Professors of conduct appear or are discussed are chiefly the Hippias Major and Minor (if we admit the genuineness—or verisimilitude—of the former), and the Protagoras: the Meno, Gorgias and Republic. I have tried to shew that in the Sophista and Euthydemus the Sophist is a teacher of an entirely different type. And of the six dialogues above mentioned I think it may be fairly contended that the three former are most likely to represent the actual relation of Socrates to the ethical teachers of his age: for they are no doubt the earlier, and the obvious aim of each of them is to exhibit Socrates in controversy with Sophists: whereas in the Meno the Sophists are only mentioned incidentally; the polemic of the Gorgias is directed primarily against Rhetoricians, and the Republic is chiefly constructive and expository. Now suppose a person to know no more than that there were in Athens certain clever men whose teaching was dangerous, as being subversive of the commonly received rules of morality, and tending to establish egoistic maxims of conduct: and suppose that with this infor-

mation he is set down to read the three first-mentioned dialogues. He is introduced to Hippias, Protagoras and Socrates. Hippias has composed an apologue in which he makes Nestor recommend to Neoptolemus the different kinds of conduct that are considered Noble or Beautiful: Socrates, by ingenious questioning, reduces him to helpless bewilderment as to the true definition of the term *καλόν*. Again, Hippias has lectured on the contrast between the veracious Achilles and the mendacious Ulysses: Socrates with similar ingenuity argues that wilful mendacity or wilful wrong-doing generally is better than ignorance and involuntary error: Hippias protesting against the dangerous paradox. Again, he finds Protagoras explaining how it is that any plain man is, to a certain extent, a teacher of Virtue, having knowledge of the chief excellencies of conduct, and being able to communicate them to others: a Professor of Conduct is only a man who knows and teaches what all plain men know and teach, in a somewhat more complete and skilful manner. Socrates, on the other hand, argues that all Virtue resolves itself into a method of calculating and providing the greatest possible pleasure and the least possible pain for the virtuous agent. Can any one doubt that such an unprejudiced reader would rise from his perusal of the three dialogues with the conviction that Socrates was the Sophist as commonly conceived, the egoist, the ingenious subverter of the plain rules of morality? And though perhaps even at this point of his studies (and certainly when he had read a little further) he would decide that Socrates was not really a "corrupter of youth," he would see no reason to transfer the charge to Protagoras or Hippias. He would see that Socrates attacked their doctrines not as novel or dangerous, but as superficial and commonplace. Impostors they might be, in so far as they pretended to teach men what they knew no better than their pupils: but if they knew no better they knew no worse: they merely accepted and developed the commonly received principles. And thus—to come to the later dialogues to which I have referred—one finds that Socrates even half defends them in the 'Meno' against the popular odium which he shared with them: Anytus is made to confess, that whatever blame they may

deserve, his own abuse of them has been uttered in mere ignorance. So again in the Republic, where Plato's satire takes a bolder sweep, there is a sort of indirect and latent defence of the Sophists against the charge on which Socrates suffered as their representative. Plato clearly feels, that whatever quarrel Philosophy might have with the Sophists, Demos had no right to turn upon them: Demos himself was the arch-Sophist and had corrupted his own youth: the poor Professors had but taught what he wanted them to teach, had but conformed to the common manner and tone of thought, accepted and formulated common opinion. Nor is the view of 'Sophistik' presented in the Gorgias really different, though it has been differently understood. No doubt it is a "sham Art of Legislation," it does not give the true principles on which a sound social order is to be constructed: but that is not because it propounds anti-social paradoxes: rather, it offers seeming-true principles, which fit in with the common sense of practical men.

It is said, however, that there are other passages in Plato which clearly exhibit the anti-social tendencies of the Sophistic teaching: and that especially in the last two dialogues to which I have referred such evidence is to be found. Let us proceed to examine these passages in detail.

The most comprehensive and pregnant formula in which this anti-social teaching is thought to be summed up, is that τὸ δίκαιον, justice, or social duty generally—exists νόμῳ only, and not φύσει. It is clear from the references in his Ethics &c. that Aristotle found this doctrine very widely held by his predecessors: and we should draw a similar inference from a well-known passage in Plato's Laws (B. x. p. 8. 89, 90) where he speaks of "the wisest of all doctrines in the opinion of many" "...that the honourable is one thing by nature and another "thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing "about them and altering them." The commentators do not hesitate to treat these passages as referring to the Sophists: in fact they make the reference in such a matter-of-course manner, that one is startled to find how entirely unauthorized it is. Aristotle's allusions are quite general: and Plato simply

says that these are "the sayings of wise men, poets as well "as prose-writers." This no doubt does not prove that he is not referring to the Sophists: but when we consider that it is the great assailant of Sophistry who is speaking, it seems pretty strong negative evidence. It is said however that other passages in Plato shew so clearly that the doctrine was actually held by the Sophists, that there was no reason why he should mention them by name in the *Laws*. It is said (1) that Hippias in the 'Protagoras' draws precisely the same distinction between νόμος and φύσις, and that Plato's testimony is here confirmed by Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. c. 4): (2) that Callicles in the 'Gorgias' employs the same antithesis as a quasi-philosophical defence of his cynically avowed immorality: (3) that Thrasymachus in the 'Republic' puts forward a view of justice coinciding substantially with that of Callicles, though not couched in the same language. This cumulative evidence seems at first sight very strong: but I think that on a closer examination every part of it will be found to break down.

In the first place, it must be observed that the mere adoption or bringing into prominence of the distinction between the 'conventional' and the 'natural' as applied to the laws and usages of society is no evidence of egoistic, anti-social disposition or convictions. Rather, we may say, is the recognition of such a distinction an obvious and inevitable incident of the first beginnings of philosophical reflection upon society, especially in an age of free and active mutual communication among a crowd of little states differently organized and mostly in a state of rapid change. And the natural effect of such recognition upon an ordinary mind, sharing in the ordinary manner the current moral sentiments and habits of its society, is rather an endeavour to separate the really sacred and stringent bonds, the fundamental and immutable principles of social behaviour, from what is conventional and arbitrary in positive law and custom. And it is just in this attitude of mind that Hippias appears in the dialogue with Socrates that Xenophon records. After some characteristic sparring, Socrates has defined the Just to be the Lawful. This surprises Hippias: "Do you "mean they are identical?" he answers, "I do not quite under-

“stand how you use the words...how can one attribute much “intrinsic worth to laws, when their makers are continually “changing them?” That is, Justice in Hippias’ view is therefore not τὸ νομιμὸν, because it must be σπουδαιότερον πρᾶγμα. And the few sentences in the Protagoras in which the Professor’s style of lecturing is somewhat broadly caricatured, are quite in harmony with Xenophon’s account: and indeed would suggest this view rather than the other if taken alone.

With Callicles the case is quite different. His use of the antithesis of φύσις and νόμος is no doubt flagrantly immoral: an open justification of the most sensual egoism. The only lacuna in the argument here—and it seems to me a sufficiently large one—is that Callicles is not a Sophist, and has no obvious connexion with Sophists. “No matter,” say Zeller and others, “he must be reckoned a representative of the Sophistische “Bildung.” Now here a distinction must be taken, the importance of which I shall presently urge at more length. If by “Sophistische Bildung” is merely meant what German writers commonly call the “Aufklärung”, or rather the frivolous and demoralizing phase of the “Enlightenment” diffused through polite society in this age, the negative and corrosive influence which semi-philosophical reflexion upon morality has always been found to exert—this is no doubt represented in Callicles. But if it is meant that Plato intended to exhibit in Callicles the result, direct or indirect, of the teaching of our Professors of Conduct: then I can only say that he dissembled his intention in a way which contrasts strikingly with the directness of his attack in other dialogues. For Callicles is not only nowhere described as a friend or pupil of Sophists: but he is actually made to express the extremest contempt for them. “You know the claims,” says Socrates, “of those people who “profess to train men to virtue.” “Yes, but why speak of these empty impostors” (ἀνθρώπων οὐδέενος ἀξίων): replies Callicles. Certainly we have here a most unconscious “representative”.

It is said however that Aristotle speaks of Callicles as a Sophist, or at least as a Sophistical arguer: and that in respect of his use of this very antithesis. The passage referred

to is Sophist. Elench. XII. 6. Both Sir A. Grant and Mr Cope interpret it in this way: and as Aristotle's authority on such a point cannot be disregarded, we must consider the passage carefully. Sir A. Grant introduces it as follows:

p. 106. "One of the most celebrated 'points of view' of the Sophists, was the opposition between nature and convention. Aristotle speaks of this opposition in a way which represents it to have been in use among them merely as a mode of arguing, not as a definite opinion about morals. He says (Soph. El. XII. 6), 'The topic most in vogue for reducing your adversary to admit paradoxes, is that which Callicles is described in the *Gorgias* as making use of, and which was a universal mode of arguing with the ancients,—namely, the opposition of 'nature' and 'convention;' for these are maintained to be contraries, and thus justice is right according to convention, but not according to nature. Hence they say, when a man is speaking with reference to nature, you should meet him with conventional considerations; when he means 'conventionally,' you should twist round the point of view to 'naturally.' In both ways you make him utter paradoxes."

Now the words which are here rendered "that which Callicles is described in the *Gorgias* as making use of" are ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ γέγραπται λέγων. But what is "Callicles in the *Gorgias* described as saying"? Is he "reducing his adversary to admit paradoxes"? On the contrary, he is *complaining of this procedure on the part of Socrates*. ὥς τὰ πολλά, &c., he says, ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ πολὺν λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως τὰ τοῦ νόμου. It is Socrates who is the Sophist, or at least is charged with Sophistry: and Aristotle, intent on his subject, and not thinking of the reputation of Socrates, has simply quoted the passage as a good illustration of a particular sophistical topic. This piece of evidence therefore turns out most unfortunately for our opponents. It incidentally illustrates that close affinity between the later, Eristic

Sophistry, and the teaching of Socrates, which it was the object of my former paper to exhibit: but it has nothing whatever to do with the morals of Callicles or their origin.

When we attempt to speak exactly of the relation of Callicles to "The Sophists," the necessity of distinguishing the different meanings of the term *Σοφιστής* makes itself strongly felt. Callicles may be fairly or at least plausibly called a pupil of Gorgias, but expresses utter contempt for Professors of Conduct (a class in which Gorgias expressly declined to be included). I think the explanation of this is not hard to find, if we bear in mind the circumstances under which the dialogue was written. It must be later than the execution of Socrates: and it was probably composed not long after that event¹: at a time, therefore, when the orthodox-conservative reaction was at its height, and the odium attaching to the name of Sophist especially strong. The languidly contemptuous dislike and distrust, with which old-fashioned persons had formerly regarded all this newfangled lecturing and disputing on conduct, was now changed into loud and menacing hostility. This new art that had attracted the leisured youth of Athens, was not, they now saw, mere idle pastime and folly: it was a deadly seed from which aristocratic-revolutionary intrigues and the despotism of the Thirty had sprung. Hence every one was anxious to repudiate the invidious title: in particular, the teachers of Rhetoric would emphasize the distinction between them and the Professors of Conduct, which hitherto, in the view of the world in general, had scarcely been recognized. "We have nothing to do," they would say, "with the charlatans who pretend to impart virtue: what we profess is the harmless, practical, necessary art of Public Speaking." Thus Isocrates, who in the preceding age would have accepted the title of Sophist, and who at a later period² does not repudiate it, now insists on being called a Philosopher, and writes an oration *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*. Under these circumstances the polemical aim of Plato in writing the *Gorgias* was somewhat complex. On the one hand he endeavours to shew the substantial identity of

¹ Cf. Thompson's *Gorgias*.

² In the *περὶ Ἀντιδόσεως* written not long before his death.

Rhetoric and Sophistic: they were both aimed at the production of 'Appearances, not Realities: the benefits of both were equally hollow and illusory. On the other hand he has no sympathy whatever with the prevalent fury against the Professors of Conduct, the blind selfish impulse of the Athenian public to find some scapegoat to punish for the general demoralization which had produced such disastrous consequences. He does not say—as posterity generally have understood him to say—"It is not Socrates who has done the mischief, but "other teachers of virtue with whom you confound him." On the contrary, he is anxious to shew that the mischief is not attributable to Professors of Conduct at all. It is with this view that he introduces Callicles, the "practical man" who despises professors, and thinks that the art of private and public life is to be learnt from men of the world. This is the sort of man who is likely to hold egoistic and sensual maxims of conduct. His unaided reflection easily penetrates the incoherencies and superficialities of the popular morality: his immoral principles are weeds that spring up naturally in the social soil, without any professional planting and watering, so long as the sun of philosophy is not risen.

This latter view appears still more clearly in the Republic, especially in the fine passage at the outset of Book II. (compared with B. VI.). There the *naturalness* of the evolution of audacious unrestrained egoism from conventional morality is made still more prominent. 'We find,' says the youthful interlocutor, 'that people in general praise justice and try to instigate us 'towards it, but we always find that they do so by speaking of 'the rewards it gets from gods and men. They admit too that 'justice is hard and irksome, injustice easy and pleasant. 'Again, we find that they honour rich men in public and 'private, even though wicked: and do not conceal their contempt for the virtuous poor. Nay the gods, since their forgiveness and favour is to be obtained by sacrifices, seem to do 'much the same. Hence a spirited young man naturally thinks 'that though successful lawlessness is no doubt difficult, and perhaps ordinary people had better keep to the broad road of law-observance, still the former path is the nobler of the two in its

'very difficulty, and he who can walk it successfully is truly 'fortunate in the eyes of gods and men.' Surely here we may read between the lines an answer to the charge against Socrates. "You corrupt youth," said the Athenians to the sage, "and they make oligarchical revolutions." "Not so," retorts the disciple, "it is you who cause the demoralization, by "your low views of virtue and of the gods. An acute and spirited "youth pushes these to their logical conclusions: he decides "that consummate Injustice is one of the *καλά* which the "proverb declares to be *χαλεπά*: and thus inspired he enters "clubs and plots revolutions."

What has been already said will have indicated the view that I take of the cynical deliverances of Thrasymachus. I see no reason to class him among the Professors of Conduct whom we are now considering. Plato does not call him a *σοφιστής*: and though no doubt he might be called so, in the looser sense in which the term was applied to Gorgias, he does not fall within the class either according to the earlier or to the later of its more limited definitions. He does not define justice as a professed teacher of virtue, but as a rhetorician, possessing the cultivated omniscience to which ancient rhetoricians commonly laid claim, and so able to knock off a definition of Justice, as of anything else. That "Justice is the interest of the stronger" is a plausible cynical paradox which a cultivated person might naturally and prosperously maintain in a casual conversation: but we are not therefore to suppose that Hippias or any other Professor of Conduct would take it as a thesis for a formal lecture on Virtue. Indeed, even if we had not direct evidence to shew that their discourses were much more conservative and commonplace, we might have concluded *a priori* that the Athenian youth would not have thronged to hear, with the simple earnestness described by Plato, such frivolous paradoxes as those thrown out by Thrasymachus.

We may now see with what justice Grote exclaims that the German writers "dress up a fiend which they call 'Sophistik';" which exists only in their imaginations. Analysing the historical costume of this scare-crow, we find it to consist chiefly

of unrelated fragments, illegitimately appropriated and combined. The framework, however, on which these fragments are hung, is supplied by the general scheme of development of Greek philosophical thought, which seems to be accepted in Germany. If this framework be left unassailed, it will still be believed that the earliest professional teaching of morality in Greece *must have been* egoistic and anti-social: although there may be no evidence to prove that it *was* so. I shall therefore try to shew in a subsequent paper that Grote's view of the teaching of the Sophists is no less strongly supported by general historical considerations than by particular testimonies: and that the adoption of the opposite theory has led Zeller and others into serious misapprehension of the true drift and position of both Socrates and Plato.

ON THE WORDS "NEAP" AND "EBB."

Is there any connection between the words *neap* and *ebb*? There seem to me to be two cogent reasons against the entertainment of the idea. These are (1) that the meanings of the words are very different, as will appear; and (2) that the true initial letter of *neap* is not *n*, but *h*, the word being shortened from *hneap*, as it were; and though there are instances of the loss of an initial *n*, I do not know that there are any of the loss of an initial *hn*.

It is sufficient to consider the words separately.

The *neap* is the A. S. *nép*, which is sometimes found compounded with *flood*, forming the compound *nép-flód*, a neap-flood or neap-tide. The word *nép* itself occurs in a splendid passage in Cædmon, which describes the overthrow of the Egyptians in the Red Sea; see Cædmon, ed. Thorpe, p. 207. The form *hnép* (with initial *h*) is not found in A. S., but this is not remarkable, since *n* and *hn* are confused; as, e.g. in *hnecca*, a neck, also spelt *necca*. The cognate word in prov. Swedish is *napp*, signifying stingy; but the usual Swed. word is *knapp*, scanty, with initial *k*, which connects it at once with the verb *knappa*, to pinch, which is obviously the Icel. *hneppa*, to pinch, whence Eng. *nip*. In Danish we find *knappe*, to scant or curtail, *nippe*, to twitch, *knibe*, to pinch or *nip*. But the Icel. also has the adjective *hneppr*, scanty, small, strait, nipped, narrow, pinched in; and this is at once the analogous word to the English *neap*, and explains clearly the sense of the word. A *neap-tide* is, in fact, a scanty tide, a tide which fails to rise as far as usual, and this is well known to be the ordinary sense of it. It is clear also that to *nip* is closely allied to the Suio-Goth. *nappa*, to

pluck, and the common Eng. *nab*. The Dutch has not only the adjective *knap*, signifying strait, close, narrow, and several other things besides, but also the verb *knappen*, with the various senses of to snap, to catch, to crack, to crush, and to eat. The sense of *cracking* shews that this is really the Eng. *knap*, to snap or break, and here we find at last the missing *h* of the A. S. (*h*)*nép* still represented in modern English by an initial *k*. That *kn* is here equivalent to *hn* is shewn by the Mæso-Gothic, which has *dis-hniupan* for "to break or knap asunder," and *dis-knupnan* for "to be broken asunder," words which only occur in Luke viii. 29, and Luke v. 6. We may also connect with it the Eng. *snap*, and probably *snip*. The word *snipe* is also cited by Wedgwood as named from its long bill, the Platt-deutsch *snippe* or *snibbe* meaning both *snipe* and *bill*. The Dutch *sneb*, or *neb*, means a bird's *neb* or bill; which is spelt *nib* when we speak of the end of a pen. The *snipe* is the bird that *snaps* up things with its *neb*, or *nibbles* whatever it can *nab*. To return to the word with which I started, the evidence all goes to shew that a *neap-tide* means a scanty tide, and that the A. S. *nép* ought to have an initial *h* before the *n*.

But the word *ebb* has a different sense, viz. to recede; the *ebb* of the tide means the receding of the tide after its flood or rising, a phænomenon that happens twice a day, instead of very seldom, like the *neap-tide*. What the exact derivation may be, I cannot certainly say, but the spelling never varies. The same stem *ebb-* is found in Old Friesic, Platt-deutsch, North Friesic, Danish, and Swedish. In A. S. we have the verb *ebban*, as in the phrase *pæt wæter was geebbod*, the water had receded; also the compound word *se-ebbung*, meaning a bay, lit. a sea-ebbing. Wedgwood suggests a connection with the G. *ab*, which is the Eng. *off*, as though to *ebb* meant to *go away*, a sense which it will certainly bear, but I find no clear proof of this; unless we may class it with the numerous words that are connected with Ger. *abicht*, reverse, Icel. *öfugr*, retrograde, and the E. *awk* in *awkward*, the original sense of which is back-handed, reverse, whence the secondary sense of left-handed or clumsy. The word *ebb* is still preserved in the

Shropshire dialect as an adjective, with the sense of *shallow*. Webster suggests a connection with English *even*, as though the *ebbing* of the sea made up for the flood or made matters *even*. This also is conjectural; and, though we may illustrate such a letter-change by the Cumbrian word *Hwitehebben* for *Whitehaven*, and O. E. *habben*, to have, it seems still less satisfactory than the former. I find nothing to shew that *ebb* was ever spelt *nebb*, in any language.

My conclusions then are; that *neap* is for *hneap*, and must not be cut down to *eap*, which even then would differ from *ebb*; that the senses of the words *neap* and *ebb* are radically different; and that the phænomena to which the words refer occur at different periods and in different ways.

WALTER W. SKEAT.

ON ΣΚΟΠΟΥΜΑΙ AS A PASSIVE AS WELL AS MIDDLE VERB.

IN the Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, under σκοπέω, it is said that the Present Passive of this Verb is 'rare and very late.' That it is rare in the Pres. Pass. may be true, but only because the form is little needed. It is probable that σκοποῦμαι Pass. would be used by a classical writer whenever he needed it, and two passages will here be cited, where it appears to be so used, one in Plato, the other in Demosthenes.

But first let the point be argued *a priori*.

As to the Middle σκοποῦμαι.

This is very frequent in Plato, occasional in Tragedy, used also twice in Isocrates: and although it is true that very little difference between the Act. and Depon. senses can often be drawn, yet on the whole it seems fair to say that the Middle implies a more deliberate and reflective consideration, like ὀρώμαι Middle as distinguished from ἰρώ.

But this Deponent use of ὀρώμαι does not exclude its Passive use: as ἡ παῖς ἰρᾶται Soph. Antig. 423. Why then should a Passive σκοποῦμαι be excluded when occasion requires it?

But further.

The Verb, we know, has a double form; σκοπε- (for Pres. and Imperf.), σκεπτ- (= σκεπ-) for other tenses, *very* rarely found in Present.

Now the Perfect ἔσκεμμαι and its Participle ἔσκεμμένος are notoriously used both as Deponent and as Passive. That is (to take here the Participle only), ἔσκεμμένος may mean either *having considered* or *having been considered*.

We may ask then whether it is not unreasonable to deny that the Present Participle *σκοπούμενος* is open to mean either *considering* (in a Deponent sense), or *being considered* (in a Passive sense).

Having laid this foundation in 'the Reason of the case' (which seems conclusive in itself), let us proceed to consider the two passages in which *σκοπούμενος* is found to be Passive.

I. Plato, Leg. VI. 772 D.

Ὅποτε τις οὖν καὶ ὀπηνίκα τῶν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι γεγονότων ἔτη σκοπῶν καὶ σκοπούμενος ὑπ' ἄλλων κατὰ νοῦν ἐαυτῷ...ἐξευρηκέναι πιστεύει, γαμείτω κ.τ.λ.

Liddell and Scott cite this passage as an example of the Middle use, and translate "*inquiring and having inquiry made by others.*" Here would be a most remarkable instance of the Middle sense of indirect agency, were the version correct. But this is very questionable. Ficinus simply renders, *alios aspiciens ab aliisque aspectus*. That he is right, is probable from the consideration, that the other sense would rather require δι' ἄλλων as in Phaed. 83, where ὁ τι ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ is opposed to ὁ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν (ἡ ψυχὴ). And, if we refer to the previous context in 771 (at the end), we shall see that Plato recommends a legal provision that young people shall have a fair opportunity of inspecting each other (*θεωροῦντάς τε καὶ θεωρουμένους*), and that families shall have means of observing those who may come among them hereafter as bridegrooms and brides: ἀναγκαίως ἔχει τὴν ἀγνοίαν ἐξαιρεῖν παρ' ὧν τέ τις ἄγεται καὶ [ἀ καὶ] οἷς ἐκδίδωσι κ.τ.λ.

This shews that the young gentleman of 25 is not only to examine his future wife, but to be the object of examination by others, herself to wit and her guardians (*σκοπούμενος*).

II. Demosthenes, in Lept. 473.

Εἶτα ταῦτα νῦν εἰ χρὴ κύρια εἶναι σκοποῦμεν; ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος πρῶτον αἰσχροῦς τοῖς σκοπουμένοις, εἴ τις ἀκούσειεν ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι σκοποῦσιν εἰ χρὴ τοὺς εὐεργέτας εἶναι τὰ δοθέντα ἔχειν· πάλαι γὰρ ἐσκέφθαι ταῦτα καὶ ἐγνώσθαι προσήκεν.

It is strange that commentators and translators should so

long have been content in this place to assume that *σκοπουμένοις* is Middle, and used (contrary to the practice of Demosthenes) in exactly the same sense as the Active form which twice appears in the sentence; while *ἐσκέφθαι* afterwards is Passive. Perhaps they would plead that Demosthenes uses *σκοπουμένοις* to avoid the confusion between *σκοποῦσιν* Partic. and the *σκοποῦσιν* (Verb) which follows. But this would hardly be a sufficient justification. On *every* ground, it must be clear that *σκοπουμένοις* is Passive and Neuter (Dative of Respect); and that the true version is:—

‘And are we then now considering whether these grants ought to remain in force? Why, the question, at the outset, is disgraceful *in the very subject-matter of consideration*, were any one to hear that Athenians are considering *whether they should allow their benefactors to keep their gratuities*. For this point ought to have been considered and resolved long ago.’

Surely no argument need be added to recommend an interpretation which seems to carry conviction of its truth on the face of it.

B. H. KENNEDY.

NOTES ON SOPHOCLES

(*continued*).

Oed. R. 329, Electr. 451, Trach. 553.

A PASSAGE of well-known difficulty, called by G. Dindorf in his Preface to the Teubner text, one of the "cruces criticorum," is the verse and a half in the dialogue between Oedipus and Teiresias,

ἐγὼ δ' οὐ μὴ ποτε,
τᾶμ' ὥς ἂν εἴπω, μὴ τὰ σ' ἐκφύνω κακά.

Teiresias has been sent for by Creon and Oedipus, that he may be questioned concerning the murder of Laius. The Seer, knowing that Oedipus was the perpetrator of the deed, is most reluctant to reveal it; but Oedipus presses him hard, and says his conduct is neither lawful nor friendly to the state; nay, shortly afterwards, in a rage at the Seer's persistent silence, he declares his opinion that it was *he* who plotted the murder, if he did not execute it;

ἴσθι γὰρ δοκῶν ἐμοὶ
καὶ ξυμφυτεῦσθαι τοῦργον, εἰργάσθαι θ', ὅσον
μὴ χερσὶ καίνων (346).

Without stopping here to criticize Dindorf's wanton corruption of the text, as I consider it, in reading (325), what is even rather doubtful Greek,

ὁρῶ γὰρ οὔτε σοὶ τὸ σὸν φώνημ' ἰὸν
πρὸς καιρὸν ὀρθῶς μῆτ' ἐγὼ ταῦτόν πάθω,

for ὥς οὖν μῆδ' ἐγὼ ταῦτόν πάθω, i.e. εὐλαβοῦμαι μὴ &c., I come at once to Teiresias' reply, in which the main difficulty

lies; and I think the context shows clearly that what he meant to express was this, "Abuse me as you like, I will never reveal that it was you who did the deed." Οὐ μὴ ἐκφήνω τὰ σακάκα, ὥς ἂν εἴπῃς τὰ ἐμὰ κακά. Hence for εἴπω I propose to read εἴπῃς. The latter clause means, quite literally, and without the slightest forcing of syntax or sense, 'however you may speak of, or in whatever terms you may represent, the wrong that I am doing,' namely by preserving silence. This sense of ὥς ἂν, 'however', is perfectly legitimate; take a single example from the Symposium of Plato, p. 181 A, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὥς ἂν πραχθῇ, τοιοῦτο ἀπέβη, i.e. an 'act becomes good or bad, accordingly as it shall have been done.' I add a line from memory, from Euripides, I think,

ὅπως ἂν ἐκβῇ τῶν ἐρωμένων ὁ νοῦς,

'that is according as the mind of the objects of one's affection may turn out.'

There remains however a serious difficulty, viz. the repetition of μὴ, in οὐ μῆποτε μὴ ἐκφήνω. To avoid this, for ὥς ἂν εἴπω it has been proposed to read ἐξανείπω (Blaydes), 'never shall I declare my thoughts or mind, lest I should reveal your misfortunes.' It is clear that this cannot stand, because the word 'thoughts,' not expressed, is contrasted with κακά, which is expressed. The contrast must lie in τὰ ἐμὰ κακά and τὰ σακάκα. Besides, the change of ὥς ἂν εἴπω into ἐξανείπω is itself not satisfactory in a critical point of view, especially as the compound itself nowhere occurs. I therefore agree with Elmsley and Donaldson, that the μὴ must be regarded as repeated, from the interpolation of the clause τᾶμ' ὥς ἂν εἴπῃς. Precisely similar, except that the οὐ and not the μὴ is repeated, is Philoct. 416,

ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ Τυδέως γόνος
οὐδ' οὐμπολητὸς Σισύφου Λαερτιά
οὐ μὴ θάνωσι.

I cannot therefore help thinking, that the slight change of εἴπω into εἴπῃς removes all difficulty, and supplies a meaning entirely satisfactory.

A very similar correction, ἔχει for ἔχω, I propose in another of the passages, Trach. 553, where Deianira has been expressing her fears that Hercules no longer loves her, and her distress at the suspicion. She adds, however, that she thinks she has a φίλτρον which will remove all her anxiety, viz. the application of a charm formerly given her by the dying Centaur Nessus,

ἦ δ' ἔχω, φίλαι,
λυτήριον λύπημα, τῇδ' ὑμῖν φράσω.

This is generally rendered, 'in what way I have a redeeming pain, I will explain to you'; and a redeeming pain is supposed to mean, by an inversion sufficiently harsh (to say the least of it), "a painful remedy."

Here again with a protest against Dindorf's monstrous change of τῆς νεωτέρας ἀνὴρ, 'the husband,' i.e. the real *man*, 'of the younger,' into τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἄρ' ἦ, I propose to read ἔχει for ἔχω, thus making λύπημα the subject and λυτήριον the object, 'in what way my grief has a remedy.' There is no difficulty at all in taking λυτήριον as a substantive, as in Pind. Pyth. v. 99, τὸ καλλίνικον λυτήριον δαπανᾶν, 'the consolation that victory brings for expenses incurred.'

It is not a little remarkable that Hesychius explains λυτήριον by φυλακτήριον. This so precisely suits the present context, that I am induced to suppose he had reference to the passage: and if so, it is obvious that he must have taken it in the same way, as an accusative of the object. The meaning in his view would be, 'how my trouble has a way of being removed,' or 'a precautionary measure to prevent its being realized.' He adds, it is true, λυτήριος· φύλαξ, but it is not unnatural to suppose that he explained the adjective in the same sense as he had adopted for the noun.

In Electra 451, there is great difficulty about the sense of τήνδ' ἀλιπαρῇ τρίχα, which Mr Jebb, with the scholiast, interprets, 'This neglected hair,' ἀύχμηράν. Hesychius recognises the

word in ἀλιπαρῇ. αὐχμηρά, where αὐχμηράν seems an obvious correction. The Schol. on Soph. records a variant λιπαρῇ, i.e. *ικέτιν τρίχα*, while others take ἀλιπαρῇ to be the negation of this, 'hair unfit for suppliant offering'; to which Mr Jebb very justly objects.

There certainly were two wholly distinct words, λιπαρός, connected with λίπος, 'grease,' meaning 'bright,' shining, sleek, glossy, applied to Athens, (ταῖς λιπαραῖς ἐν Ἀθήναις, from the colour of the marble, which has a kind of oily or fatty look when nearly new,) and so a fit epithet for well-kept hair; and λιπαρῆς, implying the notion of long-continued and earnest supplication and importunity, connected with λίπτεσθαι and λελιμμένος. My contention is, that the two verses in Sophocles, 451—2, are interpolated, and are due to some late grammarian or transcriber who did not know the distinction. If λιπαρῇ was written, and intended as a synonym of λιπαράν (as I suppose), it was to be expected that ἀλιπαρῇ would be invented by those who had felt the difficulty. My belief is that the passage originally stood thus,

σὺ δὲ
 τεμοῦσα κρατὸς βοστρύχων ἄκρας φόβας
 κάμου ταλαίνης, (σμικρὰ μὲν τάδ', ἀλλ' ὅμως,)
 αἰτοῦ τε προσπίτνουσα &c.

The reason of the interpolation lay in the hyperthesis or incorrect position of the τε, a use which is very familiar to readers of Thucydides. The sense was, αἰτοῦ ἡμῖν τε μολεῖν αὐτὸν ἀρωγόν, καὶ παῖδ' Ὀρέστην &c. Or, as in Aesch. Ag. 99, the τε may serve to connect the verb with the participle. It may be remarked, that ζῶμα in the sense of ζώνη, a woman's girdle, occurs nowhere else in Attic Greek, but is an Homeric word to signify a flap or apron in the armature of a hoplite; and lastly, that though the offering and even the burning of clothes for the use of the dead was a Greek practice, it is difficult to find any parallel to this alleged custom of hanging up a plain girdle or unembroidered waist-band as a propitiatory offering for a male hero deceased.

F. A. P.

Soph. Œd. Rex, 337, 338.

Τειρεσίας. ὀργὴν ἐμέμψω τὴν ἐμὴν, τὴν σὴν δ' ὁμοῦ
ναίουσαν οὐ κατείδες, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ ψέγεις.

I VENTURE respectfully to dissent from Dr Kennedy, when in the 'Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology,' Vol. I. p. 313, he gives his opinion, that Sophocles "uses ὀργή to imply a disposition, provoking anger, and not anger itself." To my mind the altercation has not proceeded far enough for any *angry* ὀργή to be remarked on Teiresias's part, and thus far I agree with Dr Kennedy. But it seems to me that although Teiresias *may* play upon Œdipus's word ὀργάνειας, yet his reference is rather to ἄτεγκτος and ἀτελεύτητος, as applied to himself, cognate qualities to which he asserts to be in Œdipus unknown to their possessor. Thus I should translate ὀργή simply 'temper,' as in Antig. 354, ὀργαὶ ἀστύνομοι, and countless other passages. It will then refer to the *obstinacy* of Teiresias in refusing to answer and of Œdipus in persisting to ask questions, which must have an evil result. "You have found fault with my temper, but didn't see that your own is next door to it, but are blaming me." ὁμοῦ ναίουσαν would mean literally 'in the same house with it,' or, as we say, 'in the same boat with it.'

Soph. Œd. Rex, 476—482.

φοιτᾷ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀγρίαν
ὕλαν ἀνά ἄντρα καὶ
πέτρας, ἅτε ταῦρος
μέλεος μελέῳ ποδὶ χηρείων,
τὰ μεσόμφαλα γᾶς ἀπονοσφίζων
μαντείᾳ· τὰ δ' αἰὲ
ζῶντα περιποτᾶται.

I think the words μέλεος μελέῳ ποδὶ χηρείων ought to be taken in close connection with ταῦρος, as indicating the forlorn condition of a bull driven by a stronger one from the herd, and

thus in a state of widowhood. The condition of such a bull is described by Virgil, Georg. III. 224—227 :

“Nec mos bellantes una stabulare, sed alter
Victus abit, longèque ignotis exulat oris,
Multa gemens ignominiam plagasque superbi
Victoris, tum quos amisit inultus amores.”

[The same reference is given by Professor Campbell, whose work I had not seen when this note was written.]

Soph. Œd. Rex, 914—917.

ὕψοῦ γὰρ αἶρει θυμὸν Οἰδίπους ἄγαν
λύπαισι παντοίαισιν οὐδ’ ὅποῖ’ ἀνὴρ
ἔννοους τὰ καινὰ τοῖς πάλαι τεκμαίρεται,
ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, εἰ φόβους λέγοι.

Can a reference to anger satisfy the requirements of the context in the interpretation of the first line of the above passage? Is there not rather a reference to the changeableness and inconsistency of a man who is in the power of the last speaker, if he do but say something to frighten him? I should be inclined to paraphrase this first line with reference to the sense of *μετέωρος* ‘at sea,’ and to translate: ‘Œdipus has his mind too far at sea through all manner of annoying thoughts.’

[My interpretation has since been supported by a reference to Eurip. Iph. in A. 919, sent me on the proof: ὑψηλόφρων μοι θυμὸς αἶρεται πρόσω.]

Soph. Œd. Rex, 1084—1109.

εἴπερ ἐγὼ μάντις εἰμὶ——αἷς πλεῖστα συμπαίξει.

The words *σέ γε* occur twice in this chorus, and on the first occasion, i.e. in the strophe, involve a singular harshness of construction, there being no subject for the transitive verb *αὔξειν*, and its direct object being immediately afterwards the subject of the passive *χορεύεσθαι*. Besides this the usual punctuation appears to me extremely clumsy, especially in the antistrophe, where it seems to make *τῶν μακραιώνων* dependent upon *τίς*, and to leave *τις θυγατὴρ* completely out in the cold.

In the strophe, therefore, I propose to read *σέ με* for *σέ γε*,

thus supplying a subject for αὔξειν and mitigating the general harshness of the construction.

I will transcribe the whole chorus with my emendation and suggested punctuation in hopes that both may commend themselves to others, as this has done to myself.

- στρ. εἴπερ ἐγὼ μάντις εἰμὶ
καὶ κατὰ γνώμην ἴδρις,
οὐ τὸν Ὀλυμπον ἀπείρων,
ὦ Κιθαιρῶν, οὐκέτι τὰν ἐτέραν
πανσέληνον, μὴ οὐ σέ με καὶ πατρίωταν Οἰδίου
καὶ τροφὸν καὶ ματέρ' αὔξειν,
καὶ χορεύεσθαι πρὸς ἡμῶν ὡς ἐπήρα φέροντα
τοῖς ἐμοῖς τυράννοις.
λήιε Φοῖβε, σοὶ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀρέστ' εἴη.
ἀντ. τίς σε, τέκνον, τίς σ' ἔτικτε;
τῶν μακραιώνων ἄρα,
Πανὸς ὀρεσσιβάταο
προσπελασθείς, ἣ σέ γέ τις θυγατὴρ
Λοξίου; τῷ γὰρ πλάκες ἀγρόνομοι πᾶσαι φίλαι·
εἴθ' ὁ Κυλλήνης ἀνάσσων,
εἴθ' ὁ Βακχεῖος θεὸς ναίων ἐπ' ἄκρων ὀρέων εὔρημα
δέξατ' ἔκ του
Νυμφᾶν Ἑλικωνίδων, αἷς πλεῖστα συμπαίζει;

"If I am a seer and intelligent in mind, no more during another month, O Cithæron, I swear it by Olympus, shalt thou be untried without my magnifying thee as the countryman and fosterer and mother of Œdipus, and without being honoured with processional dances by us, as bringing things pleasant to my sovereigns. And, Ieïan Phœbus, may these things be agreeable to thee!

"Who, child, who was thy mother? Was it then some daughter of the divinities approached by mountain-traversing Pan or by Loxias?—for to him all the pasturage table-lands are dear—or was it the ruler of Cyllene or the Bacchic god dwelling on the mountain tops, who received the treasure-trove from one of the Heliconian nymphs, with whom he sporteth most?"

Soph. Œd. Rex, 1167, 1168.

Θεράπων. τῶν Λαῶν τοίνυν τις ἦν γεννημάτων.

Οἰδίπους. ἡ δοῦλος ἡ κείνου τις ἐγγενὴς γεγώς;

It appears to me that the force of Œdipus's question is entirely lost by the commentators, so far as I am acquainted with them. When the servant says that the child was one of Laius's offspring, it seems to me absurd to suppose with Wunder, that *γεννήματα* is used *sensu singulari* to include Œdipus's whole household, both slaves and children. I would suggest that it is better to take ἐγγενὴς as = ἐν γένει, and to refer δοῦλος to the status of an illegitimate child, the son of a slave. Œdipus's question would then be: 'Was it by birth a slave, or a legitimate member of his family? Was it a Teucer or an Ajax? Was it an Ishmael or an Isaac?'

That I am not straining the force of ἐγγενὴς, I think, will be plain from 1430 and 1431:

τοῖς ἐν γένει γὰρ τὰγγενῇ μάλισθ' ὀρᾷν
μόνοις τ' ἀκούειν εὐσεβῶς ἔχει κακά·

the sentiment of which is equivalent to the vulgar English proverb, that a family ought to wash its dirty linen at home.

Soph. Œd. Rex, 1419, 1420, 1421.

Œdipus. οἷμοι τί δῆτα λέξομεν πρὸς τόνδ' ἔπος;

τίς μοι φανέται πίστις ἔνδικος; τὰ γὰρ

πάρους πρὸς αὐτὸν πάντ' ἐφηύρημαι κακός.

Here πίστις is usually taken as a 'ground of confidence,' and I cannot say that this is wrong. Still the preceding line appears to me to indicate that the πίστις was somehow contained in the ἔπος, and therefore I would suggest, that πίστις is used in the sense so frequent in Aristotle's Rhetoric, where αἱ πίστεις signify 'the proofs,' i.e. the means of producing persuasion. 'What means of inducing Creon πιθέσθαι μοι (1434) with regard to my request, ὧν ἐπαίτῳ (1416), will be found for me, that is consistent with justice?'

[I find the reference to Aristotle also given by Professor Campbell.]

A. H. WRATISLAW.

ON THE ETYMOLOGY OF ΝΗΔΥΜΟΣ.

BUTTMANN, in § 81 of his *Lexilogus*, speaks of an epithet of sleep which is found in the MSS. of Homer in twelve passages, and elsewhere in early poetry, only thrice in the Homeric Hymns. In spite of the traditional connexion with ἡδύς, Aristarchus the grammarian was so much puzzled by the initial ν, that he invented a new derivation making the word synonymous with νήγρετος; but such an epithet is otiose and even nonsensical in some of the Homeric passages. Further there is evidence of the existence of a form ἡδυμος in Simonides, Aleman, and epic writers. Buttmann's theory is that having the digamma (as Φηδύς); when that useful letter dropped from the alphabet, persons as in other cases neglected to sound it, and put the separable ν at the end of the word preceding it, if that word ended with a vowel, as is the case with the majority of instances in Homer where it occurs. The commonest collocation is ἔχε Φηδυμος ὕπνος, which when the digamma was lost would be written for euphony ἔχεν ἡδυμος ὕπνος.

Physiologists, no doubt, could give a clearer account of this insertion of the separable ν to avoid *hiatus*: but any one who tries the experiment will, I think, find that this is the easiest liquid to produce with the smallest exertion of the tongue after the enunciation of a vowel through the frame of the mouth. That the Greeks found it so, is notorious to every urchin who, passing from the stage of *amo* under the mild rule of his governess, begins to have presentiments of τύπτω, when in the first sheet of his grammar he shudders at ν παραγωγικὸν *sive* ἐφέλκυστικόν. This letter at last became a regular parasite and such forms as εἶπεν and ἐστὶν are found even before words beginning with a consonant in MSS. of the Greek Testament from the 4th century

onwards, the earliest MSS. being the most constant in retaining it as Mr Scrivener says (*Introd. to Criticism of N. T.*, p. 414), premising that it was originally an integral part of the forms. In English we have now but few final variations; but among them we have *an* for *a*, and in poetry *thine*, *mine*, for *thy*, *my* before a vowel. This last word was originally *min*, the possessive case of the first personal pronoun.

The fickleness of use is curiously exemplified in the *Book of Common Prayer*, where, in the first sentence of the proper collect of Easter week, 'thine only-begotten Son' is printed for the Sunday, and 'thy only-begotten Son,' for the Monday and Tuesday¹.

Now we may observe farther that this euphonic *n* has a tendency to coalesce with the succeeding word. We know that some half-dozen years ago Mr Toole used to amuse the audience of the Adelphi with 'a Norrible tale,' we also know that it is very easy to speak of 'a *norange* and a *negg*.' It is strange however that the original word was *norange* which (as Mr Skeat tells me) comes through the Spanish *naranja* from the Arabic *nârandg*, and lost the *n* in French, by a false derivation as *malum aurantium*, the golden apple. On the other hand *naye* is found in early English (e.g. *Morte Arthure*, quoted by Halliwell) as a corruption of *an aye*, an egg.

There is no lack of instances in English where final consonants are transferred to the initials of words which were used frequently to follow them.

I have known children amuse themselves with making a word's head out of its tail, for, like the slave in Aristophanes' play who said *μόλωμεν αὐτό κατεπάγων πυκνόν*, they will repeat the name *Alice* quickly until it becomes *Sally*. We get several instances of the final *s* of one word becoming attached to another in the sibilant which represents the possessive termination of a word suppressed from some half feeling of reverence and transferred to the next word in the oaths which are found so frequently in plays of the 17th and novels of the 18th century:

¹ A similar variation may be observed in the proper collect of Whitsuntide. The words '*Jesus Christ*' of

the Sunday are varied as '*Jesu Christ*' for the two days following.

the *s* being frequently modified into *z*: and in one case even an extra *n* is foisted in 'for they say odd's nouns' according to Mrs Quickly. Mr Skeat has given me an instance of the reverse process where *spink* the older form of the word *finch* has gone through a previous stage of losing its initial *s*.

Again we have instances of an adventitious *n* in several familiar names. *Nan* for *Anne*, *Nell* for *Ellen*, *Ned* for *Edward*, *Noll* for *Oliver*, *Numps* for *Humphrey*; and Grose in his *Provincial Glossary* (ed. 1790) gives '*Nickin*, *Nikey* or *Nizey*, a diminutive of *Isaac*.' It must have been by a similar conspiracy of vocal organs that *Euripus* has been metamorphosed into *Negro-pont*. Other words I have found in comparatively late writing.

'Mother's *nonly son*' in Cradock's epilogue to Goldsmith's *She Stoops to Conquer*, which came too late to be spoken.

'Into his *noun* Country,' [Eachard's] *Speculum Crape-Gownorum*, or, A Looking-Glass for the Young Academicks, 1682. *Nawen* is still given in the *Craven Glossary*.

I think I have seen the word *naunt* for *mine aunt*, though I cannot find it in the dictionaries. *Nuncle* is of course familiar from Shakespeare, and is said by Halliwell to be still in use. He gives in his dictionary another word meaning uncle; *neme* (following *thy* and *my* in MSS. Cantabb. quoted by him): surely this is another instance of the same phenomenon; *eme* or *eyme* being an equivalent for *Oheim* (A. S. *Eām*), common enough in the poem of *Wallace* by Henry the Minstrel in the middle of the fifteenth century.

In the ballad 'Clavers and his Highlandmen' relating to Killiecrankie, 1689, 'But her nain-sell, wi' mony a knock, Cried, "Furich, whigs awa', man."' *Jacobite Songs*, Maurice Ogle, 1871, p. 5. *Nonce* is perhaps rather an archaism preserved by such 'conceited' writers as C. Lamb. It was originally *for then anes* = for the once.

The following provincialisms are collected from Halliwell. *Nangnail*, a hangnail. *Nannle-berries*, anberries, warts¹ or excrescences. *Nappern*, an apron (Northern and also early). *Neen*, the eyes (Yorkshire), *nynon* was an older form. *Nif*, an

¹ Should we compare with this, 'It is such another *Nan*!'?

Merry Wives of Windsor, i. 3.

if (Somerset). *Nobby-colt* (Gloucestershire) is perhaps an *hobby colt*. *Nunc*, a large lump or thick piece (South) I should connect with hunk or hunch.

Obsolete forms are; *nale*, alehouse. *At then ale* is commonly written *at the nale*, and then even *at nale*, or *atten ale*, or *atte nale*; all these forms being (as Mr Skeat says) used indiscriminately, *then* being a later form of the dative *tham*. *Nall*, for an awl, the tool, is found in Tusser and in a writer rather later in the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Ni, a brood of pheasants. This being a word more often spoken than written, it is not easy to decide between the rival claims of *eye* and the form with an initial *n*.

Nias, an eyas, a young hawk (*Cotgrave*). Nares however suspects a connexion with the French *niais*.

'*Nigit* an ideot.' (*Grose, Prov. Glossary*.)

Nikle is a curious word for *icicle* in *Promptorium Parvulorum*.

Ningle, for mine ingie, or favourite, in old plays.

Nirt, hurt (*Gawayne*).

Noke, an oak. (*Nominale MS.*) *atte noke* = *atten oke*.

Norloge, a clock (*ibid.*).

Numbles, the umbles or entrails of a deer.

Mr Skeat gives the following instances of the *transference* of *n* from *William of Palerne* (reprinted by him for the *Early Eng. Text Society*).

(1) þan fond he nest and no neiȝ, l. 83 (*non eiȝ* = no egg).

(2) a noynement anon sche made, l. 136. [Autolycus uses the participle '*nointed*' in the *Winter's Tale*; but that is an abbreviated form of *anointed*.]

(3) alle my noþer, l. 458 (all mine other).

(4) lacche me in þi narmes, l. 666 (clasp me in thine arms).

(5) Yister neue, l. 2160 (*yestern eve*, as in *gestern, hesternus*).

We even find *pink neyes* = *pinken eyes*. The reference for this has been given in *Notes and Queries* by Mr Skeat in a note

on *piggesnie* (*pigges ye* = pig's eye), a term of endearment in Chaucer, Udall's *Roister Doister* iii. 4, &c.

There are two remarkable words which I have noticed in Sir John Maundevile's *Voiage and Traueile* (about 1350). 'Thei maken a maner of hissynge, as a *Neddre* dothe' (*cap.* 19). It is natural to suppose that a *Neddre* is a corruption or change from an *adder*. It appears however from the existence of the A. S. *næddre*, the German *Natter* (and the Latin *natrix*), that the form with the *n* (which is still current in the north of England, *Halliwell*) was the earlier.

On the other hand Sir John Mandevile tells how in the convent of Mount Sinai 'ne entrethe not no Flye ne Todes *ne Ewtes*, ne suche foule venymouse Bestes, ne Lyys ne Flees, be the Myracle of God and of oure Lady.' The word *ewt* corresponds with the A. S. *efete*: but the point about it which I would remark is that we now have two parallel forms, one with the *n* attached from the indefinite article, the other without; I mean of course *newt* and *eft*.

Mr Skeat tells me of three words which, like *adder*, have probably lost the initial. *Orange* has already been mentioned: *augur* = *naugur*; A. S. *nafu* the nave of a wheel, *gar* a spear or borer; thus *augur* means a *nave-borer*, whence the alternative name a *centre-bit*.

umpire, O. Fr. *nompair* the uneven or odd man, who settled a dispute between a pair of others: here *nom* = *non*, the *n* becoming *m* before *p*.

Again the negative *ne* is apt to coalesce with the following word in such cases as *n'ot* = *wot not*; *nist* = *wist not*; *n'as* = *was not*, &c., &c.

There is some evidence of a similar process in the case of other letters: as *the ton* and *the tother* for *that one* and *that other*.

Also *dapple gray* is thought by some to be equivalent to *apple* or *pomely gray* as Chaucer calls it.

But it is clear that *n* is the letter most subject to this kind of transmigration.

Since writing the above my attention has been drawn to two philological essays by the late J. C. Hare, which were printed many years since and recently issued by Professor Mayor. The latter of the essays, that on *Words corrupted by False Analogy or False Derivation*, contains a passage (pp. 36—38) on the question in hand. One word which I had overlooked is there mentioned, *an ouch*, or *a nouche*, a ‘broche,’ the second being perhaps the original form (L. L. *nocia*, *nosca*, *nusca*; O. G. *nüschin*).

PHILOSTRATUS VIT. SOPH. I 22 § 2.

COBET in *Mnemosyne* 1873 p. 212 among corrupt passages of Philostratus, as printed in Kayser’s last edition (in Teubner’s bibliotheca), notices one, which he partly emends by one easy and certain conjecture, but confesses that a further remedy is required: ‘Aliquid dispicio p. 523 [of Olearius] οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε θνητὰ νομισθείη τὰ ἀνθρώπεια οὐδὲ διδακτὰ ἃ ἐμάθομεν εἰ μνήμη συνεπολιτεύετο ἀνθρώποις. Hoc unum video requiri: εἰ μὴ μνήμη συνεπολιτεύετο: reliqua corrigit qui poterit.’ The words οὐδὲ διδακτὰ ἃ ἐμάθομεν suggest the required correction: read οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε μαθητὰ νομισθείη τὰ ἀνθρώπεια οὐδὲ διδακτὰ ἃ ἐμάθομεν εἰ μὴ μνήμη συνεπολιτεύετο ἀνθρώποις.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

29 July, 1873.

THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER,

Edited, with marginal references, various readings, notes and appendices, By HENRY HAYMAN, D.D., Head Master of Rugby School. Vol. II. Books vii. to xii.

It would really seem that the world will never be tired of the "Homeric controversy." At the very time when attacks are being made upon the study of Greek, as a part of a liberal education in our schools and universities, new translations of Homer are being multiplied, and new editions of the text are following each other, taking up and discussing with unabated interest the old inquiry, "Who was Homer?" The second volume of Dr Hayman's *Odyssey* has deservedly attracted a good deal of attention. It is the work of a most painstaking scholar, is replete with information on almost every conceivable department of Homeric learning; it is even chivalrously conservative as against the "destructive" theory of Wolf and his followers: it is almost exhaustive in *self-illustration*, i.e. in the collection and comparison of Homeric passages; and lastly, it is written in a beautifully clear, unpedantic, and interesting style, especially in the Appendices. These, or most of these, points, will be acknowledged by all as high merits. If, in logical argument and inference, the long and really important Preface appears somewhat strained and far-fetched in its pleadings, we may attribute this rather to an excess of zeal in proving the genuineness of the Homeric poems against all assailants, than from any conscious unfairness or inability to grasp the subject in its widest range. The author deals at considerable length with a series of arguments that have of late been brought to bear against the claim of the *Iliad* and

the *Odyssey*, in their present form, to an antiquity greater than about the middle of the fifth century B.C. By their *present form* is not meant their entire composition, but their compilation and adaptation, and to a considerable extent even their reconstruction, out of really old materials, *i.e.* out of a much larger mass of unwritten epic poetry, that can be proved to have been current under the general name of "Homer" in the times of Pindar, Herodotus, and the tragic writers. Dr Hayman's Preface extends to more than 130 pages, and it touches on and discusses so many topics, that it becomes rather a difficulty how to reply to it as a whole, in a somewhat limited space. Dr Hayman addresses himself principally to a categorical answer to the doubts and difficulties as to the commonly received date of these poems, put forward in the paper on this subject, published by the Cambridge Philosophical Society¹. He does not grant the force of the objections as a whole, *i.e.* as a cumulative and presumptive argument: he disputes the correctness of some of the statements; and he is not deterred from asserting his belief in the genuineness of the poems by the antecedent improbabilities that are brought against it.

It is a curious feature of the Homeric controversy, that many of the arguments employed on either side are like two-edged weapons. They cut both ways, and deal havoc according to the training of the combatant. It is rather a favourite argument of Dr Hayman's to show, that the same reasons for bringing the Homeric poems (as we have them) down to so late a date as the "writing period," or about the Platonic age, may be used to prove them much later still. Whether the hint, or brief and even casual mention of an incident, in those poems, in itself furnishes, as one party contends, an inference that it came from a late epitomiser of older, fuller, and generally familiar stories; or, as the other party maintains, it was the original story, of which others (*e.g.* the tales in the Greek tragedies) were later developments,—the "cookings from Homer," 'Ομήρου τεμάχη, as Aeschylus is said to have called them,—is a question that ad-

¹ On the comparatively late date and composite character of our *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. (Vol. XI. Part ii. of the *Transactions*.)

mits, of course, of no definite settlement. We can only reason on probabilities; on the known analogies of myths and legendary ballads, and on the practice, as far as we know it, of rhapsodes and the composers of oral narratives. To take one example; the "Ἀβιοι in Il. iv. 23—6 are called a "just race"; they are mentioned as such in Herod. iv. 23—6, and in a fragment of Aeschylus, somewhat earlier (frag. 184, Dind.). In all these places they may have been adopted independently from the rhapsodists or the anecdotes of λογοποιοὶ, who had heard tales of some happy far-distant clime, where people neither stole nor wronged each other,—a kind of "Salt Lake" Utah, where everybody was as good as possible. Certainly Dr Hayman is not justified in saying that "the myth in Aeschylus' time had *grown to embrace* further their special exemption from the necessity of tilling the ground" (οὐτε γατόμος τέμνει δίκελλ' ἄρουραν). This correlation between sin and labour, we need hardly remind Dr Hayman, is older than Aeschylus.

In answer to the objection, that our present Homeric texts contain the merest fragments of the tale of Troy which we know to have been current 450 B.C., and therefore that what we call Homer could not have been *the* Homer of the age of the Greek Tragedies; Dr Hayman replies, that this is no valid argument, because Homer himself may have been an epitomist from earlier ballads; and that the subjects of the Tragedies on the Troica were the residue rejected by the Homer of B.C. 850. But how can he, how can any one, explain away the patent and undisputed fact, that these supposed ἔπη ἀπόθετα, or rejected epics, were so much better known and so far more popular than an Iliad or an Odyssey, even four centuries later? What can we think of the "divine Homer," and of his alleged influence over the thought and poetry of Hellas, if after his poems had existed in nearly their present shape, for four centuries, they had not superseded those very different versions of the story which we find so persistently in Pindar, the Tragedies, and the works of the vase-painters?

Still less satisfactory is Dr Hayman's answer to the argument of lateness founded on the generally virtuous and amiable

character of the Homeric characters, especially the women. It had been remarked, that whereas the tragics generally depict these characters, and especially that of Helen, in a bad light, there is much less of villany and *immorality*, if not of the mere savageries of war, in the Homeric account. And it has hence been argued, that the superstitious fear of speaking evil of Helen, (the penalty of which, as Plato tells us, was believed to be blindness,) and the general progress of a more advanced and philosophic age, would fairly well account for this in a late compiler; while the Tragics generally seem to have followed the older and more "sensational" account. Dr Hayman seems to have visions of a real golden age, and to believe in the general declension of the human race from virtue to vice; in other words, in the general chastity and virtue of primeval people. He concludes therefore that Homer's "experience of human nature was confined to a period before certain infamous vices existed." The tragics, he thinks, ought by the same argument to make *their* "Homeric" characters amiable; whereas it is certain that their conception of Helen, of Menelaus, Ulysses, was as bad as possible. Is it likely, we ask, if Homer really depicted his characters as virtuous B.C. 850, and if the Iliad and Odyssey were really known and regarded as of paramount authority four centuries afterwards, that the same characters should have turned out vicious in the hands of the Tragics? Or that, if the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus was as disinterested as we read of it in the Iliad, Aeschylus should have plainly described it as a relation between the heroes that was anything but reputable? Plato, in the Symposium, says Αἰσχύλος φλυαρεῖ,—that it is an idle tale. Dr Hayman does not see that in Plato's age the Iliad and the Odyssey had become the standard "Homer," and everything was tested by the poems as they were then accepted in their written and literary form. The simple explanation, then, of this discrepancy in the tragic and the epic accounts is, that the tragics followed the earlier and still generally popular conceptions, and either had not or knew not the Homer in which they are polished and adorned with a varnish of virtue. The argument, *per se*, may be worth

little; but it proceeds on a course of reasoning that is perfectly consistent with the theory of a late compilation.

It is a fact of the greatest interest, and one that must bear with almost crushing weight on the Homeric controversy, that no less than sixteen of the extant Greek tragedies, and fifty-eight of those now lost, but the titles and (to some extent) the subjects of which are known, refer to events and characters in the Trojan war, but are not, with very few exceptions, identical with those treated and described in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Dr Hayman labours to show, that the proportion of those which can be referred to those poems (or, as the advocates of the other side would with equal justice say, "to subjects included in or alluded to in those poems,") has been somewhat understated; *i.e.* that out of the seventy-four tragedies on the *Troica*, not half a dozen or so, but twenty, may with probability be regarded as founded on our Homeric texts. But Dr Hayman has not fully appreciated the point held in view in the compilation of the above list; which was to show, that these plays could not have been borrowed directly from our Homer, even though a few of them touched on some topics alluded to in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. For instance, the "*Ὀπλων κρίσις*," attributed to Aeschylus, must have followed some poem, very celebrated at that period, that detailed the anger of Ajax, and his subsequent suicide, in consequence of the unfair award of the arms of Achilles to Ulysses. "Some poem," we say, because no absolute reliance can be placed on the alleged authorship of epics that were included with our Homer in the "Cyclus" of much later times. There can hardly be a doubt that all were, in the time of the tragics, the common stock of the rhapsodes, and were called by the common name of "Homer." We are sure of this, *viz.* that recourse was not had to "our Homer" for the subjects and materials of the drama. The Ajax, and in part, the Philoctetes, of Sophocles, are directly founded on the legend, which is merely alluded to in the briefest and most incidental manner in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*. Precisely the same may be said of the tale of the Wooden Horse, the capture and burning of Troy, the death of Achilles, his fight

with Memnon, and many other tales, which are so scantily alluded to in our texts that we are morally certain the tragics never took them from the "Homer" that Dr Hayman believes was their sole ultimate source. We may add, that in his effort to enlarge the list of "Homeric" tragedies, he rests on little more than the merest assumption that such plays as the Proteus, the Ostologi, the Philoctetes, had reference to actual scenes in the Iliad or the Odyssey. He has overlooked, too, the fact, that the Myrmidons, the *Ἐκτορος λύτρα*, and the *Ψυχοστάσια*, were not omitted, but expressly included by the compiler, in his list of tragedies referring to subjects in the Iliad. The same is true of the *Ἑλένης ἀρπαγή*, the *Ἑλένης ἀπαίτησις*, the *Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος*, the *Ναυσικάα*, none of which were omitted, but the subjects of all were duly considered and discussed in their bearing on the Homeric question. On the whole, and in round numbers, it may fairly be granted that a dozen out of seventy Greek plays can be connected more or less clearly with our present Homeric texts.

The truth is, however, that the general question is not in the slightest degree affected by the precise number,—be it six, or ten, or twenty,—of Greek plays and of painted Greek vases representing Trojan scenes, that exhibit subjects common to them and to our Homeric texts. We are no nearer the proof that, because the subjects are in common, therefore Pindar, or the tragics, or the vase-painters, took them out of our Homeric texts. There is still a total absence of proof that, in the present form of those epics, they possessed them at all. The fact, at all events, is established by the most conclusive evidence, that our Homer was not in B.C. 450 *the* Homer, to which every other composer or "Cyclic" writer was held secondary and inferior. The contrary must, in reason, be admitted, that if these poems did then exist in their present form, or nearly so, they were much less known, much less cared for, much less *in ore vulgi*, than other legends of the Troica. No special pleading can ever overturn this primary and all-important fact. And whether the language of Homer is the *genuine* early Ionic, or merely embodies a number of traditional metrical words and forms, worked up with many comparative modern-

isms, many omitted and some spurious *digammas*, and even with some pseudoarchaic or imitative words; is a question that must be dealt with in rigid connexion with the foregoing facts.

The popular doctrine, repeated and enforced by Dr Hayman, that the Greek Tragedies contained Trojan legends "developed by post-Homeric manipulation," is, we contend, nothing more than assumption. "The Cyclic poets" (he says, § XXI.) "supplied the dramatists with what they wanted, and the latter turned it to account, and so far set aside as antiquated the simpler Homeric forms of their legendary themes." And this, he goes so far as to say, "instead of proving the modernness, directly suggests the antiquity of our Homer."

In fact, Dr Hayman forces the argument from its natural course, to suit his own view of the matter. To take a single example: the celebrated account of the shield of Achilles in *Iliad* XVIII. is nowhere ever alluded to by any writer earlier¹ than Plato, who cites (*Phileb.* p. 48) a verse from that book, about the "sweetness of revenge," so that we have therein a reasonable presumption (though nothing more) that he also had the description of the shield made by Hephaestus for Achilles. But, in the *Electra* of Euripides (445 seqq.) we have the description, and quite a different one, of the original shield, given by the gods to Peleus as a marriage-gift (*Il.* XVIII. 84), and lost by being lent to Patroclus. It is curious to find Dr Hayman confounding these wholly different stories; of which that in Euripides, from its place in the story, is likely to have been the earlier one. He asks (§ LXXXIII.) "where in the *Iliad* have we any more than *one* suit of divine armour, viz. that of *Il.* XVIII. ascribed to Achilles?" The mention of the original suit, and the capture of it by Hector, may be called the theme of the two preceding books. Dr Hayman's remark therefore (in the note on § XXIII.) loses all force, as a baseless assumption: "We know that Euripides gives Achilles a shield remarkably unlike the one given in *Il.* Σ; although this part of the *Iliad* *must certainly* have been current in his time." Where, we ask, is the proof of this? It certainly cannot be drawn from the fact that *δέησεν* assumes the Attic con-

¹ The *Scutum Herculis*, falsely attributed to Hesiod, we knowingly except.

traction δῆσεν (Il. XVIII. 100, Ar. Ran. 266), that τέλος is used in the wholly mistaken sense of τέλος (544), or that Λίνον αείδειν, "to sing the Linus" (570)—a strange anachronism—should have to be evaded by the non-natural interpretation of λίνον "a lute-string." We might go further, and ask, where, in all the extant plays of Euripides, can we lay our hands upon a *single* passage that can be shown to have been borrowed or adapted from our Iliad? And if so, where is the proof, or even the ground of inference, that Euripides knew of the Iliad at all? Dr Hayman thinks it so obvious that he must have known it, that he says (p. xxiv.) the destructive argument proves too much; "because it proves that our Iliad and Odyssey were not generally known in the time of Euripides. A conclusion which seems to me to need no refutation." We can only say, that if such a statement were even made (which it has not been), a refutation of it would be more difficult than Dr Hayman supposes. The very verses he quotes on his title-page from the Troades of Euripides, while they show, as passages in Aristophanes show, that the tale of Ulysses' wanderings, in some form, was familiar to the Athenians at that period, do not in the least prove that the Odyssey then existed in its present complete and continuous state.

Again, we think Dr Hayman does not deal quite fairly (Pref. § XXIX.—XXXV.) with the negative argument derived from the general absence of "Homeric," but not of Trojan, scenes from the earlier painted vases, which are supposed to claim an antiquity of five centuries or even more before the Christian era. Their evidence is most important: for if it can be shown that they very rarely treat of any scene described in our Homeric texts, then at least there is good ground for believing that they regarded other poems and other legends as of greater authority, or at least preferred them as more generally known. So far as we know, their evidence in this respect coincides entirely and most remarkably with the tragic writers. Dr Hayman contends that local interest would so far prevail, that general scenes from the Iliad or the Odyssey might have been omitted from the list of popular subjects of representation. The force of the argument on the other side really turns on the

fact, that the artists did represent very frequently, even primarily, scenes from the Troica, but *not* those in the Iliad or the Odyssey, though they are sometimes briefly hinted at in those poems, *e.g.* the "Judgment of Paris," or the "Marriage of Peleus." The "local" theory has no weight. These artists selected such scenes as were most familiar to all from the recitations of the rhapsodists; and, if they did not get these scenes out of our present Homer, they either did not know him, or they meant by that name something very different from what we mean, or they regarded "non-Homeric" stories about Troy as of more general interest.

The famous "Chest of Cypselus," supposed by Pausanias to be really archaic,—albeit his judgment is not by any means to be trusted absolutely in this matter,—is claimed by Dr Hayman on the one hand, as it is by his opponents on the other, in proof of the Homeric or non-Homeric character of the Trojan legends of the period. The date is thought by Dr Hayman to be "probably as old as 600 B.C.,"—an opinion worth nothing at all, as we have not the chest to examine, and as we know that Pausanias, like Herodotus and very many others, was extremely credulous about pretended antiquities, of which he had no critical knowledge. Anyhow, we get little out of this chest in favour of Homer as we now know him; the duel of Ajax and Hector was a hackneyed subject with the vase-painters; that of Coon or Iphidamas and Agamemnon finds its place in the eleventh Iliad; Thetis receiving the arms for her son may refer to a non-Homeric story, that the arms of Peleus were conveyed to him across the sea by the Nereids (Eur. El. 442); while Odysseus and Circe, Nausicaa and her handmaids, are undoubtedly stories found in our Odyssey, and we cannot deny that, (assuming the poem as then existing in some form, which no one wishes to deny,) they may have been taken directly from it. But then on this very chest there was a considerable preponderance of subjects from the Troica *not* in our Homer. Here then, as everywhere, there crops up the unquestioned existence of other than Homeric ballads, that apparently had a decided precedence in popularity. Dr Hayman concludes, with more subtlety, we think, than honesty of con-

viction, from the silence of Pausanias about other *written* poems in his time (about A.D. 150), that he "regarded the Homeric poems as already current, when other incidents represented on the chest floated in legend only." The mistake is to make the opinions (supposing even that he held them) of a man living nearly a thousand years after the supposed "Homer," any evidence as to what was the real source of the Troica of early art and of the early tragedies. For Pausanias, quite as a matter of course, attributed them, as far as he possibly could, to the Homer of the day,—the Homer as we have it.

It would take a great space to discuss this most important topic, the evidence of the Greek vases. Dr Hayman has attempted at considerable length to show that a fair number of them do represent scenes from our Homeric poems. The contention on the other side is, that extremely few of the really archaic vases now known to exist (and the aggregate number even of these is great) have paintings that can be assigned to our texts. It is evident, too, that even these prove nothing more than that the scenes they represent have been preserved in our Homer, supposing it to be a later composite text. *Some* of the vast mass of tales and legends about Troy must have found a place in an Iliad and an Odyssey, even if compiled in as late an age as that of Quintus Smyrnaeus, who lived in the fourth century after Christ. His extant poem is in fact an epitome of the stories not embodied in, though probably quite as old as, the Iliad and the Odyssey.

Dr Hayman takes too much on trust the supposed antiquity of the "Lamberg Vases," published in part in two vols. by Mr Laborde. Vases with written names seldom perhaps reach an antiquity of B.C. 500; and there are good reasons for thinking that, in the style of the writing, they are not unfrequently "pseudo-archaic." When Dr Hayman specifies ten subjects in this volume, which he says "correspond with scenes from our Iliad and Odyssey" (§ XLVI.), he merely guesses at the subjects of *four*, which may equally well mean something quite different; *three* are the commonest of subjects, sung, probably, by nearly every rhapsodist that ever rehearsed "Homer" at all, viz. the combat of Achilles and Hector, or Hector and Ajax. No one

ever doubted that such stories go back to a possibly great antiquity. But, because they find a place in our Iliad, they do not tend to prove that it is a composition of B.C. 850.

But, even granting these vase-paintings the antiquity that is claimed for them, we say of them, as of the "Chest of Cypselus," that they do at least conclusively prove this, that our Homer had no claim whatever in those early times to be the primary or paramount authority, or indeed in any way the source, of the history of the Trojan war. For they are so mixed up with non-Homeric Troica (call them "Cyclic" subjects, or what not) that it is as plain as anything can be that subjects such as those said to have been treated by Stasinus, Arctinus, Lesches, Agias, &c., the "Cypria," the Ἰλίου Πέρσις, the "Return of the Heroes," were all "Homer" alike. The vast mass of orally recited epics had settled down at some period not long before Plato's time into a written "Iliad" and "Odyssey"; and then only they took a permanent precedence over the rest, which however, as we have said, lingered on till quite late times, with the reproach and almost the contempt unjustly attaching to them, of being merely "post-Homeric" imitations. Everything not in the Iliad and the Odyssey was palmed off on a "scriptor Cyclicus."

We may further illustrate this position, (which it is most important fully to expound, though, we fear, at the risk of some tediousness) from the famous "François vase," found at Chiusi in 1845. Mr Dennis, in his "Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria" (II. pp. 99, 115), calls this fine amphora "an Iliad, or rather an Achilleid, in pottery, for its subjects have especial reference to the great hero of the Trojan War, from the youthful deeds of his father, and the marriage of his parents, down to his own death, interspersed with mythological episodes." It is now preserved at Florence, and is referred to the second, or later-archaic, Greek style,—the figures being black, tinted with white and red, on the yellow ground of the clay. It was fairly, perhaps, to be regarded as not later than B.C. 500, the style of writing being very old, and in part βουστροφηδόν. Thus the maker's name is ΚΑΙΤΙΑΣ (qu. ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ?) ΜΕ ΕΓΡΑΦΕΝ (backwards), and ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ ΜΕ ΠΟΙΕΣΕΝ. When Mr Dennis called this "an Iliad or rather an Achilleid," he expressed a

consciousness of the fact, that it was impossible to suppose its details were borrowed from our Iliad. Thus we have

1. Ajax bearing the body of Achilles.
2. Battle of Centaurs and Lapithae.
3. The Calydonian hunt.
4. Funeral games in honour of Patroclus, with five cars and the names of the drivers.
5. Marriage of Peleus and Thetis.
6. Achilles pursuing Troilus. Hector and Polites issuing from the gates of Troy for the protection of their brother (Troilus).
7. Return of Hephaestus to heaven.
8. Pygmies mounted on goats encountering the cranes.

Of all these subjects, only No. 4 can fairly claim to be a subject from our Iliad. For it is perfectly fair to argue, that the slight allusions to the Centaurs, the Pygmies (III. 6), and the Calydonian hunt (II. IX.), show clear indications of being epitomised from much fuller and older stories, such as these paintings were meant to illustrate. But critics of Dr Hayman's school persist in arguing, that because some scenes are common to early vase-paintings and to our Iliad, therefore the paintings must have been taken from our Iliad. We contend that this is a *non-sequitur* in every sense.

The large intermixture of apparently modern (*i.e.* comparatively modern) words with undoubtedly archaic forms and phrases in our texts, has been alleged as a presumptive argument that our texts cannot claim a genuine antiquity. Dr Hayman endeavours to answer the objection at great length. He compares the diction of Hesiod, Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, Theognis, &c., and says, "in no one of these will there be found any less degree of modernism than in our Homer." That is not to the point, even if so vague a statement could be proved. By the "modernisms" of Homer it is meant, that a large class of words appear in our Homer which, so far as we can judge from the most careful study of the progressive development of the language (*e.g.* of such very marked differences as exist between the language of Thucydides and Demosthenes or Plato), belong

to quite an advanced period of epic composition. Such are, colloquial formulae such as *ὅτε μὲν, ὅτε δὲ*, for "sometimes"; verbs like *κελητίζειν, ἀτιμάζειν, ἰσάζειν, ἀπαιτίζειν, παππίζειν, ἀγορτάζειν, ἐρατίζειν, &c.*; such medial forms as *μεγαλίζεσθαι, πληκτίζεσθαι, ἐπαγλαϊεῖσθαι, οἰνίζεσθαι, &c.*, and a number of medical and anatomical terms, as *κοτυληδών, πρότμησις, κύστις, &c.*, evidently much more suitable to the age of Hippocrates than to that of warlike heroes. This question, it is admitted, must turn largely on the intuitive feeling for the language which none but very good scholars can hope to possess. If any one believes that the Greeks of B.C. 850 had such a term as *κελητίζειν* "to ride on horseback," we cannot, of course, prove him to be in the wrong, though we may think him rather credulous. This is one of those presumptive arguments which have a cumulative rather than a special or isolated force. An Ionic diction, such as that of Herodotus, of B.C. 450, would be, in a prose writer, the natural and uniform language; but in an old poem recast or remodelled at about the same period, it would be largely mixed up with archaic words. These archaic words, being all conveniently metrical, would form the stock-in-trade of all the early poets; and thus Dr Hayman has only lost his labour in drawing up long lists of passages (§§ XLVIII.—LXII.) in other writers which contain the same "Homeric" phrases. Obviously, this does not in the least prove that they took them from "our Homer." It is just as tenable a view (as has already been said of the vase-paintings), that all came from a common source, viz. from a large mass of orally recited epics very long anterior to the period of a written literature.

It is singular that, with all his anxiety to establish the genuine antiquity of the Homeric poems as we now have them, Dr Hayman yet makes admissions that go nearly as far as the very objections he is endeavouring to meet. All they allege is, that our Homeric texts are a compilation from, and to some extent a remodelling of, early epics that had become well-nigh obsolete and more or less obscure in the period of a written literature about B.C. 450. He says (p. lxxix.), "I believe that our Homeric poems continued *for no few centuries* liable to the caprices of rhapsodists, adding, omitting, recombining, and re-

arranging, as best suited their immediate purpose." But, what others attribute to the efforts of a literary age, i.e. the first committing of these poems, in a continuous and dramatic form, to writing, Dr Hayman attributes, with much less probability, as we think, to the "interests of the rhapsodists." So difficult it is, in our times, to detach our minds from the idea of written lectures and written sermons. We know (if only from Plato's *Ion*) that memory was the very point on which these rhapsodists prided themselves most. Can we conceive them sitting at home and conning over MSS. at any early period of Greek life?

The fact, then, is perfectly undeniable, that Pindar and the tragic writers did not in the main follow our Homer. They had a "Homer," and they used his supposed poems. But he was something very different indeed from our Homer. Dr Hayman meets this difficulty by a kind of quibble; he replies, that "no *direct* reference occurs in Pindar and the older writers to the Cyclic any more than to the Homeric poems." Of course not: they had no idea of *any* author but Homer. And his attempt to account for the very secondary and partial repute in which *our* version of the tale of Troy was held (supposing it then to have existed in nearly its present shape), is weak. Great poets, he argues, are not appreciated at first, and require a philosophic period for their true merits to be discerned. Thus he would explain the fact, that out of more than forty allusions to the *Troica* in Pindar, only about six can in any way be connected with our texts. Even supposing that, by stretching probabilities somewhat far, not six, but ten Homeric episodes could be recognised in Pindar, the argument is not materially affected.

To recapitulate briefly; in the fifth century B.C. the tale of Troy was the fertile source of poetry and art, when poetry and art existed in their fullest and finest development. We look round to recognise the "divine Homer," and we find him not, except here and there under circumstances which are perfectly compatible with the late compilation of such poems as we have been accustomed to attribute to him.

(*To be continued.*)

ARISTOTELIA.

Eth. Nic. v. 1135 b 33.—ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ.

ARISTOTLE is speaking here of acts done under the impulse of anger and not denied by the agent, who believes himself to have been justified in what he did. But who is the ἐπιβουλεύσας, and how can an angry man be said to work insidiously against his enemy? The difficulty has been deemed so serious that Sir A. Grant has recourse to what may be termed an heroic remedy, that of giving ἐπιβουλεύειν a meaning not recognized by the lexicons. Mr H. Richards, also, in a former volume of this Journal (iv. p. 154), is led to devise an entirely new way of taking the passage, on the ground mainly that ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας cannot in any sense be identified with ὁ ὀργισθείς. "It is hard to see (he says) how ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας can apply to a man expressly said to act οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας, especially if we compare VII. 6, 3 [1149 b 14] ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος. If he nurses his anger and plots vengeance at his leisure, he must lose his character of ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν." On this I would remark that the passage in Book VII. need not be taken into account: ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν is hardly the same thing as ὁ θυμώδης, and there is no manifest inconsistency in saying "passionate men are not treacherous," and in intimating the possibility of a man nursing his wrath and plotting vengeance at his leisure. It would be strange if the legal mind of antiquity failed to recognise so obvious a fact as the case of a man who acts from anger and yet postpones his vengeance: Plato certainly has a great deal to

say about it in Book IX. of the Laws, where the punishment of homicide is under discussion. One who slays another in anger is to pay the penalty for involuntary homicide and also to go into exile for two or three years, according as he commits the deed without or with premeditation:—ὁ δὲ θυμῷ μὲν, μετ' ἐπιβουλῆς δὲ κτείνας τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν πρόσθεν αὖ, τρία δὲ ἔτη, καθάπερ ἄτερος ἔφενγε τὰ δύο, φευγέτω (p. 867 C).

Eth. Eud. ii. 1225 b 1.—δοκεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ, καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὃν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες, ἥτοι ὥς ὅτι μὲν πόμα, ἀλλ' ὥς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον. τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὅ.

This passage, on the voluntariness of actions, is still (as Bonitz said of it thirty years ago) 'locus manifeste corruptus.' I observe that both Fritzsche and Spengel (*Aristot. Stud.* ii. p. 16) keep the dative ἀγνοοῦντι, not seeing that the form of the sentence (δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ εἰδότα τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι πρᾶττειν) imperatively demands the accusative. But what are we to do with the ἥτοι ὥς in the parenthesis? If we refuse to follow Fritzsche who tampers with what is sound, and content ourselves with writing ἢ τὸ ᾧ for the corrupt ἥτοι ὥς, the place will be intelligible enough:—

δοκεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὃν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες· ἢ τὸ ᾧ ὅτι μὲν πόμα, ἀλλ' ὥς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὅ.

Pol. iii. 14, 1285 a 7.—αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἶον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ αἰδιός ἐστιν· κτείνει γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ EN TINI ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΙ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ. δηλοῖ δ' Ὁμηρος· ὁ γὰρ Ἀγαμέμνων κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἠνείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελλόντων δὲ καὶ κτείνει κύριος ἦν. λέγει γοῦν “ὃν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης <φεύγοντα νοήσω>, οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἢ δ' οἰωνούς. παρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.” One of the many ways of

dealing with the parenthetical *εἰ μὴ ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ* is to omit the last word and make the clause in its curtailed form mean, "except in certain cases," *ausser in gewissen Fällen*, as Bernays puts it. I would suggest, however, that if we eliminate anything, it should be the little word *τινί*, which looks like an interpolation intended to soften down the obvious absurdity of the traditional text; and further, that in *ἐν βασιλείᾳ* a couple of letters have been lost. An infinitesimal change in accordance with well-known paleographical precedents will then yield the following result:—

ENBASIAEIAI = EN * KA * EIAEIAS.

That is to say, *ἐνεκα δειλίας*—a reading which the quotation from Homer seems to render indispensable. The strange suggestion of Schmidt (*ἐν τινι δειλίᾳ*), and the still stranger one of Lindau (*ἐν τινι βίᾳ δειλίας*), involve the same idea.

Poet. iv. 1448 b 25.—οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμμουνοτο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ΕΤΕΡΟΙ ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια.

Ought we not to read *ἄτεροι* for *ἕτεροι*? A similar correction is required in ch. xi. also (1452 b 3):—ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀναγνώρισις, αἱ μὲν θατέρου πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ᾗ δηλὸς ἄτερος [vulg. ἕτερος] τίς ἐστίν.

iv. 1449 a 7.—τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἄρ' ἔχει [so Vahlen] ἤδη ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἱκανῶς ἢ οὐ, αὐτό τε καθ' αὐτό ΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα, ἄλλος λόγος.

For *κρίνεται εἶναι*, or rather *κρίνεται ἢ ναί*, the reading of A^c, I would write simply *κρίναι*, on the hypothesis that the vulgate implies an earlier stage in the manuscript tradition in which *κρίνεται* was corrected by the superscription of *ἦναι*, the intention of the corrector being to restore *κρῆναι*, i.e. *κρίναι*. From Spengel's contemptuous note I learn that this suggestion has been anticipated by (if I understand him rightly) Forchammer, who appears to give a slightly different explanation of the genesis of the common reading.

v. 1449 a 38.—*ἡ δὲ κωμωδία διὰ τὸ μὴ σπουδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν· καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμῳδῶν ὀψέ ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν.*

For *κωμῳδῶν* we ought perhaps to read *κωμῳδῶ*.

v. 1449 b 4.—*τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἡγνότηται. τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις. τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης πρῶτος ἦρξεν κ.τ.λ.*

The asyndeton in the sentence *τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς* is, to say the least, suspicious, and moreover, as the text now stands, *Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις* is without a verb; for it is manifestly impossible to say *τὸ μύθους ποιεῖν ἀπέδωκεν*. Susemihl accordingly would have us omit *Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις* as a gloss; but there is another alternative, and that is, to suppose these words to be out of place. Improbable as this hypothesis may seem at first sight, I believe the truth of it to be all but demonstrated by the fact that the erudite Themistius must have had this very passage in view when he wrote the following (*Orat.* xxvii. p. 337 A):—

οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει τὰ παρ' ἐτέροις ἀρχὴν λαβόντα πλείονος σπουδῆς παρ' ἄλλοις τυγχάνειν. ἐπεὶ καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἦρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας· ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦσθην Ἐπίχαρμός τε καὶ Φόρμος· κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη [Ἀθήνησιν ἠύξήθη?].

It is Themistius also, we must remember, who has preserved for us the valuable Aristotelian fragment about Thespis, which so aptly fits into another well-known gap (in ch. iv.) in the miserably mutilated book which has come down to us.

vi. 1449 b 36.—The conclusion that every tragedy is made up of six elements is the complex result of two separate arguments, each establishing the existence of three elements; the first treating of the music, scenery, and language in a drama; the second of the plot (*μῦθος*), characters (*ἥθη*), and thought (*διάνοια*). The second argument runs, or ought to run, as follows:—the fact which the drama seeks to counterfeit is action (*πράξις*): action, however, implies agents with qualities

intellectual and moral: in a play, then, the action, *i.e.* the story conceived in an abstract or general form [*καθόλου*, as *Arist.* says in a later *Ch.*], is represented by the *μῦθος* or plot, while the purely personal or individual element is supplied by the *dramatis personae* introduced. But to get this sense out of Aristotle's words we must not only emend but also supplement the existing text:—

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινων πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιοῦς τινας εἶναι κατὰ τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν (διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναί φαμεν ποιάς τινας, πέφυκε δ' αἷτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι διάνοια καὶ ἦθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες) ἔστι δὴ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις τῶν δὲ πραττόντων τὰ ἦθη καὶ ἡ διάνοια. λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἦθη κ.τ.λ.

I agree, therefore, with M. Thurot in considering the parenthesis to extend to πάντες, and with Vahlen in writing πέφυκε δ' for the common reading πέφυκεν. My reasons, however, are not identical with Vahlen's, for I regard the πέφυκε δὲ as a sort of afterthought suggested by the preceding φαμέν, the appeal being in the first case to language and in the second to the nature of things. And, in accordance with Eucken's view, I write ἔστι δὴ for the manuscript ἔστι δέ, to shew that the apodosis begins at this point. As for the clause which I have provisionally introduced, I believe the insertion of it or something similar to be required by both sense and grammar. It certainly saves us from the necessity of finding an antithesis to τῆς μὲν πράξεως in πέφυκε δὲ or τὰ δὲ ἦθη, and moreover gives the following string of definitions the justification they at present lack.

vi. 1450 b 12.—Having discussed three of the six elements in a play, *viz.* the *μῦθος*, *ἦθη* and *διάνοια*, Aristotle proceeds to say:—

τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ΜΕΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ ἡ λέξις (λέγω δέ, ...λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν...) τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [πέμπτον]

ἡ μελοποιΐα μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων· ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μὲν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς.

After expunging πέμπτου (or rather πέντε) as a marginal gloss, there still remains the difficulty to find something for τῶν μὲν λόγων to stand in antithesis to. These words can hardly be opposed to the parenthetical λέγω δέ, nor yet to τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν: in the latter case the logical coherence would be a pure illusion, as we may easily see by examining the bare framework of the sentence: τέταρτον τῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ λέξεις, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἢ μελοποιΐα καὶ ἡ ὄψις. There is in fact no grammatical opposition to be discerned here, but there is nevertheless a real one. The four elements first enumerated, the μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια and λέξεις enter into a drama as a purely *literary* work, as a thing to be read [comp. Poet. xxvi.] and not seen or heard. For τῶν μὲν λόγων, therefore, I propose to read τῶν ἐν λόγῳ.

vii. 1451 a 3.—Speaking of the length of the tragic plot Aristotle argues that the limit in one direction is fixed by the circumstance that the whole must be εὐμνημόνευτον, just as in material things (ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινων) the possibility of beauty depends on the whole being εὐσύνοπτον. The argument is then summarized thus:—

ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ΣΩΜΑΤΩΝ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μήκος τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι.

Ueberweg wishes to substitute σχημάτων for σωμαμάτων, but the συνέστηκεν which precedes suggests a very different word, namely, συστημαμάτων.

vii. 1451 a 6.—τοῦ δὲ μήκους ὅρος ὁ μὲν [so Bursian] πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς τέχνης ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν τραγωδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἂν ἡγωνίζοντο, ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε ΦΑΣΙΝ.

If ἀγωνίζεσθαι, said of the dramatic poet, retains its etymological meaning of to *compete* or *contend* for a prize, we might

surely expect the dative *τραγωδίαις* here, as one certainly would with the kindred words *ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι* and *νικᾶν*. As for the parenthetical *ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτὲ φασιν*, the clause is one of such notorious obscurity that Hermann proposed to transfer it to a more suitable place in the next Chapter. We may keep it where it is, however, if we alter a letter or two and write *ἄλλοτ' εἰώθασιν*.

xxiv. 1459 *b* 34.—In a discussion on narrative poetry (*διηγηματικὴ μίμησις*) and the special fitness of the hexameter for this form of literature, we read:—

τὸ γὰρ ἥρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων.

I do not see any meaning in the *καὶ* before *ἡ διηγηματικὴ* and suspect that a word has dropped out. Perhaps we should restore, *περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ταύταις ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων*.

xxv. 1461 *a* 34.—ὥδὲ *Η ΩΣ* μάλιστ' ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι, κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺν ἢ ὥς *Γλαύκων* λέγει.

The *ἢ ὥς* after *ὥδὲ* (which no one has hitherto succeeded in explaining) I take to be a dittographia of the *ἢ ὥς* in the next line.

xxvi. 1461 *b* 27.—The question as to the comparative worth of Tragedy and Epic poetry turns mainly on the point, Which of the two implies the better public? Tragedy, it may be urged, addresses an uncultivated audience (*πρὸς φαύλους*) whose dulness is the recognized excuse for the exaggerated style of acting now in vogue (*ὥς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῇ, πολλὰ κίνησιν κινεῖνται*): whereas the Epic addresses a higher and more select class (*πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς*). This being the general meaning, it would seem that the omission of a word has not a little confused the sense of the opening of the argument:—

εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἦπτον φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατὰς ἐστὶν αἰεί [so Vahlen], λίαν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτικὴ· ὥς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, ἂν μὴ κ.τ.λ.

Ought we not to read πρὸς ἅπαντα (i.e. πρὸς τοὺς τυχόντας) in lieu of ἅπαντα?

TWO PASSAGES IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

v. 476 A.—καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκάστων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἈΛΛΗΛΩΝ κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκάστων.

WHAT meaning can we attach to ἀλλήλων here? The recent interpreters seem to acquiesce pretty unanimously in Stallbaum's view that there is an allusion to the *κοινωνία* or union of Ideas with one another maintained in the Sophist. But the matter is not quite so clear as Stallbaum imagines. (1) The Sophist (if Plato's) must be a good deal later than the Republic. (2) The chronological objection apart, the inhuman obscurity which Stallbaum tacitly attributes to his author is sufficient to condemn his explanation as too recondite and far-fetched for the present passage. (3) If legitimate, the reference to the Sophist is not to the point. In the Sophist Plato, no doubt, talks of a *κοινωνία* of Idea with Idea, but the result of the union is still something Ideal; the process belongs from first to last to an eternal world of abstract metaphysical relations: we are not told or led to infer that, because Motion (for instance) partakes of Identity and Difference (ταύτου καὶ θατέρου), the union immediately renders Motion, Identity, and Difference phenomenal, and gives them a sort of secondary existence among the things of sense. But the *κοινωνία* of Rep. v. makes the

Ideas phenomenal: the whole motive for the argument, in fact, is to assert with all possible emphasis the dualism between *ὄντα* and *φαινόμενα*, and thus define the Philosopher as distinct from the *φιλόδοξος* or believer in phenomena. (4) Is it credible that Plato conceives 'bodies, actions, and Ideas,' to be an exhaustive account of things capable of participating in Ideas, *i.e.* of having predicates; or that we can be expected to find such a statement intelligible without some slight assistance or elucidation? My suspicion is that, just as the series of Ideas is cut short with the brief *πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περί*, the list of concrete things participating in Ideas must end with an equally comprehensive expression, and that the true reading accordingly is not *ἀλλήλων* but *ἄλλ' ἄλλων*—the general sense being, 'it is by their union with bodies, actions, and so forth, that Ideas come to be phenomenalized, and thereby appear many.' It is satisfactory to see that Dr Badham (Pref. to the Phaedrus) also pronounces *ἀλλήλων* corrupt, though I am unable to accept his suggestion *ἄλλη ἄλλων* as the right one.

vii. 533 E.—Summing up the discussion at the end of Book VI., Socrates reminds us that *διάνοια* was the name there given to the faculty employed in the abstract sciences: the name, however, he forthwith adds, is a very unimportant matter:—

ἔστι δ', ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων περί σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν προκεῖται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφήνεια ἃ λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ. Ἀρέσκει γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.

So runs the passage in the Zürich text, which deviates from Par. A only so far as to add *ἃ* before *λέγεις*. The words *ἀλλ' ὃ—ψυχῇ* are the despair of critics; Schneider and Stallbaum, for instance, omit the offending clause altogether, in preference to accepting emendations like those proposed by Steinhart and K. F. Hermann. The latter, who wishes to read *πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφήνεια ἃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρκέσει*, overlooks the circumstance that *σαφήνεια* must still mean what it meant in Book VI.; that it is, therefore, a psychological term denoting 'clearness of con-

ception'—the correlative in the subject of ἀλήθεια in the object of knowledge (Rep. vi. 511 E). As for ἀρκέσει, the addition is unnecessary, if we suppose Socrates to interrupt his interlocutor and take the word out of his mouth by breaking in with his own, ἀρέσκει γοῦν: a similar involuntary aposiopesis is found in Rep. iv. 439 A: ἔστι δὲ δῆπον δίψος—; Ἐγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· πώμα-τός γε. As a possible source of the manifest confusion in this passage, I would suggest that πρὸς is a corruption of πῶς, and that the original reading was something like the following:—

ἀλλ' ὁ ἄν μόνον δηλοῖ τὴν ἔξιν, πῶς ἔχει σαφηνείας ἀ λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ—Ἀρέσκει γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.

I. BYWATER.

THE MSS. OF SOPHOCLES.

(For some account of the MSS. treated of in this paper the reader is referred to the 'Note on the MSS.' appended to the edition of the Text of Sophocles just published by the Oxford Clarendon Press.)

WILL the work of collating the MSS. of the great classical authors ever be completed? It is not in itself an endless task, but it is a laborious and ungrateful one, and those who have sufficient interest in the subject are either unqualified for this special function or are engaged in other labours.

It may be of some service, if one, who cannot himself hope to accomplish much in this direction, should be able to convince those who in this respect are better situated, that something still remains to be done, and that they must not be too easily persuaded that a sufficient approximation to completeness has been made—*ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν*.

In the case of Sophocles there has arisen a hindrance of a peculiar kind. Since the publication of Elmsley's collation of the Medicean (or chief Laurentian) MS. in 1826, the belief has been gaining ground that this MS. is the veritable archetype of all the rest, and that the variations from it which are found in later MSS. are without exception the result either of fortuitous error, or of conjecture, or of both. Of course, if this is true, the only help afforded by the 'apographa,' as the more recent MSS. are now styled, is that trifling *quota* which Byzantine scholarship, through its peculiar difference, may have been able to add to the criticism of other ages. It would hardly be worth while to thresh the waggon-load for the sake of the

amount and quality of grain which might be got from this. But for even a single grain of authentic tradition it would be well worth while.

1. Cobet¹ in 1847, perhaps following a hint of Elmsley's, first enunciated the supposed fact, which Dindorf has since avowedly, though not always consistently, made his rule of criticism. Even if their verdict should not have unqualified confirmation in the end, we certainly owe to it one great boon, in the collation of the chief MS. made by Duebner for Dindorf's Oxford edition of 1860, *the only complete collation of the seven plays in any MS. which has ever been made public, if we except other collations of the same MS.*

The grounds of their opinion are briefly the following.

All the MSS. of Sophocles that have been examined, including L. a. (the Medicean), are found to agree in manifest errors, of which the important ones are indeed much less frequent than in the case of Aeschylus, but the slight blemishes, often proved to be such by the metre, are very numerous. Not to multiply instances, it would be a welcome surprise to find a MS. which in O. T. 258 should give ἐπεὶ κυρῶ and not ἐπικυρῶ (or ἐπικουρῶ), or which in Aj. 406 had some intelligible and metrical reading instead of τοῖς δ' ὁμοῦ πέλας: one which in El. 691 did not drag in the pentathlon in defiance of sense and metre, or in Tr. 840 were free from νέσσου θ' ὑπο, or in Philoct. 862 had something more harmonious and significant than ὁρᾷ, βλέπει, καίρια φθέγγει (or φθέγγου). Even if it be granted that a closer study of the language tends to reduce the number of *loci desperati* in the MS. text, there must always remain enough to justify the conclusion that all existing MSS. are derived from one MS., and one probably not of great antiquity, although many of its errors may have descended (as we know from citations in the case of some) from a very early time.

All scholars who have even looked into the matter must be so far agreed, and they must also be agreed that the archetype of our present text of Sophocles, whether more or less ancient,

¹ De Arte Interpretandi. Leyden, 1847.

must have been far more sound than that from which the Medicean Aeschylus was taken¹.

2. At this point there enters a presumption drawn from the analogous position of the text of Aeschylus. In the case of Aeschylus there exists positive proof that, *with two exceptions*, all other copies, *at least of the Agamemnon*, are derived from the Medicean. All but two have two great lacunæ, omitting Ag. 310—1066, and Ag. 1160—Choeph. 9. And in the latter case the two outer leaves of the quaternion, that should contain the missing part, remain, proving that it was there at first, as clearly as the husk shows where the chesnut has been. Here therefore we are on the ground of fact. But some caution is necessary, or we shall step off it again. For are we certain that when the first transcript of the Medicean MS. was made, there may not have been other copies of the minor sylloge (Prom., S. c. T., Persæ), or of some single play (say the S. c. T.), and if these existed, are we certain that they were not used? This must be ascertained through the examination of each play separately, and M. Merkel² is to be commended for the caution of his proceeding in making every page the subject of a separate investigation. Then before applying the analogy to Sophocles it would be well to inquire how far the two MSS., which are certainly not derived from the Medicean in its present state, give evidence of a different text. If they do not, may we safely assume that their originals were copied from the Medicean before the earliest of the other extant copies, i.e. in the twelfth or early in the thirteenth century? This assertion has been made, but I am not aware that it has ever been subjected to thorough criticism.³

Before leaving the Medicean Aeschylus, some prevailing mis-

¹ The derivation of all existing MSS. from one archetype, which, even if not extant, cannot be proved to be very ancient, is common to several of the greatest writers. Does it show the tyrannical authority at some epoch of one great name, in giving currency to one recension and to one only,

until the traces of all others were lost?

² Italienische Handschriften von Aeschylus.

³ See a valuable series of papers on the Medicean MS. of Aeschylus by W. Dindorf in Leutsch's *Philologus* for 1862, 3. Also the Preface to his *Lexicon Aeschyleum*.

conceptions should be removed. The Aeschylus has formed part of the same volume with the Sophocles from very early times, if we are right in tracing the hand of one of the early correctors throughout, but it is not by the same hand as the Sophocles, nor on membrane of the same quality. The Sophocles is all in one hand (not unlike that of the Ravenna Aristophanes), and is written continuously, except that there is a break before the Oedipus Coloneus (which comes last), as if this play had been copied from a different original¹. Then comes the Aeschylus, which appears to have been at one time a separate volume—first the Persae, to l. 705, in a hand resembling the Sophocles; then the rest of Aeschylus (with the lacunæ) in a totally different hand, which M. Merkel thinks earlier, and on thicker vellum; then the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius in a hand (or hands) more resembling the Sophocles again². I mention this, because the frequent reference to the Medicean as *one* MS., has tended to obscure the differences between the fortunes of the two great tragic writers.

3. The controversy really turns upon the question whether the variants of the later MSS. are *without exception* such as can be probably attributed to subsequent emendation or depravation. The common errors, let them be ever so numerous, only go to prove a common archetype. The existence of MS. 'conjectures' by no means implies that these all originated with one of the MSS. in which they are found. And one strong instance of a reading which cannot fairly be accounted for except by authentic tradition, will raise a fair presumption that others, which by themselves would not have seemed beyond the range of Byzantine conjecture, are also traditional. For, assuming for a moment the hypothesis of a lost archetype, what might we reasonably expect if it were discovered? Of

¹ The same thing happens in L.b. with the *Trachiniae*; one of several reasons for doubting the opinion of Dindorf that this MS. (with its peculiar errors) was copied *directly* from L. a.

² At the end of the Apollonius,

under a great blot, there is a colophon (in what hand I cannot say), which some one may still be able to read. I have often tried, and always with the same result, indicating the tenth of September, A.D. 1000.

course it would have all the errors which are universal in our present MSS., barring a few accidental coincidences. If it were any gain to us, it would have some new readings, which for their intrinsic excellence we should immediately adopt against all our present MSS., and it would decide, in doubtful places, which of two readings was only a recent invention. It would also, perhaps, in some instances, confirm the witness of a later MS. against that of the earliest which we have now. *But these instances would probably be very few*, because in each case the probability of the early copy having preserved the reading of the archetype would greatly preponderate over the probability of the later copy having done so. The question for us is, whether we have any grounds for supposing that even *a few* readings of the later MSS. come from an earlier source than any now existing MS. It is a question which hardly admits of demonstration, depending as it does on a delicate balance of probabilities.

α. If l. 800 of the Oedipus Tyrannus is a genuine line, then *no* MS. of Sophocles written before the middle of the fourteenth century is wholly derived from L. a. For experts are agreed that this line, of which there is otherwise no trace in L. a., was written on the margin of that MS. either late in the fourteenth or early in the fifteenth century. Is the line, then, genuine? M. Dindorf has recourse to his favourite hypothesis of interpolation. The verse was, as he believes, the invention of some scribe of the twelfth century, which found immediate and universal acceptance. It most certainly deserved it. For how natural and touching is the expression of confidence repeated before the critical disclosure! How solemn the pause before the conclusion of the line! How essential that at this point of all others Oed. should add the epithet *τριπλῆς*, and not speak vaguely of 'this (part of the?) way'! And if we assume further that a previous lacuna has thus been happily supplied, by some one who caught at least the general meaning, how strange that a line so indispensable to the context that it is universally accepted as soon as suggested should ever have been lost!

β. But there may have been more than one copy of the

Oedipus Tyrannus even when L. a. was the sole repository of the other plays. The following instances of sound readings due to later MSS. are certainly less striking than the one already mentioned, but it seems less probable that they should be due to Byzantine conjecture than to continuous tradition:— and it should be remembered that the burden of proof rests with those who assert that in the twelfth century there was only one available MS. of Sophocles:—

O. C. 945, *κᾶναγον*, Par. A. *κᾶνανδρον*, L. a.

Ant. 29, *ἄκλανστον ἄταφον*, most MSS. *ἄταφον ἄκλανστον*, L. a.

— 235, *δεδραγμένος*, Par. E., Ven. 472 mg., Aug. b. mg. *πεπραγμένος*, L. a. *πεφραγμένος*, Par. A.

— 386, *εἰς δέον*, most MSS. *εἰς μέσον*, L. a.

— 757, *κλύειν*, most MSS. *λέγειν*, L. a.

Aj. 28, *νέμει*, Par. A., Ven. 468 M². *τρέπει*, L. a.

— 205, *ὁ δεινὸς μέγας*, Ven. 468. *ὁ δεινὸς ὁ μέγας*, L. a.

— 546, *που τόνδε*, Par. A., Ven. 467, 472, M² mg. *τοῦ τόνδε*, L. a.

— 1011, *ἥδιον*, Ven. 467. *ίλέων*, L. a. *ἴδιον*, c. gl. *οἰκείον*, Ven. 472. *γρ. ἥδιον*, L. a. mg., hand of 15th century.

Phil. 220, *ναυτίλω πλάτῃ*, most MSS. *κάκ ποίας πάτρας*, L. a.

Trach. 331, *ἄλλην...λύπην*, Par. A. *λύπην...λύπην*, L. a. *λοιπὴν...λύπην*, cett.

Of a somewhat different character is the reading in

El. 1304, *δεξαίμην*, Ven. 472, Palat. Ven. 468 mg., Dresden mg. *λεξαίμην*, L. a. *βουλοίμην*, cett.

The force of some of these instances consists in their being found in the majority of MSS., others are commended by their excellence, which can hardly be due to the invention of Byzantine scribes. And the probability of this is further lessened when a reading which had rested on a single MS. is found in several.

The reading of L. a. in Phil. 220 is similar to the early variants which appear in the scholia and in the hand of the diorthotes on the mg. of L. a. The reading *ναυτίλω πλάτῃ* is extremely probable (cf. *πῶς δέ σε ναῖται | ἥγαγον* of the

Odyssey), while Nauck's conjecture *καὶ ποίας τύχης* weakens the important emphasis on *τίνας* and anticipates the question which comes more naturally a few lines below. (The conjecture however has considerable merit, esp. comparing l. 305, *πολλὰ γὰρ τάδε, κ.τ.λ.*, Philoctetes assuming that some misfortune has brought them to the isle.)

On Aj. 1011 it is important to observe the intermediate reading *ἴδιον* with the attempted explanation occurring in a MS. of the 14th century. Can the writer or the scholiast of this MS. have known of the reading *ἰλέων*? *Δεδραγμένος* in Ant. 235, though occurring in very few MSS., is manifestly right. Cf. Il. XIII. 393. It was misunderstood by one scholiast, who explains it by *νευικημένος*, while another rightly explains it by *ἀντειλημμένος*. But when once lost, could Byzantine criticism have restored it from these hints, and from the reading *πεπραγμένος*, when the more obvious *πεφραγμένος* was close at hand?

δεξαίμην is also manifestly right, and it appears from the corruption in L. a., as well as from the reading *βουλοίμην*, that the idiom, which is familiar to us from Plat. Phil., &c., was not obvious to the medieval scribes. Hence, while the appearance of *δεξαίμην* in a few MSS. may possibly be ascribed to conjecture or even to chance, it appears more *probable* that it has come down from an uncorrupted source.

γ. It remains to inquire whether the errors of the later MSS. are *without exception* such as may be most probably referred to a period subsequent to the 11th century, and to copies made from a MS. such as L. a. Many of the errors in L. a. itself are such as occur in uncial MSS. or happen in deciphering uncial characters. Are any of the mistakes of the later MSS. of this kind? The following amongst other instances deserve at least to be considered.

- ω* for *ο* and *vice versa*^{γρ. μικρόν} O. T. 200 *πυρφόρων*, Flor. Γ.
 Aj. 223 *αἶθωνος*, Flor. Γ.
 O. T. 771 *τοσοῦτῶν*, Flor. Γ.
 El. 163 *μολῶντα*, Ven. 468.
 Aj. 811 *χορῶμεν*, Ven. 468.
 „ 926 *στερεόφρον*, Ven. 472.

ω for ο and <i>vice versa</i>	Phil. 226 ἀπηγριωμένων, Flor. Γ.
θ for τ „ „ „	Aj. 805 ἀνθλίους, Ven. 468, 467, M ² . (ἀντολίους, Ven. 472). O. T. 827 καῖέτρεψε, Flor. Θ. O. T. 670 ἀποστήναι, Par. 2884. El. 1156 ταῦτ' ὁ, Ven. 468.
δ for λ „ „ „	O. T. 186 ὅμανδος, Par. 2884.
ε for ο „ „ „	Phil. 350 θανέντος, Flor. Γ. El. 205 οἶδε, Flor. Γ. El. 222 λάθοιμ', Ven. 468, Flor. Γ. Δ. El. 370 μάθεις, Flor. Δ. El. 1378 Ἐχει μοι, Ven. 468. O. T. 11 θέλοντες, Flor. Δ.
αι for ε „ „ ' „	El. 757 καίαντες, Ven. 468. Aj. 768 κατακτήσεται, Ven. 468. El. 632 θῦσαι (γρ. θῦε), Flor. Γ. O. T. 158 χρυσαίαις, Flor. Δ. O. T. 635 ἐπαισχύνεσθαι, Flor. Δ.

In one instance we have almost ocular proof that a corruption found in later MSS. already existed when L. a. was written. In Tr. 1106, L. a. has *αὐ...δηθεῖς*, the letters *θη* being faintly legible in the erasure. Paris A and others have *αὐθηδής*.

4. The recension of Triclinius, as Elmsley pointed out, was based on a previous recension, or at least on some MS. belonging to a very distinct family of MSS. which agree in certain peculiar readings. These are collected (so far as the Oed. Col. is concerned) in a valuable note of Elmsley's on l. 7 of the Oed. Col. Yet learned editors persist in attributing to Triclinius readings which existed at least a hundred years before his time. According to Bernhardt, Triclinius was the contemporary of Manuel Chrysoloras, and 'flourished' in 1397. But most of these readings are found in Ven. 616, which is attributed by experts to the 13th century, and in Vat. Palat. 293, collated by D'Orville, who assigns this MS. to the 11th century. (See his collation amongst the Dorvillian MSS. in the Bodleian Library, x. 1, 3, 6.) Before the theory of Cobet is finally accepted, it should at least be ascertained whether the

Vatican MS. of the Oed. Col. or the Medicean MS. is the earlier. It is indeed probable that L. a. is earlier by half a century, but it is not likely that so accurate a man as D'Orville should have gone wildly wrong.

5. The degree of affinity of any MS. to L. a. will be differently estimated, according to the conception critics may have formed of the general soundness of the text. Those who think a reading corrupt will regard the consensus of MSS. in that reading as indicating a common unauthentic source. Those who believe it to be genuine will regard such consensus as tending to confirm their belief.

6. On these grounds I venture to urge that this investigation is not yet closed. I do not promise that the fullest examination of the later MSS. will yield much result. But in the case of a writer like Sophocles, it is worth while to use to the utmost even the least hopeful means¹. There is no need of cumbering editions of Sophocles with absurd readings, and the MSS. of the 15th century may be neglected till the rest are used². But collations of a few MSS. of the 13th and 14th centuries with some well-known edition might be published separately, in the manner of Gaisford's *Lectiones Platonicae*. If this were done, the reader of Sophocles would be more nearly in the position of the student of Shakespeare (who has the Cambridge edition) or of Plato (who has that of Bekker). And he might then be invited to judge for himself, whether anything is to be hoped from the later MSS., or they deserve, without exception, to be entirely neglected, as mere 'apographa' of L. a.

L. CAMPBELL.

¹ An association for this purpose would be at least as useful as one for investigating the site of Troy.

² This applies with less force to the

Trachiniae and Philoctetes, of which so few copies remain, than to Aj., El., O. T., or even O. C., Ant.

NOTES ON THE AENEID.

I.

III. 482, 'Nec minus Andromache digressu maesta supremo
Fert picturatas auri subtemine vestes
Et Phrygiam Ascanio chlamydem, nec cedit honore,
Textilibusque onerat donis ac talia fatur.'

PROFESSOR CONINGTON, reading 'honori,' took 'nec cedit honori' to mean 'nor does she flag in the task of honouring him.' Heyne thinks Andromache does not yield to the liberality of her husband, Wagner that the mantle does not yield to the other presents, Henry (on second thoughts) that Ascanius does not retire from, decline, the honour. None of these interpretations seems very satisfactory, and I think the true one is still to be gathered from the line of Silius quoted in Conington's note. Speaking of Ennius he says (XII. 412) 'nec cedet honore Ascraeo famave seni.' Considering Silius' character as an imitator of Virgil, we may infer from his using 'cedet honore' that he found it (like 'Ascraeo seni') in his predecessor, as indeed we find it in several MSS., and have Servius' testimony that it was preferred by Scaurus. Heyne and Ribbeck both adopt it. We may suppose further that he used it in the same sense as Virgil, and therefore the latter must have intended Ascanius to be the subject of the sentence, and the words must mean that Ascanius is honoured as much as his father, that is to say, that the gifts given him are as valuable as those his father receives in 464 foll. The clause thus becomes closely parallel

to 'sunt et sua dona parenti' in 469. With the change of subject we may compare such constructions as

IX. 593, 'Cui Remulo cognomen erat Turnique minorem
Germanam nuper thalamo sociatus habebat;'

or VI. 284, 'quam sedem Somnia volgo
Vana tenere ferunt foliisque sub omnibus haerent.'

The change back again in what follows is certainly awkward, but this tells equally against Henry and Wagner, and in any case 'que' must mean 'both' and look forward to 'ac talia fatur.'

II.

V. 196, 'Extremos pudeat rediisse: hoc vincite, cives,
Et prohibete nefas.'

Silius (IV. 431 'primum hoc vincat, servasse parentem') perhaps understood the words to mean 'gain this point,' and Conington follows him. Others say 'overcome this disgrace and avert it.' Is it not possible Virgil meant 'vincite' to stand by itself parenthetically? Compare Ter. Ad. v. 7. 19 'tu illas abi et traduce.' Plaut. Aul. I. 2. 17 'cultrum, securim, pistillum, mortarium...fures venisse atque abstulisse dicito;' *ibid.* II. 3. 3 'vascula intus pure propera et elue.' A construction partly similar occurs Ov. Met. III. 433 'quod amas, avertere, perdes.' In Aeneid IV. 573 'praecipites vigilate viri et considite transtris,' 'praecipites' must go mainly with 'considite;' and in IX. 466 'in hastis praefigunt capita et multo clamore sequuntur Euryali et Nisi,' 'multo clamore sequuntur' seems, as Conington says, to be a parenthetical clause. Virgil would not be unwilling to use a construction which he found in Greek authors, e.g. Soph. Ant. 1279 τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις ἔοικας ἤκειν καὶ τάχ' ὄψεσθαι κακὰ, and Thuc. III. 68. 1 τὸ αὐτὸ ἕνα ἕκαστον παραγαγόντες καὶ ἐρωτῶντες. See Riddell's *Apol. of Plato*, p. 234.

III.

- x. 185, 'Non ego te, Ligurum ductor fortissime bello,
 Transierim, Cinyra, et paucis comitate Cupavo,
 Cujus olorinae surgunt de vertice pennae,
 Crimen amor vestrum, formaeque insigne paternae.
 Namque ferunt luctu Cynum Phaethontis amanti
 &c., &c.
 Filius aequalis comitatus classe catervas
 Ingentem remis Centaurum promovet.'

The fourth line is printed as it stands in Conington's text. He¹ refers 'vestrum' to Cinyras and Cupavo (whom he supposes from 'paternae' to be brothers), and adds 'this being granted, "crimen amor vestrum" can hardly refer to anything but the existence of a criminal passion between them.' This is also Heyne's view, who says 'statuere necesse est Cinyram et Cupavonem turpi se amore prosequutos esse, quo ducere videtur voc. *vestrum*.'

For the fact here supposed there is not the least external evidence. Ovid speaks of Cynus and Phaethon, but he makes no allusion to Cynus' sons. We have therefore only the lines themselves to go by, and in them we find that the whole story rests on the one word 'vestrum.' Cinyras and Cupavo are not spoken of as brothers, and the single 'filius' of 194 is an acknowledged difficulty. Why, too, does only one brother bear the swan's plumes²? It is strange that Virgil should give five lines to the father and make only an obscure allusion in three words to the story of the sons: still stranger that the two stories should be mixed up as on this hypothesis they are, 'cujus olorinae,' &c. referring to the first, 'crimen amor vestrum' to the second, and 'formaeque &c.,' with the narrative to the first again. But the greatest objection is perhaps to be found

¹ I refer to Prof. Conington because it is impossible to discriminate his share and that of Mr. Nettleship in this part of their commentary.

² Conington increases the difficulty

by referring 'cujus' to Cinyras. Contrast the way in which two brothers are made equally prominent in vii. 670 foll.

in the connection of the two parts of this line, for it cannot be denied that thus interpreted it makes either deplorable syntax or deplorable sense¹, and is by no means in Virgil's manner. These are serious difficulties and may well make us pause, before we allow the character of two captains to be blasted by a possessive pronoun.

There is, however, another way of explaining the words which has not been without advocates, as Brunck, Schrader, and Sprengel seem all to have preferred it, and more recently both Ribbeck and Madvig have adopted it. On this theory 'Amor' is the vocative, 'vestrum' referring to Love and his mother Venus, while 'crimen' and 'insigne' are in apposition to 'pennae.' It will be observed in the first place that this removes all difficulties of syntax. 'Insigne' stands naturally in apposition, just as it does in VII. 659 'clipeoque insigne paternum' 'Centum angues cinctamque gerit serpentibus hydram,' and VIII. 683 'cui, belli insigne superbum, Tempora navali fulgent rostrata 'corona', and as 'specimen' does in XII. 164 'cui tempora 'circum Aurati bis sex radii fulgentia cingunt, Solis avi specimen.' But by the usage of the poets 'crimen' also stands in natural apposition to 'pennae,' and in shewing this I will begin with an instance which seems particularly relevant. Propertius in I. II. 30 writes 'ah pereant Baiae, crimen amoris, aquae,' which I understand to mean either that the waters of Baiae are a standing accusation against Love and a reproach to him, or that they are, poetically speaking, his guilt, 'crimen' being used not only of actual guilt but also of anything in connection with which a man is guilty, anything towards which he stands in a guilty relation. The latter seems to be its meaning in such places as Ov. Her. IV. 58 'enixa est utero crimen onusque suo;' M. III. 268 'concepit—id deerat—manifestaque crimina pleno Fert utero;' and ibid. X. 470, though it is impossible to say for

¹ 'Love was your joint crime; for love you wear the cognizance of your father's form,' is the rendering in Conington's prose translation.

² 'Insigne' here may be the accusative on the Greek model. It is re-

markable and can hardly be accidental, that in the seven or eight places where Virgil puts a word in apposition to a sentence he always uses a neuter noun. Other writers were not so nice.

certain¹. Mr Paley's explanation that '*crimen amoris*' means 'of which love has so often had to complain,' seems to me less probable, when we compare the other passages in which '*crimen*' is similarly placed. But the special importance to us of these words is in the '*amoris*' or '*Amoris*,' because thus explained it gives exactly the same expression as '*crimen Amor vestrum*,' only omitting *Venus*, and it is perhaps not extravagant to suppose that one line may have arisen from the other. It is not indeed likely that Propertius imitated Virgil, because this poem must have been written not long after the *Aeneid* was begun, but I see no improbability in the idea that Virgil may have imitated him², especially as the phrase recurs in III. 22. 24 '*hoc si crimen erit, crimen Amoris erit*,' where it may be noticed that Mr Paley's former explanation will not fit. But however this may be, the similarity of phrase seems an argument for similarity of meaning. Before leaving Propertius I may compare IV. 19. 15 '*crimen et illa fuit patria succensa senecta*,' where Paley again makes '*crimen*' = '*criminosus*,' though the sense seems rather that to womankind Myrrha will be a reproach or accusation (personified in '*testis*' 11 and 13: cf. '*objicitur*' in the first line), and III. 20. 2 '*Tam formosa tuum mortua crimen erit*.'

We come next to a passage in the *Metamorphoses* which may also be thought to shew traces of connection with Virgil's line, and, though they are very faint, no one who has observed Virgil's influence on Ovid³ will find it very unlikely that the disciple was here thinking of his master. The lines run '*perdix...unica tunc volucris, nec visa prioribus annis, Factaque nuper avis, longum tibi, Daedale, crimen. Namque huic tradiderat*,' &c., and the resemblance to Virgil's words lies first in

¹ Cf. '*facinus*' for a cup of poison in *Ov. Met.* VII. 423.

² This may be the true history of '*Oricia terebenthos*,' *Aen.* x. 126: *Prop.* IV. 749: see Mr Paley's preface (1872), note 3. Teuffel in his *Hist. of Roman Literature* (transl. by Wagner, p. 415) says, 'An allusion to *Aen.* VI. 287 sq. occurs in Horace (*O.* II. 17, 17 sq. per-

haps in the year 727), who may therefore be supposed to have known this part beforehand,' but the passages are far from bearing him out.

³ Ovid's lines on *Cygnus* (*Met.* II. 367 foll.) contain two allusions to this passage, '*silvamque sororibus auctam*,' and '*canas...plumae*.'

the vocative 'Daedale' and then in the explanation beginning 'namque.'

We find a parallel use of 'crimen' in Ov. Met. vi. 131 'et rupit pictas, caelestia crimina, vestes,' ibid. x. 197 'videoque tuum, mea crimina, volnus : ' Her. ix. 53 'una, recens crimen, praefertur adultera nobis : ' Am. ii. 18. 37 'et Paris est illic et adultera, nobile crimen : ' Tr. i. 7. 21 'vel quod eram Musas, ut crimina nostra, perosus : ' also in Lucan v. 59 'Fortunae, Ptolemaee, pudor crimenque deorum,' which Forcellini explains 'propter quem Dii incusantur.' Compare ibid. vii. 112 'Pompeii nec crimen erit nec gloria bellum.'

It will be allowed that these passages make it easy to refer 'crimen' to 'pennae.' Turning now to 'vestrum,' we find at least four places in the Aeneid (i. 140; ix. 257, 525; xi. 687) where it is used thus in addressing one person, and this may very well make a fifth. Perhaps the most closely analogous use is in the Aetna 586 'tam nobile sidus, Erigone, sedes vestra est,' where 'vestra' refers to the virgin and her father, and, according to Mr Munro, the dog. For the 'socium regnum' (Ov. Met. v. 378) of Venus and Cupid we need not look further than their conspiracy against Dido in the first book.

The whole passage will therefore mean 'with swan's feathers rising from his head, your reproach, O Love, and your mother's, and the emblem of his father's form¹.'

Cinyras, however, is still a difficulty, for though we give up his special connection with Cupavo, it is still rather strange that he should be so hurried over. After 'non ego te' &c. we expect to have perhaps as many lines about him as are given in vii. 733 to Oebalus, ushered in by 'nec tu carminibus nostris indictus abibis.' Heyne mentions a 'vir doctus, qui omne

¹ A very apposite passage occurs in the sixth chapter of Redgauntlet: 'the cause of his mother's death and the evidence of his father's guilt was stamped on the innocent face of the babe, whose brow was distinctly marked by the miniature resemblance of a horseshoe.' Ariosto's words (O. F. 13. 4) deserve also to be quoted :—

'Isabella son io, che figlia fui
Del re mal fortunato di Gallizia:
Ben dissi fui : ch' or non son più di lui
Ma di dolor, d' affanno, e di mestizia :
Colpa d' amor: ch' io non saprei di cui
Dolermi più, che della sua nequizia—'
where 'colpa' is in apposition like 'crimen' here.

'vitium in verbis *Cinyra et* quaerit et relinquit.' Prof. Madvig, who in the second volume of his *Adversaria*, takes the same view of 'crimen Amor vestrum' as I have done, and regards any other as absurd, also suspects a corruption, and proposes to read 'sine re et paucis comitate Cupavo.' The MSS. referred to by Conington have *Cinyrae*, *Cinera*, *Cumane*, *Cinire*, *Cinere*, *Cinyre*; and two quoted by Heyne have 'Cygnae,' another 'tacite.' Servius' note (a note, however, not found in all the editions: such are the perplexities of this passage) is 'Cycne. Cunare. Quidam duci nomen datum tradunt a Cunaro monte 'qui in Piceno.' Now, if Servius read 'Cunare,' there seems to be some difficulty about altering it to 'sine re.' How could so great a corruption have crept into the text so early? and how could the original reading have been wholly lost? Considering how familiar the Romans were with Virgil, it seems possible only on one hypothesis. If Virgil wrote 'sine re,' it must have been his original editors who corrupted it into a proper name¹.

There are, however, curious traces of another reading. Servius' words, as given above, seem to be a note on the word 'Cycne,' and it was the common reading in old editions. We have also some reference to this passage in the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius. He says (v. 15) that Virgil 'nullum in commemorandis regionibus ordinem servat, sed locorum seriem saltibus lacerat,' and after giving some instances from this catalogue, adds 'hinc rapit illum *Cinirus* ad Liguriam, *Ocnus Mantuam*.' Later in the same chapter he says, '*Astur* itemque *Cupavo* et *Cinirus* insignes *Cycni Phaethontisque* fabulis nullam pugnae operam praestant.' But in both these places there is some MS. authority, though not much, for 'Cycnus' instead of 'Cinirus.' It must be observed also that in the second passage he speaks of both leaders as connected with Cycnus the friend of Phaethon; but if this indicates brotherhood it has still nothing to do with the story alluded to in the former part of this article. 'Cycne' is of course still farther removed from 'sine re' than 'Cinyra' or any cognate form. If there were only better

¹ Some similar corruptions are given by Madvig in his first volume, p. 150 foll., but all appear to be post-classical.

authority for the former, the conjecture might perhaps be admissible that Virgil wrote 'Cycni paucis comitate Cupavo,' on the same model as 'Scyllam Nisi' (E. vi. 74), 'Lycaonis Arcton' (G. i. 138), and 'Ajacis Oilei' (A. i. 41), or Livy's 'Hasdrubalem Gisgonis' (xxv. 37. 8); but as the evidence stands, there seems no adequate reason for changing 'Cinyra' or 'Cinire.' It may be remarked that in Homer's Catalogue there are many instances of two or more captains being named together, sometimes brothers, sometimes not. Virgil joins father and son in vii. 648—9, and two brothers in vii. 670; but, unless he has done so here, he has nowhere followed Homer in joining together two who are not related to each other. An *a priori* argument like this has very little weight, but ought perhaps to be mentioned. As for the omission of 'aut te' before Cupavo, which Madvig makes a point of, is it more remarkable than vii. 685 'quos dives Anagnia pascit, quos, Amasene pater,' even if there we read 'pascis'?

HERBERT RICHARDS.

AULUS PERSIUS FLACCUS.

MR CONINGTON'S edition of this author is worthy of his reputation. With its Prefatory Lecture, its easy translation, and notes of his wonted clearness and research, it is a model of completeness. I venture to sift and supplement some of its points: and in some places to compare with it Mr Pretor's work in the *Catena Classicorum*. Mr Pretor contrasts generally in his treatment of debateable subjects with Mr Conington, and follows the older school, but contributes also suggestions independent and new.

Sat. I. 5. NON SIQUID TURBIDA ROMA

ELEVET ACCEDAS ... NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.

Both editors affirm here that 'NON is for NE, though the usage is blamed as a solecism by Quintilian.' The accuracy of the statement is questionable. If true, NE might stand in the place of NON: nor is it clear why Persius went out of his way to commit the solecism; he could not plead exigency of metre as Juvenal might in S. xv. 89. But in reality NON ACCEDAS is better Latin than NE ACCEDAS. In spite of Madvig's authority (see his *Opuscula*, Vol. II. p. 105, and his rule summarised and qualified in my note on Horace, C. I. 33. 1) it is not sufficiently observed that the second singular of the present conjunctive is not properly used, either with or without the negative particle, in an imperative sense. In Hor. C. I. 3. 7 REDDAS is not = REDDE, but dependent on PRECOR, as is well shown in Lord Lytton's note. Madvig l.c. shows that VENIAS is not = VENI, but that Latinity requires FAC VENIAS or CURA UT VENIAS. If the sentence is negative NON will be more correct than NE, unless

taken dependently. NON SILEAS is right (Hor. S. II. 5. 91); NE DOLEAS, Hor. C. I. 33. 1, NE FORTE CREDAS, IV. 9. 1, are dependent in construction. Persius breaks the rule once (3. 96), where, however, he borrows a phrase from Horace, and cannot therefore be accused of negligence or post-Augustan licence; it may be that in each case the conjunctive NE SIS is to be understood inferentially and in connection with the preceding clause.

This point seems overlooked in the reference made to Quintilian, a reference made by Jahn, and in Conington's note also on Virg. Geor. I. 456.

Quintilian (I. 5. 50) protests against saying 'PRO ILLO *ne feceris, non feceris.*' Madvig observes that he does not say FACIAS but FECERIS. Probably he had in his mind Cicero's well-known example HOC FACITO, HOC NE FECERIS; but at all events his simple meaning is that NON is not to be used for NE in an imperative sense; and his rule is condemnatory of NON ACCEDE, NON ACCESSERIS; but not of NON ACCEDAS. How then is this use of NON to be accounted for or explained? Wagner has an elaborate note on Virg. Æn. XII. 78, to show that NON is the fitting particle to be used '*in distinguendis oppositis et contrariis,*' and his principle is undeniable, though perhaps exception may be taken to some of his instances. Thus in Ovid, ex Pont. I. 2. 103, it would be simpler to say that NON is only put with PETITO by a trajection, that it really belongs not to the imperative verb but to the governed clause, UT BENE SIT. So in Virg. Geor. I. 456, NON is inseparable from ILLA. Thus again the application of his principle to Horace's NON ETIAM SILEAS is strained; Obbar is a better interpreter in such a passage. His note on NON ULCERET, Hor. Ep. I. 18. 72, is as follows: "LENIOR ADHORTATIO ET VELUTI OPTANTIS NON JUBENTIS, UT PLERIQUE DICUNT, EST, ID QUOD RECTE OBSERVASSE Heindorfius ad Sat. II. 5, 91, et Dissen ad Tib. II. 1. 10, MIHI QUIDEM VIDENTUR." In other words, NON with the conjunctive present signifies not direct or authoritative prohibition, but general opposition, remonstrance, or counter-declaration: thus, NON ACCEDAS would be nearly οὐ δεῖ προσελθεῖν, NE ACCESSERIS = μὴ προσέλθης. And NON DUBITES in Sat. V. 45, is

correctly translated by Pretor, *you cannot doubt*, and by Conington, *I would not have you doubt*.

This discussion however, though invited by the commentary, is perhaps not pertinent to the line at all. NON SI ELEVE ET ACCEDAS is of the same stamp as NON SI ME SATIS AUDIAS SPERES, Hor. C. I. 13. 13; NON SI SOLVAS INVENIAS, Ib. Sat. I. 4. 60; NEC SI CERTES CONCEDAT, Virg. Ecl. II. 57. The sentence is in a conditional form, its first clauses containing a general proposition, its final one (NE QUÆSIVERIS) a particular precept. Thus, 'you would (= should) not go out of your way, if public fashion decries a thing, to notice it or test the silly standard it sets up; and (as you would not do this, so) consult no judgment but your own.'

7. TE Q. EXTRA.

It is disputed whether EXTRA is adverb or preposition: the like question is raised on Horace C. III. 19. 15, TRIS PROHIBET SUPRA.

13. NUMEROS ILLE HIC PEDE LIBER.

The difficulty raised by C. as to translating 'one verse and another prose' is considerable. We can hardly suppose Persius to mean the school declamations or essays mentioned by Juvenal, I. 16, as a preparatory training: nor again does it appear that the recitations, fashionable at Rome, were ever of prose pieces. Again it is rare to find NUMERUS used of poetry as contrasted with prose. There are two instances in Ovid Pont. IV. 2. On the other hand, the word is used of prose as well as poetry by Cicero Orat. 188. 190, NUMERIS ASTRIC TAM ORATIONEM ESSE DEBERE, CARERE VERSIBUS: and IN SOLUTIS ETIAM VERBIS INESSE NUMEROS. Again PEDE LIBER has a suspicious likeness to the NON ELABORATUM PEDEM of Anacreon's style, Hor. Epod. XIV. 12. If LIBER could be = LIBERIOR; and NUMEROS rendered after the analogy of NUMERIS ET ARTE, Hor. Ep. II. 1. 261, and Ovid's NUMEROSUS HORATIUS; the contrast expressed here *might* be that between a finished and a careless style; regard to harmony or the want of it being overlooked by writers aiming at GRANDE ALIQUID.

14. GRANDE.

Illustrations of this word might come from Horace. But, as bearing on the preceding note, compare Cic. Orat. 192, JUDICAT HEROUM NUMERUM (= the Epic rhythm) GRANDI-OREM QUAM DESIDERET SOLUTA ORATIO.

23. CUTE PERDITUS.

Can this be *unblushing*? CUTE = FRONTE? So P. C. renders *bursting*. Judging by the use of CUTE CURATA for smartness and show, this opposite phrase should mean *worn-out age*.

40. VIOLÆ.

‘And from her fair and unpolluted flesh
May violets spring.’

Shakesp. Hamlet, ACT V. Sc. 1.

(Is there any link between these two parallels of poetry?)

53. LECTIS CITREIS.

couches of citron, C. And so he renders also SUB TRABE CITREA, Hor. C. IV. 1. 20, ‘neath citron roof.

Is not this a confusion of terms? Is *citron* anything else than the Asiatic fruit tree, MALUS MEDICA? But the CITRUS so highly prized at Rome was an African wood; identified by Pliny with the *θύον*. See Plin. XIII. 29 and the Delphin notes: and Mayor on Juv. I. 137.

60. SITIAT.

There is a like, even greater, condensation of phrase in Hor. C. I. 16. 8, SIC GEMINANT ÆRA.

66. DERIGAT.

So C. reads, but quotes no authority. It is entered among my V. L. on Horace, C. IV. 9. 18, as the probably correct form. I find DERECTO in Cic. De Div. II. 127, ed. Baiter.

98. LAXA CERVICE.

with a gentle bend, C. without straining my throat, P.

The expression really is the opposite of v. 14. It means 'without effort' or perhaps 'affecting an absence of effort,' *i. e.* in a languishing mode.

118. EXCUSO NASO.

C. follows Jahn in interpreting this = *emuncto*. But Pretor is surely right in taking it in the sense of '*smooth, unwrinkled*.' It is the opposite of NASO SUSPENDERE ADUNCO (Hor. S. I. 6. 5), and signifies the power of satirising without seeming or being felt to do so. Gifford's note on the word is as good as his version of the lines themselves.

SATIRE II.

12. The distinction quoted in C's note is pithily given by Orelli (Hor. S. II. 6. 10), *Mercurius apertis lucris...præerat, sic Hercules opertis*.

14. DUCITUR.

There should be no doubt as to this reading. CONDITUR, as C. remarks, is a less expressive word: it would signify the success of the usurer's schemes, DUCITUR expresses both their success and continuance.

74. C's note is misprinted. The stop after IMBUTUM is omitted. As illustrative of INCOCTUM, cf. Hor. S. II. 8. 58, INCOQUERE; a passage which I could fancy suggested to C. his version 'racy flavour of nobleness': unless indeed he found it in GENEROSO, applied as it is by Horace (E. I. 15. 18) to wine, and adopted in our familiar phrase '*generous wine*.' Really however, the adjective, as I think, contains and points the idea of v. 72, viz.: the contrast of transmitted and true nobility, and might be rendered '*ennobling*,' that which belongs to or confers true greatness.

SATIRE III.

3. DESPUMARE = COQUERE, *to digest*, C. This, though correct in result, tends to confuse terms. Virgil, G. I. 295, gives

the exact meaning: VULCANO DECOQUIT HUMOREM, throws out the steam by boiling and then FOLIIS UNDAM DESPUMAT, clears off the effervescence. And so C. well translates 'to carry off the fumes.' Cic. 2 Phil. 30 uses EXALARE nearly synonymously.

8. Jahn, quoted by C., notes a common inconsistency, viz.: that busy men are methodical and in no hurry, it is the idle who are hurried and hasty.

9. The text is not easy to determine. But if FINDITUR is adopted, would it not be better to refer it, with P., to the angry man himself, than with C. to BILIS. FINDIMUR would accord well with v. 3, STERTIMUS, and v. 12, 14, QUERIMUR, which C. reads with Hermann for QUERITUR though he translates otherwise.

MEMBRANA, C. supposes this a hit at the youth's luxury, in using parchment for ordinary writing. P. explains the word as = a parchment wrapper to hold the loose sheets.

I venture to doubt both explanations, and rather understand that the student will have all his materials at once; his CHARTÆ for the foul copies or rough notes, the MEMBRANA for the fair copies.

Cp. Hor. S. II. 3. 2, MEMBRANAM POSCAS; and A. P. 389, MEMBRANIS INTUS POSITIS; where it is usual, and seems necessary, to understand the word of the material on which the work to be revised, or that to be published, was written.

23. PROPERANDUS...FINGENDUS = propere fingendus, C.

Do we not lose something by this proposed hendiadys? PROPERO has a substantial force of its own, inculcating energy, rapidity, opposed to the listless temper. And FINGENDUS may then comprise the effect.

For comparison of words see Hor. C. III. 24. 54,

TENERÆ NIMIS MENTES ... FORMANDÆ STUDIIS.

29. CENSOREMVE TUUM VEL QUOD TRABEATE SALUTAS?

The doubt as to TUUM and the difficulties of VE, VEL are best met in P's note. "CENSOREM TUUM and TRABEATE convey

two separate ideas, and VE and VEL are both required to couple them: 'because you have a censor in your family or are yourself a knight of distinction.'

C's explanation of TUUM, that "if CENSOREM is understood of Rome it will imply that the youth is related to the Emperor," comes round to the same meaning, since the Emperors absorbed the Censura to themselves: but he does not explain the repetition of the particles except as a tautology.

33. CARET CULPA, i.e. he is beyond (the reach of) reproach.

The state implied is one of hopeless, remediless insensibility. The next clause (NESCIT Q. PERDAT) serves in part to define it, and then suggests, while it finds its climax in, the vivid realism of v. 38; the most marvellous personification, I suppose, to be found in the remains of classic antiquity. The *idéai* of Plato, or the suggestion in the Phædo of the shadows in which we live, compared with the purer brighter sphere attainable by the wise, may be held perhaps logically to contain in substance the same thought; and the Stoic notion of Virtue, and Cicero's personification of Happiness, are striking: but Persius stands alone in his ideal of a personal goodness in perfect beauty; of men admitted to a momentary glimpse of it and withering at the thoughts of what, in their selfish tyranny, they had lost.

66. DISCITE O MISERI.

This hiatus P. does not notice, C. compares it to Horace's MALE OMINATIS, C. III. 14. 11, but surely without reason. Horace's usage is defensible as a quasi-compound, and by the precedent of Catullus in SUAVEOLENS; not otherwise. At best the reading of it is debateable. But it has no bearing on such a non-elision as is accepted by editors in this line. It is strange that so few have acknowledged the manifest corruption, or seen their way to the easy correction, IO MISERI. Io may be used as equivalent to O in a simple appeal; but the change of construction and address in v. 63 sqq. indicates that the

moralist is summoning a circle of listeners : DISCITE IO is parallel to (Hor. S. II. 3. 80)

huc propius me
Dum doceo insanire omnes vos ordine adite.

It is no objection to this view, that he comes again to his first point (v. 71) and to the pupil whose indifference made him turn for a moment to the multitude. (Since writing the above I have perceived that Maclean defends and adopts IO.)

SATIRE IV.

43. Compare Cicero's SIC VIVITUR, *Ep. ad Fam.* II. 15.

49. The question whether Nero is directly aimed at in this Satire is *adhuc sub judice*. Our editors espouse the different sides; wherein while I have no hesitation in preferring C's view of the Prologue, much weight must be given to P's view of this passage. I do not observe that any editor insists on the relation of v. 49 to the preceding: if with C. we simply understand it of usury, it is in meaning identical with or a continuance of v. 47, and yet separated from it by a fresh and different charge. The order of ideas is broken. If with P. we suppose Nero intended, there is a natural sequence: 1 avarice, 2 debauchery, 3 ruffian outrage. PUTEAL is, at first sight, in favour of the other interpretation: but it may well be taken for the Forum, and especially if we suppose the three accusations not alternative but accumulated. The covetous profligate in his wild frolic would resort to the Exchange as a well-known haunt, and half in bravado, half perhaps in anger at being fleeced, sweep the scene of NEGOTIA clear with his rioters.

The idea involved in CAUTUS, and the literal interpretation of FLAGELLAS, may be additionally supported by the description of a like supposed scene in Juvenal S. III., especially v. 278:

EBRIUS AC PETULANS QUI NULLUM FORTE CECIDIT,

and v. 284, which implies the care taken for impunity in such assaults.

But of the metaphor which applies FLĀGELLAS to usurious dealing there is no other instance. A *scourge* may be a poetic emblem of reproach (e.g. VERBERA LINGUÆ) or of imperious sway as in Juv. x. 109, but hardly of a grasping spirit in business or, as Jahn suggests, in lawsuits.

One real difficulty attaches to the literal sense; viz.: that these vices are supposed to be CÆCA VULNERA (v. 44), vices which a self-deceiver may ignore in himself, and in spite of which he may seek for approbation. Still society excuses much in its favourites, and not only in Rome or Athens have such RIXÆ PROTERVÆ sometimes passed as venial.

SATIRE V.

14—17. VERBA TOGÆ.....LUDO.

The best elucidation of these three lines is to be found in Frere's essay, first printed with the introduction to Gifford's translation of Juvenal and Persius. I am surprised that it is not noticed or made use of by our editors. C. in his Preface (p. xxxi.) has an ingenious theory to account for the seemingly non-natural style of Persius; but these lines, rightly interpreted, are probably the truer key; the poet's mannerism represents the fanciful inflated taste of the day. "VERBA TOGÆ must have signified the language of good society at Rome."

The difficulty of the last clause, INGENUO DEFIGERE LUDO, may be seen in the contrariety of explanations given. Frere simply and excellently shows it to be a Circus metaphor, qualified by the adj. INGENUUS.

33. JAM CANDIDUS, 'yet unsullied,' C. There seems some slip here. JAM is not = ADHUC. P. rightly explains "JAM C. as contrasted with the prætexta."

Shilleto (Thucyd. i. 126. 6) has a note on the confusion of ἔτι and πω.

98, 99. These lines are equivocal in their wording. I take CONTINET to mean *withholds*, TENEAT *attains*, i.e. compasses. *Natural law withholds from weak ignorance the right of reaching*

(heights of) *action impossible to it*. TENEO is thus used as in the common TENEO COLLEM, PORTUM. And this I believe to be Jahn's way, though C. and P. understand him differently.

If we consider the context, vv. 97, 99 seem to bring out the notions of *may* and *can*. NE LICEAT (v. 97) refers back to LICET (v. 87). *Reason takes away that LICET. You MAY not do what you will only spoil, you cannot do (adds Nature) what is above your capacity.*

150. The variety of reading here is to be noticed. P. follows, with Jahn, the common reading. C. reads PERAGANT AVIDO SUDORE, but his notes are at variance with the text.

175. FESTUCA ... JACTAT. C. has thrown a new light on this line.

SATIRE VI.

39. MARIS EXPERS, '*unpickled*,' C. What does it mean?

There should be no doubt that P. is right in holding to Casaubon's interpretation of *emasculate*; but he would have done better in the conclusion of his note if he had fairly looked Horace's verse in the face, and seen consequently that Persius was not only reproducing his language, but his meaning. MARIS is in both authors the genitive, not of MARE, but of MAS. I may refer to my note on the line to show the simplicity and suitableness of so deriving it. The ingenuity of the Horatian scholiasts is very great. I will conclude by citing an example to show that those of Persius are not far behind. The Sch. on Pers. S. iv. 49 is, "Puteal dictum est quod ibi debitor creditori dans bona sua tanquam in puteum mittat."

J. E. YONGE.

CICERO DE NATURA DEORUM.

SINCE the edition of Davies, which appeared in the year 1718 at Cambridge, all subsequent editors of this treatise have been led into an error of which Davies himself was the cause, by the careless way in which he speaks of the corrections in a printed copy of Cicero's works (the one by Robertus Stephanus at Paris, in 1539), as though they were two manuscripts which existed at Ely. Any one who carefully reads his preface to his edition of the *de N. D.* will see that what he did collate was the edition of R. Stephanus before mentioned, a copy of which was lent or given to him by Bishop More of Ely, which contained marginal corrections by two hands, being the readings of two codices, and these corrections, according to the codex they are derived from, he calls codices *Elienses* 1 and 2. This is evident also from his preface to his edition of the *De Legibus*, where he says, "*Eliens. varias Lectiones significat quas ex Msto quodam vir doctus editioni Roberti Stephani A.D. MDXXXIX. adlevit. Iste codex quantum judicare datur non magnam prae se tulit vetustatem.*" This therefore is the *cod. El. 2*, of the *de N. D.* He calls these two codices "*optimi*" in his preface to the edition of the *de N. D.*, but he had no means of judging of their date or worth, and moreover he does not sufficiently distinguish between them. For example, in *i. 15. 39*, Davies gives "*vim*" as the reading of "*MS. Eliensis*," in place of the usual "*umbram*" for which I propose to read "*ueritatem*," and since writing this I see that Heindorf is only restrained by his respect for the so-called "*Cod. El.*" from doing the same. I may just remark here that I believe the true reading in that passage to be, "*tum fatalem necessitatem et ueritatem rerum futurarum*," slightly transposing the order (and transpositions are most frequent in the MSS. and early editions of this treatise), and comparing *sect. 40*, "*candemque fatalem necessitatem appellat sempiternam rerum futurarum ueritatem.*"

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